# Wiki Doc Wake Round Four

# 1NC

### Racial Capitalism K---1NC

#### Anti-trust against big tech is a ruse to restore capitalist competition and impose American ideology on the Global South.

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In July, the CEOs of Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon appeared before Congress in an “historic” antitrust hearing. The event was met with great fanfare from the press. In early October, the United States House Judiciary Committee published a 450-page report criticising the anti-competitive business practices of the four giants and recommending new measures to “restore competition” to the market.

Mainstream “tech critics” across the political spectrum of the so-called “techlash” are celebrating this antitrust agenda led by the US Congress and the intellectuals informing the hearings. They see nothing wrong with the American legal system reshaping corporations that dominate markets outside US borders. After all, they accept the notion that the US “owns” the world and see capitalism as the only system imaginable.

For them, the reformist goal to “restore” a “capitalism for the people” is seen as the proper way to fix Big Tech. The Americans are joined by European power elites, who are seeking to curb the dominance of Big Tech as part of an effort to increase market share for European companies.

Yet the solution to American Big Tech corporations dominating markets across the world cannot come from the American or European pro-capital legal systems. Rather, it has to be a collective effort by the international community, focused on bottom-first redistribution for the Global South, as part of a global transformation towards a sustainable green economy.

The new progressives and neo-Brandeisian antitrust

To understand Big Tech antitrust in the US, we need to understand its origins. The movement was spearheaded by a group of US legal scholars, sometimes called the neo-Brandeisians, named after Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis (1856-1941).

As a young lawyer and legal scholar, Brandeis focused on social justice issues and financial power. As corporations restricted competition through “trusts”, he became concerned with how monopoly power could undermine democracy and harm society. His work inspired “antitrust” legislation banning unfair business practices in the US.

Decades later, in the 1970s, a conservative group of legal scholars sought to restrict the scope of antitrust in the US. These neoliberals of the Chicago School, led by legal scholar Robert Bork, argued that antitrust should be narrowly concerned with economic efficiency, largely measured by lower prices for consumers. Inspired by the likes of Bork, US courts began ruling that “consumer welfare”, rather than broad concerns about democracy and power, should be the focus of antitrust.

Over the past few years, neo-Brandeisian scholars dug into legal history and argued, correctly, that the neoliberal antitrust framework does not work for Big Tech. Its business model cannot always be measured by the price that consumers pay for a firm’s product (eg Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are “free”), and broader concerns around democracy and equality should inform antitrust. In order to fix Big Tech, they insist, we need to think broadly about antitrust and antimonopoly, much like Louis Brandeis did a century ago.

While this all sounds great, a closer look at what neo-Brandesians offer reveals two significant problems with it: one, they want the US to legislate for a problem that concerns the whole world; two, they still insist on a capitalist solution which is incompatible with notions of global social justice and environmental protection.

Big Tech is global

Neo-Brandeisian scholars intend to restructure Big Tech within a framework of US law, spearheaded by US thinkers. However, the firms they want to regulate have a global reach that harms people outside of the US as well.

In fact, the central business model of Big Tech is digital colonialism. Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft (GAFAM) are worth more than $5 trillion in total and much of it is profit coming from abroad

For example, less than half of Facebook’s revenues come from the US and Canada, while nine of its top 10 user bases are from Global South countries, totalling 957 million users. The US, by comparison, has 190 million users.

Most revenue for Apple and Google comes from outside the US as well, and almost half of Microsoft’s revenue comes from abroad. A large majority of Amazon’s total revenue comes from its US operations, but it is expanding globally, and its Amazon Web Services dominate the global cloud market.

If we zoom in on individual countries, the scale of the problem becomes even clearer. A small country may provide a tiny fraction of GAFAM’s revenue, but the giants still capture a large share of various markets in that country. For example, in South Africa, Google controls 70 percent of local online advertising, and social media – led by Facebook – another 12 percent. South Africa’s largest media groups take just 8 percent of the pie

Some 84 percent of smartphones in South Africa use Google Android operating systems, while 15 percent – Apple; 72 percent of desktop computers have Microsoft Windows, while 17 percent – Apple. Other products and services, such as e-hailing, streaming entertainment, search, cloud and office suites are also dominated by American firms. This dynamic repeats throughout the world.

US tech reformers have little to say about the global nature of US tech transnationals, or about why laws regulated by the US government should reshape the core structure of global behemoths. Most of them also no longer discuss how the partnership between the National Security Agency and Big Tech promotes American military imperial interests outside of the US.

The best neo-Brandeisian scholars can argue is that their proposals would weaken the stranglehold of the Silicon Valley beyond US borders. But this is not enough to resolve the problem and does nothing to address the looming environmental catastrophe we are facing.

‘Kinder capitalism’ does not work

US tech reformers assume that market competition – supplemented by new privacy laws, public utility regulation, and some publicly subsidised, non-profit alternatives – is the solution to the power of monopoly. However, they do not address the problem of how private property in a capitalist marketplace creates inequality in the first place. Would “competitive markets” really benefit the Global South?

Competition means beating other people out, and poorer people and nations are naturally disadvantaged in such a competition.

After “restoring competition” to the tech economy, those who will dominate as “new market entrants” on the “open” internet will still be companies from richer countries: the US, European powers, China, etc, not low-income countries like Zimbabwe, Bolivia or Cambodia. And within low-income countries, the well-resourced classes will capture any new market opportunities that an antitrust push in the US may open.

Indeed, reformers assume we can restore “competitive capitalism” while we are staring at the abyss of permanent environmental destruction. Proponents of capitalism maintain that we can grow our way to poverty alleviation and innovate to stop climate change and environmental degradation. But estimates show that under the growth model of the past few decades, the global economy would require a 175-fold increase in global consumption and production just to bring billions of poor people up to a meagre $5 per day. And in the process, we would most definitely destroy the environment.

Degrowth researchers have demonstrated that capitalism is fatally flawed. A capitalist economy focuses on profit and growth, which increases greenhouse gas emissions overheating the planet and leads to over-extraction of material resources, which results in ecological collapses.

The richest nations are dependent on material extraction from the poorest. High-income countries have the worst material footprint, with a consumption level of about 26 tonnes per person per year, when the sustainable level is about eight tonnes per person globally. Low-income countries consume about two tonnes per person per year.

The Big Tech industry contributes to environmental destruction in several ways. E-waste now accounts for five percent of all global waste, and it is growing, in large part because gadgets are built with short lifespans. Instead of designing products that can last a long time, Big Tech has lobbied to kill “right to repair” laws, which would allow consumers to get their devices repaired or buy spare parts from third parties.

What is more, Big Tech directly contributes to inequality by extracting wealth from the poor and concentrating in the hands of a few US-based executives, shareholders and highly paid professionals. At the same time, it exploits workers and often denies them safe and dignified working conditions.

Digital capitalists also encourage consumerism through ads and monetise surveillance, which is destroying privacy, with grave consequences for civil rights and liberties.

Private ownership of the means of computation – software code, infrastructure and the internet – is required to extract money for content, force ads on audiences and spy on users. If the people own and control the digital environment, they would opt to share knowledge freely, reject ads and protect their privacy.

Solutions: Tech for Extinction Rebellion

It goes without saying that any solution for the digital economy must be part and parcel of a sustainable green economy. This, in turn, requires rapid wealth and income redistribution and degrowth. It is a monumental task.

Fortunately, there are some reasonable ways forward.

First, we can phase out copyright paywalls and patents. Such a move would enjoy the support of activists in the Global South and Global North, and would make the world’s scientific and cultural knowledge available to all people, irrespective of their ability to pay. Of course, equitable information sharing and generation also requires resources to bridge the digital divide and make use of scientific knowledge.

Second, software can be placed under strong free and open-source licences, online services can be decentralised, interoperable and owned by communities, while internet infrastructure can be fully socialised as communal property. The global Free Software Movement and activist scholars have already built a preliminary foundation and framework for moving in this direction.

Third, an eco-socialist Digital Tech New Deal has to be implemented to reorient the tech economy away from profit and towards satisfying the needs of the people. This requires socialising financial, intellectual and physical property. As first steps, we could impose heavy taxes on the rich to fund a global digital commons, produce plans to phase out private ownership of information and the means of computation, support workers and mandate economic redistribution to the global poor, and build a privacy-by-design tech ecosystem. All of this must be done within the confines of a sustainable economy.

These solutions need to be part of the global movement for wealth redistribution, reparations, and democratisation. In South Africa, we are building a People’s Tech for People’s Power movement to drive this agenda forward, through popular education and the formation of solidarity networks to launch actions against Big Tech and digital capitalism.

There already is a good historical precedent for global action against Big Tech. During South Africa’s apartheid era, people around the world initiated boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) against corporations like IBM and Hewlett-Packard, which aided and abetted the apartheid state and businesses.

US corporations, in response, pushed a reformist agenda called the Sullivan Principles said to improve racial equality for workers. But anti-apartheid activists rejected the move as corporate propaganda designed to manufacture consent while US corporations continued to profit from apartheid misery.

Today, the US resembles the South African apartheid state, but on a global scale. Its high-tech military projects power across the world, its diplomats impose strong intellectual property protections at the World Trade Organization, its imperialist anti-immigrant policies control the movement of people and capital, and its tech corporations dominate nearly every industry vertical outside of mainland China, all while creating a global police state.

We do not need 21st century Sullivan Principles to save digital capitalism. We need digital socialism, reparations and democratisation of tech for a global green economy. This is a matter of survival for the whole human race.

#### Western-led “tech globalization” is a façade for colonialism.

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The use of technology across the world has increased rapidly in recent decades resulting in a reshaping of how individuals and states interact, function, and develop. As such, our world is now heavily interconnected and sees digital technologies impacting nations’ ability to thrive politically, socially, and economically.1 The spread of digital technologies has been met with the belief that technological innovation could help liberate and progress the countries of the African continent to ‘catch them up’ with the West. However, the Internet and digital technologies, such as mobile phones, and the process of colonialism can be understood as historically intertwined2 as both have been developed and implemented with Western states and organisations as the driving forces at play. Meaning, globally we have seen the integration and dependency of the Internet and digital technologies spread from the West and imposed on other states, the African continent in particular. These technologies spread often through the likes of government sponsored charity initiatives like ‘Computers 4 Africa’, a United Kingdom based charity who provides schools in African nations with computer supplies. Or through the likes of ‘Free Basics’, a mobile app developed by Facebook allowing users to access a small selection of websites that can be viewed without paying for mobile data,3 which was heavily criticised for encouraging users to pay for digital technologies but also due to the fact the websites offered were majority in English rather than the native language of the country. However, it must be acknowledged that colonialism as a term is situational and often sees blanketed use to describe the experiences of many different individuals and countries4 and so, as with colonialism, each African country will have a different experience with digital technologies. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND DIGITAL COLONIALISM From the normalisation of digital technologies across the globe, has stemmed a ‘digital divide’, understood as “the unequal access to and usage of new technology”5. This has seen those in poverty across Western states disadvantaged, but also throughout the global spectrum, less affluent countries are also struggling. Unlike other forms of technology, the Internet provides African nations the ability to interact on an international platform with the rest of the world, overcoming the previous barriers that have hindered the continent 6. However, digital technologies and the realm of cyberspace came late to the African continent, largely due to the aftermath of colonialism and the countries focusing on state-building7. Nevertheless, this delay in progress has not meant digital technologies and the Internet have not progressed at all within African nations, as highlighted through the use of mobile phones and social media in the Arab Spring or in Nigeria where their Nollywood industry has been exported to large Western media streaming sites. However, due to the origins, implementation and development of digital technologies and the Internet, cyberspace and cyberculture have arguably become a product of the West. Cyberculture, the way in which people perform online, can at times be perceived as a reflection of Western morality and perceptions of ‘right and wrong’. This mimics behaviours deemed desirable in Western culture, which historically was carried out on a global scale through the process of colonialism8. The sub-Saharan region of Africa has been described as ‘a technological desert’9 and, similar to previous technological revolutions, this process began in the West and was then imposed upon the less developed regions of the world. This digital divide has seen the development of digital colonialism, which addresses the multitude of issues that have come from the Westernisation of the Internet but also the enforcement of digital technologies towards less developed countries across the African region. The digital divide arguably goes further than being about those who simply do not have access to digital technologies and the Internet10, rather the digital divide addresses the lack of access to the international markets, increased security threats, and cultural norms that have been brought by the West to the African continent. Digital technologies and the Internet have been reflective of colonial tendencies through the fact that Western states, in an attempt to ‘help’ countries across Africa, have steered them towards the adoption of digital technologies11 and encouraged a dependency on them despite providing only a small handful of benefits such as access to international markets. This situation is reminiscent of colonial times when Western states approached African countries in an attempt to ‘fix’ or ‘democratise’ their governments, we may be seeing a modern day equivalent through the deployment of digital technologies to the continent12. DIGITAL NATIVE From this digital divide and digital colonialism, the concept of ‘digital native’ has evolved into the notion that those who are born with access to the Internet and are, in turn, socialized by it are those most likely to thrive online 13. Often during colonial times, the people across the African continent were seen as subservient individuals 14 who were to follow the rules put out by Colonisers. Through digital colonialism, individuals across the African continent have been subservient to the colonial nature of cyberspace and the ways digital technologies have been spread. Many issues similar to those present during the colonial peak have re-emerged for individuals across Africa in regards to a lack of agency and individual freedom. Many African people have gained access to these technologies but not the freedom to develop content such as web pages or social media platforms in their own way15. Digital natives have much more power16 and therefore use this to create their own space with their own norms, shaping their online world according to their own outlook. This power dynamic sees the formation of an ‘othering’ concept,17 deeming digital natives the desirable norm and non-natives as needing to be assimilated. Consequently this dynamic is reflective of the types of power dynamics the African continent saw during the colonial period which does not take into consideration the cultural and spatial differences across the continent18. This ‘othering’ of individuals online based on their technological interaction creates a binary ideology of those who are not ‘native’ to the online world. BUSINESS IN CYBERSPACE Finally, cyberspace and the Internet can be viewed as an extension of colonialism in regards to the business world. The BBC reports that as the Internet spreads across the African continent, more businesses are moving online and reaching a larger market19. Cyberspace has the ability to deconstruct the pre-existed physical borders that put constraints on businesses or governments to trade in the international market therefore providing economic benefits for countries across Africa. However, the countries of the continent that have really benefited from this movement towards cyber activities are those with stable and strong economies and telecommunication systems already in place20. New digital technologies create an environment where “missionaries declare the scriptures” 21 due to the fact that these digital technologies have been beneficial to the societies and environments they were created in and where the developers and users often assume all experiences will then be the same. Simply because digital technologies have revolutionised the business world of the West by providing platforms for smaller business, encouraging e-commerce, and digital banking, does not mean that this is the same for countries across Africa. CONCLUSION The role of digital technologies across the African continent have minced and furthered patterns that were prevalent during the colonial period. Digital technologies across the African continent have produced an environment where colonialism is able to occur simply on a new platform and in a new manner. While the African continent are not merely passive bystanders in this situation, the issue does not entirely lie with them. Rather it is the mindset of Western states and companies regarding African countries that has furthered this problematic situation. Until the digital divide is breached allowing the African continent to develop their own responses to digital technologies and operate in cyberspace on their own terms, these patterns reflecting colonial prejudice and technological bias may prevail.

#### All capitalism is racial capitalism---the system of competition the aff perpetuates cannot sustain itself without theft of indigenous land, super-exploitation of black labor, imperial extraction, and racist devaluation of ‘disposable populations.’

\*2 point font and paragraph merging for readability.

\*\*Footnote 14 is inserted below the paragraph it’s cited in, other footnotes excluded for readability.

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Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.

[Footnote 14]: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51.

My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33 Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition. In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism. War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat. Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link: But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35 For Du Bois, the imperialist rivalry for the booty on offer in Africa drove Berlin’s efforts to consolidate its place in the sun by displacing London in particular. While Vladimir Lenin understood that “the war [was] a product of half a century of development of world capitalism and of billions of threads and connections,” Du Bois expanded this analysis by providing a critique of the racial foundations of capitalist expansion.36 He held that the struggle to the death during the Great War for African resources and labor had begun to “pay dividends” centuries earlier through the enslavement of African peoples, the subsequent conflation of color and inferiority, and the reduction of what was routinely referred to as the “Dark Continent” to a space of backwardness ideally suited for dispossession. He further noted that “with the waning possibility of Big Fortune…at home, arose more magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad,” especially in Africa—a dream shared by white labor and the ruling class.37 In other words, this “democratic despotism” allowed for the white working class to “share the spoil of exploiting ‘chinks and niggers,'” and facilitated the creation of “a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor” that perpetuated racial capitalism across class lines.38 Moreover, this national unity was strengthened through the disrespect and dehumanization of the racialized toilers and peasants in the plundered colonies that mitigated the exploitation and impoverishment of the white working class in imperial countries. This superexploitation allowed white workers to get a share, however pitiful, of “wealth, power, and luxury…on a scale the world never saw before” and to benefit from the “new wealth” accumulated from the “darker nations of the world” through cross-class consent “for governance by white folk and economic subjection to them”—a consensus solidified through the doctrine of “the natural inferiority of most men to the few.”39 Given the entanglement of racialization and capitalist exploitation, Du Bois averred, “Racial slander must go. Racial prejudice will follow…the domination of one people by another without the other’s consent, be the subject people black or white, must stop. The doctrine of forcible economic expansion over subject people must go.” Insofar as this admonishment applied as much to the United States as to European imperialists, beyond the international proletariat, it was the darker peoples and nations of the world who would challenge racial capitalism, not least “the twenty-five million grandchildren of the European slave trade…and first of all the ten million black folk in the United States.”40

Imperialist accumulation denotes the rapacious conscription of resources and labor for the purpose of superprofits through violent means that are generally reserved for populations deemed racially inferior. On the precipice of the Great Depression, the prominent Black communist James Ford beautifully explicated imperialist accumulation. In his 1929 report on the Second World Congress of the League Against Imperialism, he explained that the extant political economy constituted the consolidation of Africa’s partition and the “complete enslavement of its people”; the arresting of its industrialization, which hindered the development of the “toiling masses”; and the relegation of the continent to a source of raw material, a market for European goods, and a dumping ground for accumulated surplus capital. In the U.S. South, the Black poor were dehumanized by Wall Street, “white big business,” and the “rising Negro bourgeoisie” whose condition of possibility was the subjection of the Black working class. This oppression was exacerbated by rigid racial barriers, disenfranchisement, and lynching. Ford further argued that the West Indies, subjected to U.S. militarism and occupation on behalf of Wall Street, were largely transformed into a marketplace for U.S. goods. Moreover, throughout Africa, the U.S. South, and the Caribbean, Black workers were impressed into forced labor, laying railroads, building roads and bridges, and working in mines; were entrapped on plantations through peonage; and were subjected to convict leasing. In addition, they suffered intolerable working conditions and routinized violence.41

Expropriation by domination designates the seizure and confiscation of land, assets, property, bodies, and other sources of material wealth set to work by relations of economic dependence. This relationship exists both between nations and between groups. A quintessential enunciation of expropriation by domination between groups is We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro People, edited by the Black Communist William Patterson (with significant help from his wife and comrade Louise Thompson Patterson) and submitted to the United Nations by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951.42 The petition meticulously documented the past and present expropriation of Black people by the ruling class of modern U.S. racial capitalism through consistent and persistent discrimination in employment, unfair wages, forced ghettoization, inequitable and inferior accommodation and services, and the denial of justice in the courts. It further argued that this process was sustained by genocidal terror, white supremacist law, and the drive of monopoly capitalists for superprofits. Importantly, We Charge Genocide noted that, for primarily economic reasons, the historical and geographical locus of anti-Black genocide was the “Black Belt” of the Southern United States, a region expropriated by the Northern industrial capitalists and by Southern landowners alike. This was due in large part to plantation systems of sharecropping and peonage—legacies of slavery—in which Black political and economic rights were virtually nonexistent, Black laborers were inexorably tied to the land through debt, and the threat of violence and death precluded demands for justice. For Patterson, such expropriation by domination was the basis of “racist contamination that has spread throughout the United States.”43 We Charge Genocide further conveyed that expropriation by domination, a central element of modern U.S. racial capitalism, was more than a domestic concern because such practices “at home must inevitably create racist commodities for export abroad—must inevitably tend toward war.”44

Labor superexploitation can be understood as an economic relationship in which the intensity, form, and racial basis of exploitation differs little from slavery. Its effects are so extreme that it pushes racialized, particularly Black, labor effectively below the level of sheer physical subsistence. As Harrison explained, in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism, Black workers “form a group that is more essentially proletarian than any other American group” because enslaved Africans were brought to the “new world” to be ruthlessly exploited. This reality fixed their social status as the most despised group, which in turn intensified their subjection.45 Likewise, organizations like the American Negro Labor Congress and the Anti-Imperialist League analyzed that the racial capitalist superexploitation of Black nations like Haiti in the first quarter of the twentieth century for the purposes of consolidating Wall Street control over land, commercial relations, and production was accompanied by the brutalization of Black labor, the export of Jim Crow practices, military occupation, and political repression.46 In effect, superexploitation results from the conjuncture of white supremacy, racialization, and the “badge of slavery,” which exacerbates the conditions of exploitation to which white working classes are subjected. As the Black Marxist Harry Haywood argued in 1948, “the stifling effects of the race factor are most strikingly illustrated by the drastic differences in the economic and cultural status of Negroes and whites.… Beyond all doubt, the oppression of the Negro, which is the basis of the degradation of the ‘poor whites,’ is of separate character demanding a special approach.”47 Superexploitation, he explained further, constitutes a combination of direct exploitation, outright robbery, physical violence, legal coercion, and perpetual indebtedness. It stifles “the free economic and cultural development” of the Black masses “through racist persecution as a basic condition for maintaining” virtual enslavement.48

The entrapment of Black women in domestic labor throughout the twentieth century—a function of their “triple oppression”—is perhaps the most glaring example of labor superexploitation under modern U.S. racial capitalism. In 1936, the lifelong Black radical Louise Thompson explained that Black women’s superexploitation in the capitalist mode of production was based on their race, sex, and subordination in the labor market.49 That same year, Black militants Marvel Cooke and Ella Baker published an article titled “The Bronx Slave Market” in which they studied triple oppression as it related to Black domestic workers. Cooke and Baker explained that the entanglements of racism, sex-based labor subordination, and structural poverty were deeply intensified by the Great Depression and forced Black domestic workers to pauperize their labor for the abysmal wage of less than thirty cents an hour. This form of labor exploitation was unique to the female sex because domestic work was conventional “women’s work,” and it was racialized insofar as the denigration of Black people fitted this group of women for low-wage, unprotected, and contingent labor.50

#### Capitalism causes extinction---the only alternative is an international workers organization led by the Global South.

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Any serious treatment of the renewal of socialism today must begin with capitalism’s creative destruction of the bases of all social existence. Since the late 1980s, the world has been engulfed in an epoch of catastrophe capitalism, defined as the accumulation of imminent catastrophe on every side due to the unintended consequences of “the juggernaut of capital.”1 Catastrophe capitalism in this sense is manifested today in the convergence of (1) the planetary ecological crisis, (2) the global epidemiological crisis, and (3) the unending world economic crisis.2 Added to this are the main features of today’s “empire of chaos,” including the extreme system of imperialist exploitation unleashed by global commodity chains; the demise of the relatively stable liberal-democratic state with the rise of neoliberalism and neofascism; and the emergence of a new age of global hegemonic instability accompanied by increased dangers of unlimited war.3

The climate crisis represents what the world scientific consensus refers to as a “no analogue” situation, such that if net carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion do not reach zero in the next few decades, it will threaten the very existence of industrial civilization and ultimately human survival.4 Nevertheless, the existential crisis is not limited to climate change, but extends to the crossing of other planetary boundaries that together define the global ecological rift in the Earth System as a safe place for humanity. These include: (1) ocean acidification; (2) species extinction (and loss of genetic diversity); (3) destruction of forest ecosystems; (4) loss of fresh water; (5) disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; (6) the rapid spread of toxic agents (including radionuclides); and (7) the uncontrolled proliferation of genetically modified organisms.5

This rupturing of planetary boundaries is intrinsic to the system of capital accumulation that recognizes no insurmountable barriers to its unlimited, exponential quantitative advance. Hence, there is no exit from the current capitalist destruction of the overall social and natural conditions of existence that does not require exiting capitalism itself. What is essential is the creation of what István Mészáros in Beyond Capital called a new system of “social metabolic reproduction.”6 This points to socialism as the heir apparent to capitalism in the twenty-first century, but conceived in ways that critically challenge the theory and practice of socialism as it existed in the twentieth century.

The Polarization of the Class System

In the United States, key sectors of monopoly-finance capital have now succeeded in mobilizing elements of the primarily white lower-middle class in the form of a nationalist, racist, misogynist ideology. The result is a nascent neofascist political-class formation, capitalizing on the long history of structural racism arising out of the legacies of slavery, settler colonialism, and global militarism/imperialism. This burgeoning neofascism’s relation to the already existing neoliberal political formation is that of “enemy brothers” characterized by a fierce jockeying for power coupled with a common repression of the working class.7 It is these conditions that have formed the basis of the rise of the New York real-estate mogul and billionaire Donald Trump as the leader of the so-called radical right, leading to the imposition of right-wing policies and a new authoritarian capitalist regime.8 Even if the neoliberal faction of the ruling class wins out in the coming presidential election, ousting Trump and replacing him with Joe Biden, a neoliberal-neofascist alliance, reflecting the internal necessity of the capitalist class, will likely continue to form the basis of state power under monopoly-finance capital.

Appearing simultaneously with this new reactionary political formation in the United States is a resurgent movement for socialism, based in the working-class majority and dissident intellectuals. The demise of U.S. hegemony within the world economy, accelerated by the globalization of production, has undermined the former, imperial-based labor aristocracy among certain privileged sections of the working class, leading to a resurgence of socialism.9 Confronted with what Michael D. Yates has called “the Great Inequality,” the mass of the population in the United States, particularly youth, are faced with rapidly diminishing prospects, finding themselves in a state of uncertainty and often despair, marked by a dramatic increase in “deaths of despair.”10 They are increasingly alienated from a capitalist system that offers them no hope and are attracted to socialism as the only genuine alternative.11 Although the U.S. situation is unique, similar objective forces propelling a resurgence of socialist movements are occurring elsewhere in the system, primarily in the Global South, in an era of continuing economic stagnation, financialization, and universal ecological decline.

But if socialism is seemingly on the rise again in the context of the structural crisis of capital and increased class polarization, the question is: What kind of socialism? In what ways does socialism for the twenty-first century differ from socialism of the twentieth century? Much of what is being referred to as socialism in the United States and elsewhere is of the social-democratic variety, seeking an alliance with left-liberals and thus the existing order, in a vain attempt to make capitalism work better through the promotion of social regulation and social welfare in direct opposition to neoliberalism, but at a time when neoliberalism is itself giving way to neofascism.12 Such movements are bound to fail at the outset in the present historical context, inevitably betraying the hopes that they unleashed, since focused on mere electoral democracy. Fortunately, we are also seeing the growth today of a genuine socialism, evident in extra-electoral struggle, heightened mass action, and the call to go beyond the parameters of the present system so as to reconstitute society as whole.

The general unrest latent at the base of U.S. society was manifested in the uprisings in late May and June of this year, which took the form, practically unheard of in U.S. history since the U.S. Civil War, of massive solidarity protests with millions of people in the streets, and with the white working class, and white youth in particular, crossing the color line *en masse* in response to the police lynching of George Floyd for no other crime than being a Black man.13 This event, coming in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and the related economic depression, led to the June days of rage in the United States.

But while the movement toward socialism, now taking hold even in the United States at the “barbaric heart” of the system, is gaining ground as a result of objective forces, it lacks an adequate subjective basis.14 A major obstacle in formulating strategic goals of socialism in the world today has to do with twentieth-century socialism’s abandonment of its own ideals as originally articulated in Karl Marx’s vision of communism. To understand this problem, it is necessary to go beyond recent left attempts to address the meaning of communism on a philosophical basis, a question that has led in the last decade to abstract treatments of The Communist Idea, The Communist Hypothesis, and The Communist Horizon by Alain Badiou and others.15 Rather, a more concrete historically based starting point is necessary, focusing directly on the two-phase theory of socialist/communist development that emerged out of Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme and V. I. Lenin’s The State and Revolution. Paul M. Sweezy’s article “Communism as an Ideal,” published more than half a century ago in Monthly Review in October 1963, is now a classic text in this regard.16

Marx’s Communism as the Socialist Ideal

In The Critique of the Gotha Programme—written in opposition to the economistic and laborist notions of the branch of German Social Democracy influenced by Ferdinand Lassalle—Marx designated two historical “phases” in the struggle to create a society of associated producers. The first phase was initiated by the “revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat,” reflecting the class-war experience of the Paris Commune and representing a period of workers’ democracy, but one that still carried the “defects” of capitalist class society. In this initial phase, not only would a break with capitalist private property take place, but also a break with the capitalist state as the political command structure of capitalism.17 As a measure of the limited nature of socialist transition in this stage, production and distribution would inevitably take the form of to each according to one’s labor, perpetuating conditions of inequality even while creating the conditions for their transcendence. In contrast, in the later phase, the principle governing society would shift to from each according to one’s ability, to each according to one’s need and the elimination of the wage system.18 Likewise, while the initial phase of socialism/communism would require the formation of a new political command structure in the revolutionary period, the goal in the higher phase was the withering away of the state as a separate apparatus standing above and in antagonistic relation to society, to be replaced with a form of political organization that Frederick Engels referred to as “community,” associated with a communally based form of production.19

In the later, higher phase of the transition of socialism/communism, not only would property be collectively owned and controlled, but the constitutive cells of society would be reconstituted on a communal basis and production would be in the hands of the associated producers. In these conditions, Marx stated, “labor” will have become not a mere “means of life” but “itself…the prime necessity of life.”20 Production would be directed at use values rather than exchange values, in line with a society in which “the free development of each” would be “the condition for the free development of all.” The abolition of capitalist class society and the creation of a society of associated producers would lead to the end of class exploitation, along with the elimination of the divisions between mental and manual labor and between town and country. The monogamous, patriarchal family based on the domestic enslavement of women would also be surmounted.21 Fundamental to Marx’s picture of the higher phase of the society of associated producers was a new social metabolism of humanity and the earth. In his most general statement on the material conditions governing the new society, he wrote: “Freedom, in this sphere [the realm of natural necessity], can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism of nature in a rational way…accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy” in the process of promoting conditions of sustainable human development.22

Writing in The State and Revolution and elsewhere, Lenin deftly captured Marx’s arguments on the lower and higher phases, depicting these as the first and second phases of communism. Lenin went on to emphasize what he called “the scientific distinction between socialism and communism,” whereby “what is usually called socialism was termed by Marx the ‘first,’ or lower phase of communist society,” whereas the term communism, meaning “complete communism,” was most appropriately used for the higher phase.23 Although Lenin closely aligned this distinction with Marx’s analysis, in later official Marxism this came to be rigidified in terms of two entirely separate stages, with the so-called communist stage so removed from the stage of socialism that it became utopianized, no longer seen as part of a continuous or ongoing struggle. Based on a wooden conception of the socialist stage and the intermediary principle of distribution to each according to one’s labor, Joseph Stalin carried out an ideological war against the ideal of real equality, which he characterized as a “reactionary, petty-bourgeois absurdity worthy of a primitive sect of ascetics but not of a socialist society organized on Marxist lines.” This same stance was to persist in the Soviet Union in one way or another all the way to Mikhail Gorbachev.24

Hence, as explained by Michael Lebowitz in The Socialist Imperative, “rather than a continuous struggle to go beyond what Marx called the ‘defects’ inherited from capitalist society, the standard interpretation” of Marxism in the half-century from the late 1930s to the late ’80s “introduced a division of post-capitalist society into two distinct ‘stages,’” determined economistically by the level of development of the productive forces. Fundamental changes in social relations emphasized by Marx as the very essence of the socialist path were abandoned in the process of living with and adapting to the defects carried over from capitalist society. Instead, Marx had insisted on a project aimed at building the community of associated producers “from the outset” as part of an ongoing, if necessarily uneven, process of socialist construction.25

This abandonment of the socialist ideal associated with Marx’s higher phase of communism was wrapped up in a complex way with changing material (and class) conditions and eventually the demise of Soviet-type societies, which tended to stagnate once they ceased to be revolutionary and even resurrected class forms, heralding their eventual collapse as the new class or nomenklatura abandoned the system. As Sweezy argued in 1971, “state ownership and planning are not enough to define a viable socialism, one immune to the threat of retrogression and capable of moving forward on the second leg of the movement to communism.” Something more was needed: the continuous struggle to create a society of equals.26

For Marx, the movement toward a society of associated producers was the very essence of the socialist path embedded in “communist consciousness.”27 Yet, once socialism came to be defined in more restrictive, economistic terms, particularly in the Soviet Union from the late 1930s onward, in which substantial inequality was defended, post-revolutionary society lost the vital connection to the dual struggle for freedom and necessity, and hence became disconnected from the long-term goals of socialism from which it had formerly derived its meaning and coherence.

Based on this experience, it is evident that the only way to build socialism in the twenty-first century is to embrace precisely those aspects of the socialist/communist ideal that allow a theory and practice radical enough to address the urgent needs of the present, while also not losing sight of the needs of the future. If the planetary ecological crisis has taught us anything, it is that what is required is a new social metabolism with the earth, a society of ecological sustainability and substantive equality. This can be seen in the extraordinary achievements of Cuban ecology, as recently shown by Mauricio Betancourt in “The Effect of Cuban Agroecology in Mitigating the Metabolic Rift” in Global Environmental Change.28 This conforms to what Georg Lukács called the necessary “double transformation” of human social relations and the human relations to nature.29 Such an emancipatory project must necessarily pass through various revolutionary phases, which cannot be predicted in advance. Yet, to be successful, a revolution must seek to make itself irreversible through the promotion of an organic system directed at genuine human needs, rooted in substantive equality and the rational regulation of the human social metabolism with nature.30

Freedom as Necessity

Building on G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophy, Engels famously argued in Anti-Dühring that real freedom was grounded in the recognition of necessity. Revolutionary change was the point at which freedom and necessity met in concrete praxis. Although there was such a thing as blind necessity beyond human knowledge, once objective forces were grasped, necessity was no longer blind, but rather offered new paths for human action and freedom. Necessity and freedom fed on each other, requiring new periods of social change and historical transcendence.31 In illustrating this materialist dialectical principle, Lenin acutely observed, “we do not know the necessity of nature in the phenomena of the weather. But while we do not know this necessity, we do know that it exists.”32 We know the human relation to the weather and nature in general inevitably varies with the changing productive relations governing our actions.

Today, the knowledge of anthropogenic climate crisis and of extreme weather events is removing human beings from the realm of blind necessity and demanding that the world’s population engage in the ultimate struggle for freedom and survival against catastrophe capitalism. As Marx stated in the context of the severe metabolic rift imposed on Ireland as a result of British colonialism in the nineteenth century, the ecological crisis presents itself as a case of “ruin or revolution.”33 In the Anthropocene, the ecological rift resulting from the expansion of the capitalist economy now exists on a scale rivaling the biogeochemical cycles of the planet. However, knowledge of these objective developments also allows us to conceive the necessary revolution in the social metabolic reproduction of humanity and the earth. Viewed in this context, Marx’s crucial conception of a “community of associated producers” is not to be viewed as simply a far-off utopian conception or abstract ideal but as the very essence of the necessary human defense in the present and future, representing the insistent demand for a sustainable relation to the earth.34

But where is the agent of revolutionary change? The answer is that we are seeing the emergence of the material preconditions of what can be called a global environmental proletariat. Engels’s Condition of the Working Class in England, published in 1845, was a description and analysis of working-class conditions in Manchester, shortly after the so-called Plug Plot Riots and at the height of radical Chartism. Engels depicted the working-class environment not simply in terms of factory conditions, but much more in terms of urban developments, housing, water supply, sanitation, food and nutrition, and child development. The focus was on the general epidemiological environment enforced by capitalism (what Engels called “social murder” and what Norman Bethune later called “the second sickness”) associated with widespread morbidity and mortality, particularly due to contagious disease.35 Marx, under the direct influence of Engels and as a result of his own social epidemiological studies twenty years later while writing Capital, was to see the metabolic rift as arising not only in relation to the degradation of the soil, but equally, as he put it, in terms of “periodical epidemics” induced by society itself.36

What this tells us—and we could find many other illustrations, from the Russian and Chinese Revolutions to struggles in the Global South today—is that class struggle and revolutionary moments are the product of a coalescence of objective necessity and a demand for freedom emanating from material conditions that are not simply economic but also environmental in the broadest sense. Revolutionary situations are thus most likely to come about when a combination of economic and ecological conditions make social transformations necessary, and where social forces and relations are developed enough to make such changes possible. In this respect, looked at from a global standpoint today, the issue of the environmental proletariat overlaps with and is indistinguishable from the question of the ecological peasantry and the struggles of the Indigenous. Likewise, the struggle for environmental justice that now animates the environmental movement globally is in essence a working-class and peoples’ struggle.37

The environmental proletariat in this sense can be seen as emerging as a force all over the world, as evident in the present period of ecological-epidemiological struggle in relation to COVID-19. Yet, the main locus of revolutionary ecological action in the immediate future remains the Global South, faced with the harsh reality of “imperialism in the Anthropocene.”38 As Samir Amin observed in Modern Imperialism, Monopoly Finance Capital, and Marx’s Law of Value, the triad of the United States, Europe, and Japan is already using the planet’s bio-capacity at four times the world average, pointing toward ecological oblivion. This unsustainable level of consumption of resources in the Global North is only possible because

a good proportion of the bio-capacity of society in the South is taken up by and to the advantage of these centers [in the triad]. In other words, the current expansion of capitalism is destroying the planet and humanity. The expansion’s logical conclusion is either the actual genocide of the peoples of the South—as “overpopulation”—or, at the least, their confinement to ever-increasing poverty. An eco-fascist strand of thought is being developed which gives legitimacy to this kind of “final solution” to the problem.39

A New System of Social Metabolic Reproduction

A revolutionary process of socialist construction aimed at building a new system of social reproduction in conformity with the demands of necessity and freedom cannot occur without an overall “orienting principle” and “measure of achievement” as part of a long-term strategy. It is here, following Mészáros, that the notion of substantive equality or a society of equals, also entailing substantive democracy, comes into play in today’s struggles.40 Such an approach not only stands opposed to capital at its barbaric heart but also opposes any ultimately futile endeavor to stop halfway in the transition to socialism. Immanuel Kant spelled out the dominant liberal view shortly after the French Revolution when he stated that “the general equality of men as subjects in a state coexists quite readily with the greatest inequality in degrees of the possessions men have.… Hence, the general equality of men coexists with great inequality of specific rights of which there may be many.”41 In this way, equality came to be merely formal, existing merely “on paper” as Engels pointed out, not only with respect to the labor contract between capitalist and worker but also in relation to the marriage contract between men and women.42 Such a society establishes, as Marx demonstrated, a “right of inequality, in its content, like every right.”43 The idea of substantive equality, consistent with Marx’s notion of communism, challenges all of this. It demands a change in the constitutive cells of society, which can no longer consist of possessive individualists, or individual capitals, reinforced by a hierarchical state, but must be based on the associated producers and a communal state. Genuine planning and genuine democracy can only start through the constitution of power from the bottom of society. It is only in this way that revolutions become irreversible.

It was the explicit recognition of the challenge and burden of twenty-first-century socialism in these terms that represented the extraordinary threat to the prevailing order constituted by the Venezuelan Revolution led by Hugo Chávez. The Bolivarian Republic challenged capitalism from within through the creation of communal power and popular protagonism, generating a notion of revolution as the creation of an organic society, or a new social metabolic order. Chávez, building on the analyses of Marx and Mészáros, mediated by Lebowitz, introduced the notion of “the elementary triangle of socialism,” or (1) social ownership, (2) social production organized by workers, and (3) satisfaction of communal needs.44 Underlying this was a struggle for substantive equality, abolishing the inequalities of the color line and the gender line, the imperial line, and other lines of oppression, as the essential basis for eliminating the society of unequals.

In “Communism as an Ideal,” Sweezy emphasized the new forms of labor that would necessarily come into being in a society that used abundant human productivity more rationally. Many categories of work, he indicated, would “be eliminated altogether (e.g. coalmining and domestic service), and insofar as possible all jobs must become interesting and creative as only a few are today.” The reduction of the enormous waste and destruction inherent in capitalist production and consumption would open up space for the employment of disposable time in more creative ways.

In a society of equals—one in which everyone stands in the same relation to the means of production and has the same obligation to work and serve the common welfare—all “needs” that emphasize the superiority of the few and involve the subservience of the many will simply disappear and will be replaced by the needs of liberated human beings living together in mutual respect and cooperation.… Society and the human beings who compose it constitute a dialectical whole: neither can change without changing the other. And communism as an ideal comprises a new society and a new [human being].45

More than simply an ideal, such an organizing principle in which substantive equality and substantive democracy are foremost in the conception of socialism/communism is essential not only to create a socialist path to a better future but as a necessary defense of the global population confronted with the question of survival. Dystopian books and novels notwithstanding, it is impossible to imagine the level of environmental catastrophe that will face the world’s peoples, especially those at the bottom of the imperialist hierarchy, if capitalism’s creative destruction of the metabolism of humanity and the earth is not stopped mid–century.

According to a 2020 article on “The Future of the Human Climate Niche” in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, based on existing trends, 3.5 billion people are projected to be living in unlivable heat outside the human climate niche by 2070, under conditions comparable to those of the Sahara desert.46 Even such projections fail to capture the enormous level of destruction that will fall on the majority of humanity under capitalist business as usual. The only answer is to leave the burning house and to build another now.47

The International of Workers and Peoples

Although untold numbers of people are engaged in innumerable struggles against the capitalist juggernaut in their specific localities all around the world, struggles for substantive equality, including battles over race, gender, and class, depend on the fight against imperialism at the global level. Hence, there is a need for a new global organization of workers based on the model of Marx’s First International.48 Such an International for the twenty-first century cannot simply consist of a group of elite intellectuals from the North engaged in World Social Forum-like discussion activities or in the promotion of social-democratic regulatory reforms as in the so-called Socialist and Progressive Internationals. Rather, it needs to be constituted as a workers-based and peoples-based organization, rooted from the beginning in a strong South-South alliance so as to place the struggle against imperialism at the center of the socialist revolt against capitalism, as contemplated by figures such as Chávez and Amin.

In 2011, just prior to his final illness, Chávez was preparing, following his next election, to launch what was to be called the New International (pointedly not a Fifth International) focusing on a South-South alliance and giving a global significance to socialism in the twenty-first century. This would have extended the Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our America to a global level.49 This, however, never saw the light of day due to Chávez’s rapid decline and untimely death.

Meanwhile, a separate conception grew out of the efforts of Amin, working with the World Forum for Alternatives. Amin had long contemplated a Fifth International, an idea he was still presenting as late as May 2018. But in July 2018, only a month before his death, this had been transformed into what he called an Internationale of Workers and Peoples, explicitly recognizing that a pure worker-based International that did not take into account the situation of peoples was inadequate in confronting imperialism.50 This, he stated, would be an organization, not just a movement. It would be aimed at the

alliance of all working peoples of the world and not only those qualified as representatives of the proletariat…including all wage earners of the services, peasants, farmers, and the peoples oppressed by modern capitalism. The construction must also be based on the recognition and respect of diversity, whether of parties, trade unions, or other popular organizations of struggle, guaranteeing their real independence.… In the absence of [such revolutionary] progress the world would continue to be ruled by chaos, barbarian practices, and the destruction of the earth.51

The creation of a New International cannot of course occur in a vacuum but needs to be articulated within and as a product of the building of unified mass organizations expanding at the grassroots level in conjunction with revolutionary movements and delinkings from the capitalist system all over the world. It could not occur, in Amin’s view, without new initiatives from the Global South to create broad alliances, as in the initial organized struggles associated with the Third World movement launched at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the struggle for a New International Economic Order.52 These three elements—grassroots movements, delinking, and cross-country/cross-continent alliances—are all crucial in his conception of the anti-imperialist struggle. Today this needs to be united with the global ecological movement.

Such a universal struggle against capitalism and imperialism, Amin insisted, must be characterized by audacity and more audacity, breaking with the coordinates of the system at every point, and finding its ideal path in the principle of from each according to one’s ability, to each according to one’s need, as the very definition of human community. Today we live in a time of the perfect coincidence of the struggles for freedom and necessity, leading to a renewed struggle for freedom as necessity. The choice before us is unavoidable: ruin or revolution.

#### The alternative requires rejecting the aff and critically interrogating the neoliberal discourse of the 1AC---resisting capitalist pedagogy in educational spaces is the first step towards a broader movement away from Capitalism.

Giroux 20, McMaster University Professor for Scholarship in the Public Interest and The Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy (Henry, June 9th, “Racist Violence Can’t Be Separated from the Violence of Neoliberal Capitalism,” *Truthout*, <https://truthout.org/articles/racist-violence-cant-be-separated-from-the-violence-of-neoliberal-capitalism/>, Accessed 08-24-2021)

As educators, it is crucial for us to examine how we talk, teach, and write about inequality as an object of critique in an age of precarity, uncertainty and the current pandemic crisis. This is especially true at a time when a growing number of authoritarian regimes around the globe substitute replace thoughtful dialogue and critical engagement with the suppression of dissent and a culture of forgetting r. How do we situate our analysis of education as part of a broader discourse and mode of analysis that interrogates the promises, ideals, and claims of a substantive democracy? How do we fight against iniquitous relations of power and wealth that empty power of its emancipatory possibilities, and as Hannah Arendt has argued, “makes most people superfluous as human beings”? How might we understand how neoliberal ideology, with its appropriation of market-based values, regressive notions of freedom and agency, uses language to infiltrate daily life? How does a pandemic pedagogy in the service of neoliberalism produce identities defined by market values, and normalize a notion of responsibility and individuality that convinces people that whatever problem they face they have no one to blame but themselves? Repeated endlessly on right-wing media platforms, the underlying conditions that disproportionately produce chronic illness among poor people of color disappear among a public distracted, if not persuaded, by a pandemic pedagogy that celebrates unchecked self-interest, disdains social responsibility, and turns away from the reality of a society with deep-seated institutional rot and unravelling of social connections and the social contract.

Pandemic pedagogy thrives on inequality and becomes a militarized and heartless normalizing tool to convince the broader public that the lives of the elderly, sick, and vulnerable should be valued according to how much they contribute to the economy. And if they are willing to die in order not to be a drain on the economy, all well and good. Nothing escapes the cruel logic of neoliberalism with its arrogance and hubris on full display as it bathes in the glow of right-wing populism, ultra-nationalism, and neofascism. Its accoutrements of dictatorship are everywhere and can be seen in the swagger of militia that storm state capitals, in police who punch and pepper spray protesters and push elderly men to the ground, and in military forces on the streets without badges reinforcing a climate of fear, repression, and unaccountability. There is more at work here than a lack of humanity on the part of the Trump administration. As the Irish journalist Fintan O’Toole observes, there is also the deepening grip of a culture of cruelty and dehumanization. He writes:

“As a society the American people are being habituated into accepting cruelty on a wide scale. Americans are being taught by Trump and his administration not to see other people as human beings whose lives are as important as their own. Once that line has been crossed – and it is not just Trump and the people around him, but many of Trump’s supporters as well – then we know where that all leads, what the ultimate destination is. There is no mystery about it. We know what happens when a government and its leaders dehumanize large numbers of people.”

Depoliticization and the Authoritarian Turn

Neoliberalism is not only an economic system, it is also an ideological apparatus that relentlessly attempts to structure consciousness, values, desires, and modes of identification in ways that align individuals with its governing structures. Central to this pedagogical project is the attempt to prevent individuals from translating private issues and troubles into broader systemic considerations. By doing this, it becomes difficult for individuals to grasp the historical, social, economic, and political forces at work in shaping a social order as a human activity deeply immersed in specific relations of power. Neoliberalism’s attempt to erase or rewrite historical and social forces makes it difficult for individuals to imagine alternative notions of society, with themselves as collective actors, or view their problems as more than the limitations of faulty character, moral failure, or a problem of personal responsibility. Reducing individuals to isolated, discrete, hermetically-sealed human beings whose lives are shaped only by notions of self-reliance and self-sufficiency is a pedagogical strategy that utterly depoliticizes people, leading them to believe that however a society is shaped, it is part of a natural order. President Trump echoed this “no alternative” narrative when asked about celebrities and rich people having special access to being tested for the coronavirus while few others had access. He replied, “Perhaps that’s been the story of life.”

This individualization of the social with its mounting privatization, gated communities, and social atomization undermines collective action, any viable notion of solidarity, and weakens the notion of global connectivity. The philosopher Byung-Chul Han has rightly argued that contemporary neoliberal society is shaped by a dysfunctional notion of solitude and hermitically-sealed notions of agency, all of which undermine the values and social connections vital to a democracy. He writes:

“Those subject to the neoliberal economy do not constitute a we that is capable of collective action. The mounting egoization and atomization of society is making the space for collective action shrink… The general collapse of the collective and the communal has engulfed it. Solidarity is vanishing. Privatization now reaches into the depths of the soul itself. The erosion of the communal is making all collective efforts more and more unlikely.”

This panoptical nature of hyper-individualism is more aligned with shared fears than shared responsibilities. Under such circumstances, trust and the notion that all life is related become difficult to grasp as the myopic language of private self-interest inures individuals to wider social problems such as extreme inequality. There is no understanding in this discourse of the damage fanatical entrepreneurialism does to our embodied collectivity. Nor is there any value attributed to the important responsibilities, social values, and notion of the common good that exceeds who we are as individuals, or how we have been shaped by diverse social forces in particular ways.

It should be clear that questions of economic and social justice cannot be addressed by a neoliberal pedagogy that enshrines self-interest and privatization while converting every social problem into individualized market solutions or regressive matters of personal responsibility. Under neoliberalism’s disimagination machine, individual responsibility is coupled with an ethos of greed, avarice, and personal gain. One consequence is the tearing up of social solidarities, public values, and an almost pathological disdain for democracy. This radical form of privatization is also a powerful force for the rise of fascist politics because it depoliticizes individuals, immerses them in the logic of social Darwinism, and makes them susceptible to the dehumanization of those considered a threat or disposable.

Just as the spread of the pandemic virus in the United States was not an innocent act of nature, neither is the rise and pervasive grip of inequality. What is clear is that neoliberal support for unbridled individualism has weakened democratic pressures and eroded democracy and equality as governing principles. Moreover, as a mode of public pedagogy, it has undercut social provisions, the social contract, and support for public goods such as education, public health, essential infrastructure, public transportation, and the most basic elements of the welfare state. As a form of pedagogical practice, neoliberalism has morphed into a form of pandemic pedagogy that sacrifices social needs and human life in the name of an economic rationality that values reviving economic growth over human rights. As a lived system of meaning and values, self-reliance and rugged individualism are the only categories available for shaping how individuals view themselves, and their relationship to others and to the planet. The individualization of everyone and the reduction of social problems to private troubles is paralleled by sanctioning a world marked by borders, walls, racism, hate, and a rejection of government intervention in the interest of the common good. Most importantly, neoliberal individualization personalizes power, creating a depoliticized subject whose only obligation as a citizen is defined by consuming and living in a world free from ethical and social responsibilities. In many ways, it does not just empty politics of any substance, it destroys its emancipatory prospects.

The neoliberal strategists use education not only to mask their abuses and the effects of their criminogenic policies, they also – in a time of crisis, when dissatisfaction of the masses might lead to chaos, revolts, and dangerous levels of resistance – move dangerously close to creating the conditions for a fascist politics. The noted theologian Frei Betto is right in stating that under such conditions, “…they cover up the causes of social ills and cover up their effects with ideologies that, by obscuring causes, fuel mood in the face of the effects. That’s why neoliberalism is now showing its authoritarian face – building walls that divide countries and ethnic groups, executive power over legislature and judiciary, disinformation about digital networks, the cult of the homeland, the brazen offensive against human rights.”

Neoliberalism and its regressive notion of individualism and individual responsibility has undermined the belief that human beings both make the world and can change it. The pandemic has ushered in a crisis that undermines that belief and opens the door for rethinking what kind of society and notion of politics will be faithful to the creation of a socialist democracy that speaks to the core values of justice, equality and solidarity. Under such circumstances, private resistance must give way to collective resistance, and personal and political rights must include economic rights. If inequality is to be defeated, the social state must replace the corporate state and social rights must be guaranteed for all. There can be no adequate struggle for economic justice and social equality unless economic inequality on a global level is addressed along with a movement for climate justice, the elimination of systemic racism and a halt to the spiraling militarism that has resulted in endless wars. This can only take place if the anti-democratic ideology of neoliberalism, with its collapse of the public into the private and its institutional structures of domination, are fully addressed and discredited. Étienne Balibar is right in stating that the triumph of neoliberalism has resulted in the “death zones of humanity.” Following Balibar, what must be made clear is that neoliberal capitalism is itself a pandemic and a dangerous harbinger of an updated fascist politics.

### T: Private Sector---1NC

#### Next off is T private sector

#### Private sector means all non-governmental persons or entities, including non-profits

Senate Report 95 (Senate Report. 104-1, “UNFUNDED MANDATE REFORM ACT OF 1995,” <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/senate-report/1> , date accessed 9/10/21)

"Private sector" is defined to cover all persons or entities in the United States except for State, local or tribal governments. It includes individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, and educational and nonprofit institutions.

#### A topical aff could change a universally-applied standard, like the CWS [Consumer Welfare Standard]

Phillips 18, commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission. (Noah J. November 1, 2018, Before the Federal Trade Commission, “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,” <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_session_5_transcript_11-1-18_0.pdf>)

Our second topic today is the consumer welfare standard. And I think most folks even out in the public know, this is the standard that we use across the board, mergers and conduct in courts and at agencies, to judge anticompetitive conduct. It is not only a standard that we in the U.S. apply, it is a standard that is used by competition agencies around the world. It is an economically-grounded standard, and it requires that there be harm to consumers for conduct to be condemned. Mere harm to competitors is considered insufficient. So let me repeat that again. There has to be harm to consumers, not just competitors. The reason that is so, the reason harm to competitors is considered insufficient is because sometimes a less-efficient firm losing sales or market share to a cheaper, more innovative or efficient rival, can be and often is consistent with vibrant competition and with outcomes that benefit consumers. Courts and agencies have embraced this standard for decades. Today, there are two very important discussions going on about the consumer welfare standard, and they are happening simultaneously. And I think it is important that we understand that there are two conversations going on. One is a continuing discussion about how we apply the standard, regarding whether enforcement is at the appropriate level, whether it is properly targeted. This is an introspective question on some level, in which scholars, economists, practitioners, and enforcers all ask ourselves, are we bringing the right kinds of cases? Are we using the right kinds of evidence? Should we be doing more or less in certain places? The antitrust bar, the business community, and others benefit from this ongoing and active analysis. The second discussion happening now, and the one on which today’s consumer welfare standard panels will focus, is whether the standard is itself the right metric we ought to use in antitrust enforcement and in antitrust law; some argue that enforcement under the consumer welfare standard has failed because of the law, and accordingly, that we should reform the law.

#### Violation: the aff applies exclusively to conduct in the tech segment of the private sector.

#### Vote neg:

#### FIRST---limits and ground---the number of potential subsets is infinite---any industry, product, single companies, individuals---undermines clash. Only big affs have link uniqueness.

#### SECOND----precision---our interp has intent to define, exclude and is in legislative context.

### T: Per Se---1NC

#### T Prohibition

#### “Prohibition” requires a declaration of per se illegality

Loevinger 61 (Honorable Lee Loevinger- Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division. “THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW” , *Section of Antitrust Law* , 1961, Vol. 19, PROCEEDINGS AT THE ANNUAL MEETING, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, AUGUST 7 THROUGH 11, 1961 (1961), pp. 245-251, JSTOR accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 9/13/21)

Running through the history of antitrust law are two contrapuntal themes: A prohibition of restraint of trade and a principle lately called the "rule of reason" which limits the prohibition. The legal rule against restraint of trade began in the 15th century in cases holding that a contract by which a man agreed not to practice his trade or profession was illegal.1 However, in the course of development of the common law, it became established that agreements which were ancillary to the sale or transfer of a trade or business and which were limited so as to impose a restriction no greater than reasonably necessary to protect the purchaser's interest.2

Thus, when the Sherman Act incorporated the common-law principles on this subject into federal statutory law 3 by adopting the concept of restraint of trade, it presumably imported both the principle that restrictions on competition are illegal and also the principle that in some circumstances a showing of reasonableness will legalize restrictions on competition. Nevertheless, when the question was first presented to the United States Supreme Court under the Sherman Act, it was clearly held (despite later disavowals4 ) that the justification of reasonableness was not available as a defense to a combination which had the effect of restraining trade.' Indeed, it was intimated that the question of reasonableness was not open to the courts in these actions at common law.6 However, when the Court reviewed this matter in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,7 it said in fairly explicit terms both that the Sherman Act prohibited only contracts or acts which unreasonably restrained competition and that the standard of reasonableness had been applied to all restraints of trade at the common law. The Court's assertion is somewhat weakened by the fact that it construed the rule of reason not as applying a standard for judging the character or consequences of the challenged conduct, but as a technique involving the application of human intelligence, or reason, to the problem of making a judgment about whether the conduct does restrain trade.'

#### The aff violates—they create a new legal standard for courts to decide whether a practice is “unreasonable” based on weighing effects—not a declaration of illegality without inquiry

McKibben 85 (Michael D. McKibben-Vanderbilt University Law School, J.D., 1985, Vanderbilt Law Review, Associate Editor; Patrick Wilson Scholar. The Resale Price Maintenance Compromise: A Presumption of Illegality, 38 Vanderbilt Law Review 163 (1985), Available at: <https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol38/iss1/3> , date accessed 9/13/21)

In United States v. Colgate & Co." the Court developed a major exception to Dr. Miles. The Colgate doctrine allows a weak form of RPM by manufacturers or wholesalers that have attempted unilaterally to set prices.6 Although the Colgate doctrine has lost much of its vitality due to years of restrictive interpretation, in Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld Colgate against a challenge by the Federal Trade Commission. In addition, the Supreme Court, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.," recently intimated new-found support for the Colgate doctrine and a possible willingness to reconsider the Dr. Miles per se prohibition against RPM.9

The outcome of vertical pricing cases under section 1 has depended upon the perceived effects of RPM on competition. Current RPM decisions, however, rest on the principles of stare decisis and, therefore, do not depend upon political and economic theories that have developed since Dr. Miles.10 Early courts denounced vertical restraints as analogous to horizontal price fixing, which courts have assumed the drafters of the Sherman Act intended to prohibit per se. 11 Later cases, however, illustrate that the analogy between vertical and horizontal trade restrictions is not analytically sound, and the Supreme Court's attempt to maintain the per se approach to RPM has led to serious theoretical and practical problems. 12

This Note explores several problems with recent RPM decisions: (1) the effect of the per se rule on producers' rights to control their marketing strategies; (2) inconsistent use of the plural action requirement as a foil for avoiding or invoking the per se rule; (3) the suppression of benign or procompetitive activities because of the rule; (4) the difficulties with free rider marketing; and (5) the obstacles to advice and planning that recent decisions have created. This Note contends that a new standard, a rebuttable presumption13 against legality, would alleviate most, if not all, problems that the inflexible per se rule causes.

A rebuttable presumption, followed by rule of reason analysis 14 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 14]] 14. Under the rule of reason "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49. [[END FOOTNOTE 14]] in cases in which the defendant satisfies the threshold inquiry,15 would restore certainty and intellectual honesty to RPM cases. The rebuttable presumption would eliminate the need to reconcile contrary cases and the need to consider issues that parties now must address under the rule of reason. While the rebuttable presumption does not require that courts maintain or reject the Colgate doctrine,16 this Note argues that the Court could retain Colgate but primarily rely upon the guidelines and safeguards of the rebuttable presumption. This new line of inquiry would retain the benefits of the per se rule-efficiency and certainty-and would remain flexible enough to accommodate special cases in which RPM may be beneficial to the market. In many cases, the rebuttable presumption also would save society, courts, and litigants the protracted costs of rule of reason analysis.

Part II of this Note considers major RPM cases since the early 1900s, with special focus on Russell Stover and Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,'17 cases which protect the defendant under the Colgate doctrine. Part III analyzes the weaknesses of the per se rule and the benefits that could inure to manufacturers and the marketplace under the rebuttable presumption. Part IV examines the strengths and weaknesses of the rule of reason and offers an improved rule of reason approach as the second part of the rebuttable presumption standard. Finally, Part V outlines a suggested analysis for RPM disputes using a rebuttable presumption of illegality. Part V also considers the effects of the presumption on federal antitrust laws.

II. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY

A. Minimum Price Restrictions in the Supreme Court

Vertical price restrictions are written or oral directives setting a price above or below which a manufacturer wishes its distributors to sell. If the manufacturer establishes a price below which a distributor should not resell a product, the manufacturer is imposing minimum price RPM. Maximum price RPM-the setting of price ceilings- and minimum RPM are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act."' Nonprice vertical restrictions, however, which include primarily territorial distributorship limitations, generally are reviewed under the rule of reason. 19

1. Dr. Miles: The Per Se Rule

Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.20 is the basis of much of the current academic criticism of the Supreme Court's RPM approach.2 ' The plaintiff Dr. Miles, a medicine manufacturer, required its wholesalers and retailers to adhere to a minimum resale price schedule. The plaintiff also required its wholesalers to maintain control over the retailers' subsequent resale prices. The defendant Park & Sons, a wholesaler that refused to purchase from Dr. Miles under the minimum price contract, bought Dr. Miles' medicines from third parties and resold them below the plaintiff's price schedule. The plaintiff charged the defendant with inducing the plaintiff's distributors to breach their contracts by reselling to a price cutter.22 The Court denied the plaintiff's request for relief and held that the plaintiff's contract provision was void under common law and the Sherman Act. 3

After determining that the agreement between Dr. Miles and its vendees fulfilled the duality requirement of the Sherman Act,24 the Court found that the plaintiff's resale price schedule eliminated competition by controlling the price at which all purchasers received the product.25 The Court refused to accept the defendant's argument that producers of patented products have a right ordinary sellers do not have-the right to dictate the destiny of their products.26 The Court inquired whether the plaintiff had a right to restrain trade. The Court held that generally a right to control alienation does not exist without an agreement.2 7 Applying the common-law rule that contractual restraints on alienation must be reasonable and limited to the necessity of the circumstances, 2 the Court found that Dr. Miles' agreement did not fit any of the common forms of acceptable restraints.29

The Court's final inquiry was whether the benefits that the plaintiff gained from its pricing restrictions were entitled to more protection than the property rights that the defendants had in the medicine.30 The Court's response to this issue forms the heart of the per se rule.31 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 31]] 31. Per se rules prohibit certain conduct without inquiry into possible justifications for the conduct. Courts impose per se rules when the interests of judicial economy outweigh other interests. See Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 708 (1983). [[END FOOTNOTE 31]] Although the Court never explicitly condemned all vertical price fixing agreements, it found that the effects of the Dr. Miles scheme were the same as the effects that could result from horizontal price fixing at the dealer level. The Court, therefore, held that both kinds of price fixing were illegal.3 2 The Supreme Court's focus on the effects of the alleged violative activity, without regard to its purposes or benefits, is characteristic of other Supreme Court per se decisions. 3

The breadth of the Dr. Miles decision is still unclear.3 4 A narrow interpretation of the holding is that express contractual provisions restraining resale prices violate the Sherman Act. The decision left open many further questions, the first of which the Court answered by creating the Colgate exception.

2. The Colgate Exception

The Court's 1919 decision in United States v. Colgate & Co.35 is still difficult for courts and commentators to harmonize with the Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality.3 6 In Colgate the prosecution charged the defendant under the Sherman Act 37 with forming an illegal combination to fix resale prices among the wholesalers and retailers of the defendant's soap and toilet products.3 8 Colgate circulated price lists, along with provisions for penalties to distributors that did not adhere to the defendant's price lists. Colgate also engaged in policing activities, such as obtaining information from other distributors concerning noncomplying dealers, and requesting assurances from nonuniform pricers that they would comply with the defendant's guidelines. 39

The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer 40 and the Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. The Court permitted the defendant's pricing structure based on the trial court's finding that Colgate reserved no contractual rights in the goods after their sale to dealers. Colgate could enforce the price restrictions only by later refusing to deal with wholesalers and retailers that breached their contracts.41 According to the Court, because the contracts in Dr. Miles "undertook to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to sell," Dr. Miles was distinguishable from Colgate.42 The Court then laid out the Colgate doctrine: "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. 43 If the Court had employed the "effects only" logic that it used in Dr. Miles, Colgate would have been an inconsequential extension of the Dr. Miles progeny. By blending the section 1 duality requirement with common-law business principles, however, the Court created an exception to the per se rule.44

3. Narrowing Colgate

The Court quickly issued three decisions reaffirming the viability of Colgate, but in increasingly narrow circumstances. 45 Less than one year after Colgate, the Court decided United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.46 Schrader's Son was factually similar to Dr. Miles,47 but the district court initially held for the defendant, reasoning that Colgate implicitly had overruled Dr. Miles.48 The Supreme Court reversed, stressing that its intent in Colgate was only to preserve the manufacturer's right to announce its pricing policy and cease to do business with dealers that failed to comply. 49

Based on this narrow interpretation of Colgate, the Court extended the scope of Dr. Miles to implicit agreements that attempt to make resale rates binding, including agreements "implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances." 0 The Court contrasted Colgate's holding with situations in which "the parties are combined through agreements designed to take away dealers' control of their own affairs and thereby destroy competition." 51 This language created a major expansion of the per se rule by shifting the Court's inquiry from "contract" to the less restrictive term "agreement." The Court's characterization of implicit agreements as section 1 violations is the basis of most criticism of the per se rule.52 Schrader's Son did not resolve the open distinction between implicit agreements that derive from dealer acceptance of fixed prices and unilateral declarations of terms that originate from a manufacturer's normal course of dealing.

The Supreme Court was quick to quell rumors of Colgate's early demise. In Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.53 the trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could prevail despite the lack of an express or implied agreement or objections to the seller's pricing demands.5 4 The Supreme Court held that the jury instruction was insufficient to establish the defendant's liability under section 1. 55 Despite the Court's inability to draw a clear distinction between Dr. Miles and Colgate, the Court refused to extend the per se rule to prohibit inferential agreements.

#### VOTE NEG---Balancing tests devastate core links, because they allow the practice when it’s beneficial. AND, creates a moving target, because the disallowed behavior is context-dependent.

### Advantage 1---1NC

#### Primacy in Asia is unsustainable---pursuing it causes counterbalancing and miscalc.

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, 89-90)

It Is Difficult to Stop China’s Continued Rise

Second, neo-primacy’s logic rests on shaky foundations, as the United States’ opportunity to reclaim preeminence is extremely small, and the effort will likely prove both counterproductive and dangerous. Baldly, if the United States was unable to keep China from becoming a near-peer competitor in the first place via classic primacy, it is even less likely that the United States has the wherewithal to put the Chinese genie back in the bottle and now push China from the great power ranks via neo-primacy.

States generally balance when confronted with a direct external threat. This tendency is significant in the US-China context because, under neo-primacy, the United States would effectively declare itself a direct threat to China at a time when US analysts acknowledge China has a growing capacity to oppose American plans and ambitions.53 Though China is not poised to dominate East Asia, it can thus be expected to devote its own considerable resources toward keeping pace with US efforts to arrest China’s rise and/or shift the relative distribution of power in the US favor. The odds of major crises would then increase as Washington and Beijing maneuver for position, in turn raising the odds of escalatory spirals, miscalculation, and war.54

Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence. On one level, China currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the United States, yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages. This implies that Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes; if the United States feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense—roughly what the United States has spent since the Cold War—would present a still larger problem and place the United States in an even worse position.55

Nor is it just military spending that underlines neo-primacy’s limitations. After all, ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies—designed partly to limit Chinese growth—has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy able to withstand “sustained acrimony with the United States.” Given this, it is reasonable to infer that additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses.56 Considering, too, that China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than the United States’ (even during COVID-19) and that the country has worked to narrow the USChina technological gap,57 the PRC’s ability to keep pace with the United States cannot be discounted.58 Shifts in the distribution of power since the Cold War make neo-primacy self-defeating by enabling China to match US efforts while risking US national security along the way. In this sense, neoprimacy risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address.

#### Letting China win the tech race secures their great power status and forces retrenchment. That’s their 1AC IL AND…

Khong, 19 **-** Yuen Foong Khong is the Li Ka Shing Professor of Political Science at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (“Power as prestige in world politics,” International Affairs, Volume 95, Issue 1, January 2019, Pages 119–142, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy245>, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/95/1/119/5273583>)

The analysis of US–China interactions presented here reveals that the phase of heightened geopolitical competition between the two superpowers is upon us. A key bone of contention now and in the coming decade will be about the hierarchy of prestige. By most accounts, China is likely to overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy within a decade; meanwhile it is investing heavily in multiple arenas—military, economic, technological, cultural—to create facts on the ground that will force the US to recognize it as a co-equal. Indeed, if the technological advances sought by ‘Made in China 2025’ and the economic and political–diplomatic goals of the BRI are realized—big ifs, to be sure—China will be well positioned to ‘win friends and influence people’ in ways America did with its economic and technological prowess. It will be in a position to match, and perhaps overtake, the US reputation for power. A Pew poll of 2015 found that, in 27 out of the 40 countries polled, a plurality or majority of individuals believed that China ‘will or already has overtaken the US as a superpower’.78 Such polls need to be interpreted with caution; but if that day does come to pass, it will put the US in a position of great strategic angst. Kishore Mahbubani cites an exchange he had at the 2012 Davos meeting in which he raised the possibility of China replacing the United States as the world's top power—a suggestion to which Senator Bob Corker, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, responded: ‘The American people absolutely would not be prepared psychologically for an event where the world began to believe that it was not the greatest power on earth.’79

#### Otherwise, status competition goes nuclear — letting China peacefully surpass the U.S. is the only way to avoid war.

Heath 18, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND (Timothy, February 2nd, “The Competition for Status Could Increase the Risk of a Military Clash in Asia,” *RAND*, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/the-competition-for-status-could-increase-the-risk.html>, Accessed 09-05-2021)

However, while the salience of conflict for the sake of gaining territory may be declining, the importance of status as a potential driver of conflict may be increasing. Status is an ambiguous and elusive concept, but at its core, status consists of a country's ranking in a hierarchy within a peer group. Status can be measured indirectly through estimations of a country's influence and prestige, as well as its reputation. Status matters a great deal because it can confer considerable benefits, as studies on the topic have shown. Jonathon Renshon, an expert on the role of status in international relations, has described how high-status countries enjoy a greater degree of deference from other countries and can thus secure a far larger share of available resources at a far lower cost than their lower-status peers. Status can only be achieved through competition, however. Because rankings are inherently zero-sum, one country's rise in status invariably requires the diminishment of its competitors.

The immense benefits that can accompany high status and the competition required to secure it help explain why status concerns have historically underpinned many inter-state conflicts. Historically, many a country has gone to great lengths and sometimes incurred crippling costs to salvage a faltering status or increase its standing. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, for example, Great Britain pursued an unnecessary and pointless military attack to stave off a challenge from Egypt to its waning status in the Middle East. The ensuing debacle confirmed Britain's decline as a great power. During the 1960s, U.S. anxiety over its status vis-á-vis its primary rival, the Soviet Union, led Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to escalate the country's commitment to a war in Vietnam of dubious prospects, a situation the Soviet Union mirrored in its own disaster in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Conversely, the value of an increase in status can be seen in the aftermath of Japan's stunning defeat of Russia in 1904 and 1905. The outcome shocked Western opinion and earned Japan the status of peer with the world's leading imperial powers. Tokyo subsequently expanded its control of Asia. Similarly, America's victory in the Spanish-American War confirmed Spain's eclipse as a great power in Latin and South America. The United States cemented its status as the leading nation in the Americas and saw its influence expand accordingly.

As these examples suggest, competition for status tends to recede when consensus exists among peer states about relative rankings, as happened briefly in the largely peaceful and stable post-Cold War “unipolar” moment of U.S. global preeminence. However, competition for status also tends to increase in periods of uncertainty. Today, persistent economic stagnation in the developed world and the rise of developing countries have unsettled existing hierarchies and raised afresh anxiety over the standing of many great powers.

Fears of diminished standing can be seen in the immense commentary bemoaning the decline in U.S. and European influence and in the debate over the possibilities of a post-Western age. Such apprehensions have also featured prominently in U.S. policy documents. In its recently released National Security Strategy (PDF), U.S. authorities warned that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests.” These concerns are particularly acute in Asia, which has seen an intensifying strategic competition for status and influence between China and its principal rivals—the United States, Japan, and India.

For China, status is increasingly vital to realizing its revitalization as a great power. To sustain growth, China seeks to deepen Asia's integration through the Belt and Road Initiative and shape the terms of regional trade. China also seeks to construct a regional security architecture defined by Chinese-led organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building. With adequate status, China could gain the deference and cooperation from regional powers needed to control potential flashpoints, improve its security, and secure preferential access to resources and markets at a fraction of the cost in resources than would be required if it had to fight and negotiate its way through every issue. Recognizing the importance of the issue, the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress report outlined as a long-term goal the ambition to “become a global leader” in “international influence.” Similarly, Chinese leaders have stepped up efforts to strengthen the country's leadership position in the region.

For China, status is increasingly vital to realizing its revitalization as a great power.

China for now has relied on peaceful, albeit intrusive, measures to increase its influence and bolster its standing, such sustained military modernization, massive economic diplomacy initiatives, United Front tactics and the manipulation of diplomatic carrots and sticks. Some observers have seen evidence of China's increasing influence in the Philippines' and South Korea's growing sensitivity to Chinese concerns. But the effectiveness of incremental, peaceful methods is difficult to prove because their effects are harder to perceive. Some commentators, for example, regard Chinese gains in influence as limited. Moreover, peaceful, incremental efforts are also vulnerable to counter-measures. Already, a growing array of countries have begun to raise concern about Chinese economic coercion and influence operations.

The United States and its allies and partners rightfully seek to protect their interests by bolstering their respective positions, even as they continue to cooperate with China. The strategy may succeed, but at its core is the assumption that stability can best be gained if China continues to acquiesce to the international order as established after World War II by the United States and its allies. China's conviction that its security depends on changes to this order sets up a deep, structural contradiction that is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Beijing can accordingly be expected to persist in peaceful methods to supplant the United States as Asia's leader. If, however, Beijing at some point concludes that the United States and its allies have successfully stymied its aspirations, China may be tempted by riskier methods to assert its status. A precedent for such behavior may be seen in a rising Germany of the 1890s-1900s. Convinced that it had been denied a status befitting its national power by Britain and France, Germany provoked a series of militarized crises around the world. In 1906, Germany threatened war against France after the two feuded about influence over Morocco. And in a second Moroccan crisis five years later, Germany extracted colonial concessions after it deployed a gunboat in response to a French military intervention. In China's case, brinksmanship behavior could be carried out in the contested East or South China Seas with military ships and aircraft. Already, a growing literature by Chinese military writers recommends the skillful exploitation of military crises for strategic gain.

Brinksmanship carries its own risks, of course. Miscalculation could lead to unwanted war. The strategic effects could be severe as well. Rivals like the United States, Japan, and India could be alarmed enough by a clash that they step up military preparations, aggravating China's security situation. Moreover, conflict could imperil China's grand Belt and Road Initiative ambition, if aggrieved neighbors opt out and welcome investments by Japan and India instead. China has many good reasons to never consider military provocations against a neighbor. But Beijing also has compelling reasons to increase the country's standing and diminish that of the United States and its allies. Given that the ruling Chinese Communist Party has staked its reputation towards that end, China's leaders should be expected to consider all available options to achieve it.

#### 1AC Kroenig says Taiwan conflict---China will only invade when they think the door is closing---they’ll pursue gradual reunification now, but losing military control causes quick and violent lash out.

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IS THERE A DEADLINE FOR UNIFICATION? CHINA’S STRATEGIC PATIENCE Xi Jinping’s repeated association of Taiwan unification with the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” has led some to infer that the 2049 target for the latter is in fact the deadline. As a younger Chinese scholar suggested to me: “There’s a deadline within a non-deadline.” Some Chinese leaders may in fact believe that 2049 is the unification deadline, but my reading of Xi’s speeches is that he is in fact careful not to make explicit what may seem implicit. This makes perfect sense. To state a hard deadline might lead Taiwan and the United States to take actions that undermine Beijing’s Taiwan goals. Not publicly setting a target date for unification avoids the risk of having to act on the implied threat should the designated time arrive with Taiwan still outside “the embrace of the motherland.” Rather than think in terms of a deadline, it makes more sense to try to determine, at any given time, whether PRC leaders perceive that the door to achieving their goal is opening, closing, or standing still. Clearly, a judgment that the door is closing — for example, in the form of an active program by Taiwan leaders to move toward what looks like de jure independence — would demand action in response. If Beijing believes that the long-term trends are favorable for unification — that the door remains open, and that the melon will at some point fall from the stem — then patience is justified. On balance, Xi’s January 2019 speech suggests that Beijing does not believe that the door to unification is closing and that patience is justified and necessary. He in no way altered the unification goal and 1C2S formula, but his remarks do not betray a sense of danger looming or an urgency to resolve the issue. Each Taiwan presidential and legislative election and the attendant re-shuffling of the political deck will provide milestones for calibrating PRC confidence about the future. A KMT victory in 2020 would boost Beijing’s confidence, and Beijing could probably tolerate a narrow win by Tsai. After all, it survived two terms of Chen Shui-bian. The medium-term scenario that is most likely to alarm Chinese leaders is if Tsai managed to win in 2020 and then a next-generation DPP leader won in 2024. That would indicate a fundamental, pro-DPP shift in Taiwan public opinion that would imply that the door to unification is closing. Looking more long term, Xi in his speech did revive the idea that “the long-standing political differences between the two sides of the Strait are the major causes that prevent cross-Strait relations from proceeding steadily. This should not be passed down generation after generation.” The implication of that statement is that the longer the issue is unresolved, the more peaceful separation will grow as a problem for China. From the 2028 Taiwan presidential election on, each new administration that does not make significant movement towards unification will raise doubts in Beijing that it will ever happen. The closer that Hong Kong gets to the end of the 50-year period under 1C2S, the more people in China will feel the need to rely on more than strategic patience with Taiwan characteristics. TAIWAN’S RESPONSE The fundamental cleavage between the KMT and DPP defines how politicians and society respond to Beijing’s current pressure campaign against the Tsai administration. The DPP believes that the pressure is real and is a manifestation of the malevolent intentions that Beijing and its Taiwan allies hold concerning the future of the island. The KMT believes that Tsai’s refusal to accommodate Beijing on the 1992 Consensus justifies the PRC’s negative response. But it is not just a party cleavage that is operative here. Divisions within each camp complicate matters. This is particularly true within the DPP, where the “fundamentalists” are very critical of Tsai’s relative moderation towards China and her unwillingness to pursue symbolic initiatives that explicitly or implicitly promote their independence agenda. Tsai has not completely resisted that agenda. She gave the green light to a transitional justice project, the main effect of which was to deprive the KMT of assets under its control. Her willingness to go along with a relaxation of the referendum law is another, one that the DPP came to regret after the KMT used referendums to block action on certain policy issues. Yet the fact that former premier William Lai challenged Tsai for the party’s presidential nomination is the clearest evidence that this division is real. The KMT also has its divisions, mainly between the northern wing (which is more mainlander in its composition and China-friendly in its orientation) and the southern wing, which is more Taiwanese and skeptical of China on non-economic issues. This division exploded into view when Ma tried to purge legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng in 2013. These multiple cleavages impede any attempt to forge a cross-party consensus on how to deal with China across the board. Such a consensus, to be realistic, would have to start with the premise that Taiwan as a polity and society is under threat and must meet that challenge on a more unified basis. But such a consensus is difficult if and as long as the blue camp believes that the policies of the DPP administration are more of a threat to Taiwan than China is. The desire of some in the DPP to settle scores for long-ago KMT abuses during its authoritarian rule also deepens division. On one issue, there has been broad consensus within Taiwan, and that is the importance of the role of the United States. The KMT and the DPP compete as to which does a better job of managing the relationship with Washington. Beijing blames the United States for blocking unification and encouraging separatism through its security commitment and arms sales to Taiwan. Successive U.S. administrations have supported Taiwan in order to ensure that it does not have to negotiate under duress. But the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations also sought to constrain the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations from actions that would unnecessarily alarm China. On the other hand, the Trump administration’s steps to improve relations with Taipei in the diplomatic and security spheres does create the possibility that Taiwan might be drawn into U.S.-China strategic competition beyond what is wise or necessary. That said, the main reason Beijing has not made progress toward unification is not the U.S. role but its own refusal to adapt its policy to Taiwan political realities, as well as its insistence that Taiwan leaders meet preconditions before productive cross-Strait relations can occur. In this as well, intimidation may be a better way for Beijing to diminish the effectiveness of U.S. support, precisely because it is more difficult for Washington to counter.

#### Their scenarios should be presumed false---hegemony good evidence is funded by elite knowledge networks to fabricate an internationalist consensus.

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American elite knowledge networks center on the strategic and heavily interconnected corporate-philanthropic foundation. The liberal Ford and Rockefeller foundations and conservative variants all fund knowledge networks.28 Unburdened by electors or shareholders, these institutions are governed by trustees drawn from corporations, government, corporate media, and elite universities. Their elitist mindsets and ethno-racial and class identities differentiate these trustees from the majority of Americans. We can track the rise of American global hegemony by exploring the increasing significance of foundations and the institutional architecture that owes its origins to concentrated corporate wealth. At home, this comprised a dense network of think tanks, university foreign affairs organizations, area studies, and social-scientific programs, all of which interlinked with practitioners in politics, media, and government. These elite knowledge networks built long-term relationships that created pathways for the international circulation of ideas, people, and money, and usually connected strongly with American organizations like the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). These knowledge networks’ greatest achievement is the elaboration of a liberal-internationalist elite consensus that rejects isolationism and spans the two main political parties, the media, and attentive publics. With the American state’s full cooperation, such knowledge networks helped to establish the post-1945 liberal international order that included Bretton Woods, the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and NATO.

Official institutions of the liberal international order included the intertwined spines of the private and state-private institutional architecture that had been established during the Cold War to perform the major functions of US hegemonic knowledge networks. These networks grew deep roots in core Western states and civil societies. Symbiotic with NATO, European unity, and the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, such networks provided an international umbrella and developed politically powerful domestic constituencies that were invested in the liberal international order.29

Nevertheless, hegemony studies neglects American ideational-infrastructural power that is operationalized and embedded in influential power-knowledge networks, with linkages that unify private/public domains and international/domestic spheres, and that legitimize domestic vertical power inequality and horizontal inequalities between societies. Those networks are the power technology of the foreign policy establishment.30 Such neglect diminishes our understanding of the forces that perpetuate American hegemony and enable hegemonic elites to block or manage discontent. This article’s neo-Gramscian argument is that, despite crises and challenges that include the disruptive effects of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and subsequent Twitter-disseminated rhetoric, those networks continue to successfully manage, channel, or block threats to American hegemony. Such networks are likely to remain significant during the Trump presidency, and to constrain attempts to radically alter the liberal international order.

#### U.S. hegemony provokes blowback aggression due to status insecurity, sanitizes imperialism, and dooms international cooperation---decline spurs a great power concert that solves war and existential threats.

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Why Liberal Internationalism Will Fail (Again)

But in recent weeks, mainstream US foreign policy experts have provided their own spin in progressive internationalism. Advocates and practitioners of a traditional hegemonic foreign policy have sought to co-opt progressive internationalism in a series of essays which argue for the necessity of American power and global influence. These writers embody the post-Cold War centrist foreign policy coalition of liberal internationalists and neoconservatives. For them, that the greatest threat to the democratic “free” world created by the United States remains the autocratic governance model of Russia and China. While Washington should pursue cooperation on transnational governance issues where possible, they argue it cannot do so at the expense of making security concessions which would reward revisionist behavior by great power rivals. As in the past, American exceptionalism remains the identity narrative justifying a return to US hegemony, with Anglo-American norms serving as the basis for hegemonic socialization and cooperation.

The internationalist disposition is a reminder of why a mere social democratic twist on US hegemony will fail to provide actual security for the United States and its allies. Establishment voices continue to rely on state-centric assumptions about IR and ignore how state identities and interests are a function of their relationship with each other. Or, as Jennifer Mitzen and Michelle Murray might argue, the revisionist intentions of Russia and China are a product of their ontological insecurity. A hegemonic United States defending an Anglo-American order denies them recognition of their own great power identities and their right to participate in all deliberations about global order. From this perspective, we should challenge the implicit assumption made by Anthony Blinken and Robert Kagan that Russia is revisionist by nature. An internationalist perspective suggests that Russia has adopted those intentions in relation to a Wilsonian United States which seeks domination over Moscow and the transformation of its political system. The same is true for China, which rejects being cast as a “responsible stakeholder” by Washington which would eventually accept democracy following its internal transformation by global capitalism. In other words, the very terms of US relations with these states over the past 25 years is the source of their revisionist intentions, and not some essentialized feature of their domestic politics.

Further, a liberal exceptionalist narrative that contrasts “Eastern autocracy” with “Western freedom” masks how the United States has perpetuated its own systems of illiberal dominance throughout its history. Those same structures of oppression are the greatest threat to contemporary US democracy and also serve as glaring evidence of US hypocrisy. In his defense of American exceptionalism, Jake Sullivan represents institutional racism as a bug rather than a feature of the American political system by emphasizing the liberal ideals of the Founders and casting Donald Trump’s white ethnonationalism as an aberration. But this telling of the American story whitewashes the long history of an exclusive, white ethnic US identity dating back to the early 19th Century and its role in generating the modern United States. Scholars of American political development and US history have long demonstrated that institutions of slavery and land conquest constituted US society and made possible its economic prosperity rather than some kind of intrinsic tendency toward freedom.

Fast-forward to the present: liberal exceptionalism further denies how economic globalization made possible the rise of authoritarianism. Nils Gilman and David Klion rightly argue that the kleptocratic alliance between autocrats and oligarchs is the true threat to democracy and rule of law. Their ability to concentrate political and economic power has been enabled by the emergence of an integrated global market that privileges the freedom of capital over the needs of ordinary people, one created by the United States when liberal internationalism went global after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Finally, attempts to revive US hegemony will doom transnational efforts to deal with existential non-state threats. Hegemonists like Thomas Wright argue that Russia and China are the greatest threat to the United States, and that Washington should never make concessions to either power as a means of ensuring cooperation on issues of global governance. However, “ring-fencing” global capitalism and climate change as separate issues will fail to achieve the necessary level of cooperation to cope with these threats. National security policymakers cannot recognize that the greatest dangers faced by US citizens are non-state economic and ecological global processes that shape domestic politics from the inside-out, and not rival sovereigns. Economic destitution to the point of embracing fascist dictators coupled with environmental collapse are near-certain non-state threats which transcend our boundaries – in fact, as a global power, the United States has been complicit in creating them.

The internationalist disposition would suggest that the priorities of US foreign policy must change. Regulating global processes should be the primary objective, and it requires that the United States pursue intense macro-levels of cooperation with all other states, including its rivals, to achieve them. Yet it will be unlikely to do so if it remains wedded to liberal hegemony and consumed by great power competition. Short-term incentives to accumulate resources and power will override the long-term need for global governance. The result will be a world whose people live in precarity, ravaged by climate change, and constantly on the verge of great power war.

From “Disposition” to “Grand Strategy”

The internationalist disposition clearly illustrates why old US strategies are incompatible with the progressive internationalism of the US left. However, contra Colás, progressives should not avoid developing of a positive vision for foreign policy due to the diverse range of radical perspectives. To do so would cede pro-restraint arguments to structural realist and libertarian advocates of offshore balancing who offer no template for global engagement or institutional cooperation. What progressives must do is articulate a grand strategy, or a plan that mobilizes all elements of national power and influence, grounded in a relationalist ontology that combines restraint with internationalism. This strategy must be post-hegemonic (a term even Ikenberry has flirted with), post-statist, and supportive of intense international cooperation based on the diversity of identities and values otherwise ignored by the universalist pretenses of Anglo-American liberalism. If our very existence is mutually dependent on others, then we need a foreign policy based on solidarity in response to collectively experienced threats.

I think there is a strategy consistent with the international disposition: great power concert. A concert strategy requires that all great powers pursue mutual accommodation and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment to maintain international stability. Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any one actor, such as the United States, to establish rules for global governance which can mobilize all others. On this basis, a concert strategy would lead the United States to collaborate with others on the basis of mutual co-existence and embrace joint decision-making at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism.

Security and The Balance of Power

A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.

#### U.S. hegemony is a smokescreen for imperialism---their authors wish away millions of avoidable casualties caused by U.S. interventions to uphold hierarchal domination.

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In that reality, the United States has long been an imperial power with white nationalist aspirations. Given the racialized nature of U.S. imperial expansion, it makes sense that Alexis de Tocqueville predicted, in a chapter entitled “The Three Races of the United States,” that the United States would one day govern “the destinies of half the globe.” In its early days, while still a slave-holding country, the United States asserted its sovereignty through genocide on a continental scale and annexed large portions of northern Mexico. The country went on to overthrow the independent state of Hawaii, occupied the Philippines and Haiti, exerted its regional power throughout Latin America, expanded its international hegemony after World War II, and became what it is today: the world’s foremost military and nuclear power with a $716 billion “defense” budget that exceeds the spending of all other major global powers combined.

“Taking over from the British Empire in the early twentieth-century,” argues James Tully, the United States has used its many military bases located “outside its own borders”—now nearly 800 in over 80 countries— to force open-door economic policies and antidemocratic regimes on states throughout the formerly colonized world. An extremely partial list of sovereign governments that the United States either overthrew or attempted to subvert through military means, assassinations, or election tampering since 1949 includes Syria, Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba, Chile, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Yemen, Australia, Greece, Bolivia, and Angola. Such interventionist policies have contributed substantially to today’s inegalitarian world in which an estimated 783 million people live in profound poverty. In sum, for untold millions of humans in the Global South, the seventy years of worldwide order, security, and prosperity that Ikenberry and Deudney associate with Pax Americana has been anything but ordered, secure, or prosperous.

And yet the norm against noticing prevents foreign policy analysis from even acknowledging—let alone grappling with—the relationship between race and imperialism that has characterized U.S. international relations from the country’s earliest days. This regime of politely un-seeing—of deflecting—connections between U.S. foreign policy, race hierarchy, and colonial administration was clearly not in effect when Foreign Affairs was released under its original name: the Journal of Race Development. This began to change, however, in the 1920s. Among other contributing factors, World War I, the rise of anti-colonial revolutions, and the emergence of liberal internationalism as a popular ideology helped convince foreign policy experts in the United States and Europe to adopt a policy language oriented toward “development” rather than imperialism or racial difference. Mainstream international relations scholarship today remains committed to a narrative in which the discipline itself and U.S. foreign policy has always been and remains race blind, concerned solely with the relationship between sovereign states who cooperate, deter, or compete with one another in a global system in which the United States is simply, like Caesar, the “first citizen” (Ikenberry) or “the luckiest great power in modern history” (Walt). For liberals, this involves a studied erasure of the imperial origins of twentieth-century internationalism in the League of Nations’ Mandate system and the complicity of Woodrow Wilson in preserving, as Adom Getachew puts it, “white supremacy on a global scale.” For realists, it requires both forgetting the anti-Enlightenment origins of postwar realist thought and reinserting the “security dilemma” back into history so that, with the help of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, the world can—as Slavoj Žižek says—“become what it always was.”

International relations experts will acknowledge U.S. violence and overreach when necessary, but routinely read the illiberalism of U.S. foreign policy as an exception that is not at all representative, in Anne Marie Slaughter’s words, of “the idea that is America.” Slaughter, with Ikenberry, can consider bad behavior only briefly and only in the service of insisting that what matters most is not what the United States actually does with its power but what it intends to do. Yes, “imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history,” Ikenberry and Deudney argue, but what matters is that liberalism “has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices.” Indeed, even those public intellectuals such as Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff who, after September 11, called for the United States to embrace its status as an imperial power, framed their arguments in deflective, liberal terms. By contrast, because realists project the security dilemma retroactively into history (while also simultaneously excising imperialism) they can only see the U.S. destabilization of Third World economies, assassinations, and secret bombings as tragic necessities (great powers, claims Mearsheimer, “have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system”) or as the result of liberals’ ill-advised desire to force “our” values on other nations. Both of these deflective strategies reinforce the illusion that we live, in Nikhil Pal Singh’s words, in an “American-centered, racially inclusive world, one organized around formally equal and independent nation states” where some states just happen to have more power than others, and where the alternative—Russian or Chinese hegemony—is too frightening even to contemplate.

That deflection would play such an outsized role in supporting the ideological edifice of international relations today is hardly surprising. Turn-of-the-century British liberals who supported their empire also drew upon a variety of different deflective strategies to reconcile the violence and illiberalism of British imperial expansion with the stated liberal goals of the Empire. Such deflection made it impossible for these thinkers—many of whom would go on to work as some of the first international relations scholars in Britain and help found The Royal Institute of International Affairs—to link the problems of empire with the violence and disruption of imperialism.

Similarly, deflection within international relations today obscures the U.S. role in maintaining the profoundly hierarchical, racist, insecure, deeply unjust reality of the current global order. It also makes it impossible to address how U.S. foreign policy (covert and overt) has contributed to the destabilization of that order by creating the circumstances that give rise to “failed states,” “rogue regimes,” and “sponsors of terrorism.” Moreover, it impedes any theorizing about how the widespread appeal of Trump’s xenophobia at home might, in part, be the product of U.S. foreign policy abroad, the bitter fruit of the War on Terror and its equally violent predecessors. In other words, in the grand tradition of liberal empire, U.S. foreign policy deflection actively disrupts the link between cause and effect that an entire science of international relations was created to explain.

### Advantage 2---1NC

#### K turns clean energy---so we don’t need 1NC indicts.

#### Globalization causes war---populist backlash ensures instability and conflict that flips any benefit.

---Specifically indicts interdependence theory.

Gonzalez-Vicente 18, University Lecturer in Global Political Economy @ U Leiden (Ruben, “The liberal peace fallacy: violent neoliberalism and the temporal and spatial traps of state-based approaches to peace,” *Territoriality, Politics, Governance*, 8.1)

Yet, the contemporary ascension of nationalist and populist movements and leaders that herald deeply illiberal views (Xi included) must come as no surprise after decades of neoliberal triumphalism and the promotion of a transnational order that placed the crafting of a world market above the needs of societies themselves. In such a context, the contemporary rise of nationalism and populisms across the world is not some liberal order antithesis emerging from a vacuum, but rather a logical consequence of this liberal order, constituting an often reactionary ‘counter movement’ that cannot be tackled with liberal prescriptions for increased market globalization (Polanyi, 2001). This paper takes aim at the now long-held and recently revitalized argument for a liberal peace. While not attempting to predict any specific outcome regarding the future of global peace, it argues that the rise of illiberal and reactionary discourses that we now observe, and their potential corollaries, must be understood in a dialectical sense as the result of a liberal market-oriented inter-state order that failed to tackle the great social dislocation that it played a fundamental role in fomenting.

To develop this critique, I draw upon three main bodies of literature that, despite their apparent affinities, are seldom brought together. These include Polanyi and Gramsci-inspired understandings of hegemonic crisis, counter-movements, and the rise of nationalism and populism (Gill, 2015; Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017); critical political economies of social conflict within a context of neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2005; Springer, 2015); and political geography analyses of international relations theory (IRT), and more specifically critical geographies of peace (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Flint, 2005; Koopman, 2016; McConnell, Megoran, & Williams, 2014; Megoran, 2011; Nagle, 2010; Williams & McConnell, 2011). Elaborating upon these, I contend that the methodological nationalism of the disciplines of economics and international relations – in which much of the liberal view is based – has left them in a sorry state in making sense of recent political development throughout the world, specifically when addressing the contemporary rise of reactionary forms of populism.

In this sense, the high degrees of violence and vulnerability associated with processes of market integration have often escaped the radars of economics and IR analyses, fixated as they are with mono-scale scrutiny of national economies and state-to-state relations. Although some liberal IR scholars have laid the grounds for a less normative paradigm that incorporates domestic variables and bottom-up societal processes into the understanding of state action, the assumption remains that policy interdependence and compatibility between states, combined with the Pareto-efficient outcomes of globally integrated production and trade, result in ‘strong incentives for coexistence with low conflict’ (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 521; see also Oneal & Russett, 1997; McDonald & Sweeney, 2007). Recent developments suggest there are fundamental flaws with this largely deductive hypothesis. Whereas on aggregate terms, and according to some measurements, nation-states may have benefitted more or less from globalization, social conflict occurring at multiple scales – and indeed in a class-based dimension – is an undeniable constitutive element of state action, the latter reflecting and/or attempting to contain particular constellations of social forces and their interests. In this way, the damage inflicted upon many by increasingly disembedded markets and post-political states that shield policy from popular deliberation (both the products of the liberal agenda) are at the very root of the current crisis of liberal hegemony (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017).

In what follows, I draw upon a variety of cases to explain how a dialectical approach to liberalism, neoliberalism and their illiberal responses,1 and a multi-scalar analysis of market violence are indispensable in explaining much of the turbulence that world politics faces today. To be clear, the paper’s goal is not to deny that state leaders factor in the economic repercussions of conflict when they contemplate its possibility – a logical assumption of liberal international relations scholarship. The aim is instead to argue that these calculations tell very little about the nature of peace and conflict as historically bounded processes that need to be studied in relation to broader transformations in the global political economy, the latter affecting state behaviour in terms of both economic policy and inter-state rivalry. In this way, and crucially, I also wish to refute the liberal argument that the pursuit of economic integration at any (social) cost will unequivocally lower the prospects for international conflict or, indeed, structural violence more broadly understood as a multi-scalar phenomenon.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section problematizes the concept of peace in IRT, with a more detailed discussion of economic liberalism. The following section presents a temporal critique, contextualizing the contemporary rise of illiberal politics within the transformation of the global political economy under world market capitalism. After this, I build upon Agnew (1994) to develop a scalar critique and argue that liberalism’s methodological nationalism hampers a proper assessment of the transnational dimensions of processes such as development, violence or peace. I chart various scales of market-induced violence and vulnerability (as a form of economic violence) in the global era, tracing the rescaling of violence and risk from the interstate scale to the individual sphere. I conclude by discussing the transition from a ‘durable disorder’ (Cerny, 1998) to an emerging (albeit contested) new populist order under world market capitalism. To do so, I echo Polanyi and Marx in contending that processes of marketization, replete as they are with contradiction, cannot engender liberal or capitalist peace, but result instead in anti-liberal reactions of various kinds (what Polanyi called ‘counter movements’) to the violence of unrestrained markets. Importantly, these counter movements can often take reactionary characteristics, as people under threat or the perception of threat retreat into culture and nationalism against the ‘other’ and internationalism in all its variants.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE LIBERAL PEACE

While the pursuit of peace is a central preoccupation for progressive IR scholarship, peace as a concept and as an actual manifestation is rarely discussed in the IR literature. Instead, peace often appears as a negative occurrence, intuitively understood as the avoidance of war or an absence of overt inter-state violence (Galtung, 1969; Richmond, 2016, p. 57). Thereby, most IR literature focuses on the challenges to state-based peace, with commentary typically dominated by the two main competing schools, realism and liberalism, both subdivided into further dissenting subcamps. Conventional realist approaches take the ‘anarchic’ or violent nature of international politics as a given and place their focus on states’ survival strategies. Offensive realists warn of the disruptive effects of ‘power transitions’ and in the contemporary context claim, for example, that as China grows economically and militarily, and as its interests expand and it seeks greater influence, tensions with other countries are certain to arise (Mearsheimer, 2014). Defensive neorealists hold similar assumptions about the foundations of the international system, yet contend that states privilege security over domination and that the incentives for conflict are contingent rather than endemic, with balances of power potentially keeping states at bay and preventing conflict (Waltz, 1979).

Liberal theorists dispute these interpretations and reject that competition alone guides state behaviour. Elaborating on the Kantian ideal of ‘perpetual peace’, and drawing upon Adam Smith, David Ricardo or John Stuart Mill, liberal theories contend that economic integration and institutional enmeshment or socialization exercise a constraining force on conflict and are conductive to peaceful scenarios (Doyle, 1986; Howard, 1981; Johnston, 2008; Keohane & Nye, 1977). While there is no absolute agreement on the exact shape that such ‘interdependence’ should take (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001), liberal IR scholars often hold that large-scale conflict in the 21st century can be avoided if the liberal world order survives the relative decline of the United States and manages to assimilate rising powers such as China. The emphasis is placed both on institutions and norms of reciprocity, on the one hand, and on economic integration, on the other. Regarding the latter, and evoking Smithian language, the agenda for a ‘capitalist peace’ assumes that free markets represent ‘“a hidden hand” that  …  build(s) up irrevocable and peaceful connections between states’ (Gartzke, 2007; Richmond, 2008, p. 23), and that ‘put simply, globalisation promotes peace’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003, p. 562). The theory is in many ways deductive, but relies also on the statistical data that on aggregate tends partially to support the liberal peace argument (except for the period leading to the First World War; see also Barbieri, 1996) and on the ‘logic’ that national leaders are not expected to act irrationally or be insensitive ‘to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors’ (Hegre, Oneal, & Russett, 2010, p. 772).

A more nuanced exposition of the liberal argument suggests that what brings nations together and heightens the opportunity cost of conflict is market integration according to a set of commonly devised regulations – rather than the realization of an ideal ‘free’ trade archetype (Moravcsik, 2005). This results in a sort of ‘embedded liberalism’, with the successful integration of post-Soviet states and China in world market capitalism through World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and other liberalizing initiatives understood as a deterrent to military action and, hence, as an effective strategy for both global growth and security, particularly in the face of China’s rising economic and military might (Funabashi, Oksenberg, & Weiss, 1994). From this perspective, not only is violence avoidable but also peace may indeed be engineered with the creation of a world market society being key to this endeavour as well as to the broader goal of crafting a liberal hegemony able to deliver a veritable ‘end of history’ where markets and functioning liberal democracies prevail (Fukuyama, 1992). The engineering of market-orientated democracies has indeed often been the main task of liberal peace- and state-building operatives in post-conflict areas (Campbell, Chandler, & Sabaratnam, 2011).

Yet, decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its realization. Across the world, liberal market integration has facilitated convivial relations among key countries and paid important dividends to elites, yet it has also resulted in the concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands, rising inequalities within countries (although not between them) and higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as the logic of market competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives (Anand & Segal, 2015; Lynch, 2006). The relation between the United States and China or the processes of economic integration in the European Union are clear examples of these trends. In these places as well as others, inequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to a populist and nationalist momentum that can be interpreted both as a popular response to the extreme and diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). By prescribing ever more market globalization to counter populist politics and avoid conflict, liberal elites add fuel to the fire as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranchisement of significant segments of the population in the first place. Thereby, it is crucial to understand how the argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness along market lines.2

Two of the underlying problems in the liberal peace argument stand out. The first has to do with the statistical selection of fixed points in time that suggest correlations between growth in trade and diminished conflict – while failing to discern mechanisms of causation (Hayes, 2012). A wider temporal lens is needed to situate the contemporary rise of mercantilist and illiberal politics in the context of neoliberal globalization, representing the same sort of ‘counter movement’ that Polanyi had warned of in his reading of the 19th-century downward spiral towards war – aided in our contemporary case by the demise of the traditional left (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017; Carroll & Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017). The second problem relates to liberal international political economy and IRT’s scalar fixation on inter-state matters and hence their inability to factor in violence in the absence of war. I turn now to these two points.

NEOLIBERALISM’S ILLIBERAL MOMENT AS COUNTER MOVEMENT

On paper, the two intertwined arguments for liberal peace would seem to make sense: if countries remove the barriers to trade and investment and choose to specialize in their comparative advantages, international productivity will be raised and we will enjoy a more prosperous global economy with satisfied consumers and states; also, if states develop close economic linkages, they will have important material incentives to avoid conflict with one another. In the real world, competition between jurisdictions and social groups implies often that the development and prosperity of some is based on the exploitation and vulnerability of others, as typically emphasized by the extensive literature on bifurcated economies, temporally constrained and contradictory growth patterns, and uneven and destructive forms of development. In this way, it is not that economic interdependence, when removed from its social context and put under the microscope, does not raise the costs of conflict. However, the political choices and social transformations needed to achieve interdependence are a key variable to understanding a state’s behaviour and predisposition to conflict. And while governments may in many junctures align with the interests of capital, they are not immune to crises of legitimacy, and will need to mediate issues of accumulation and social cohesion when people perceive the social transformations required to achieve interdependence to have a negative impact on their lives (Jessop, 2016, p. 189). This will reflect in a way or another on state behaviour as political elites, current and prospective, jostle for votes and/or legitimacy.

A key problem with the argument for liberal peace lies in its emphasis on narrow temporal correlations between trade and (lack of) conflict, which removes interdependence from its broader political economic context, disembedding peace and conflict from the broader set of historically bounded and politically contingent social relations that underpin them. A widened analytical timeframe renders clear the dialectical relationship between (neo)liberal social projects and their social responses, both progressive and reactionary. Whereas high volumes of trade may coincide at a particular ‘optimal’ period of liberal expansionism with interstate peace, they may also transform societies in ways that engender the conditions for a potential ‘illiberal’ turn or counter movement resulting in a higher risk of conflict as beggar-thy-neighbour positions emerge and new enemies need to be sought by political elites to bind national-constrained constituencies to their agendas to maintain power.

We can observe this temporal incongruity in the work of some of the key proponents of the capitalist peace. For example, Oneal and Russett (1999, p. 439) argue that trade ‘sharply reduces the onset of or involvement in militarized disputes among contiguous and major-power pairs’, which are identified by Maoz and Russett (1993) as the set of countries more likely to enter into conflict with each other. Despite Oneal and Russett’s sophisticated approach to the data (modelling, for example, to avoid ‘false negatives’ by factoring in geographic contiguity, or controlling for alliances) and the attention paid to statistical rejections of the liberal peace argument, trade interdependence and the occurrence of conflict are analyzed on a year-by-year basis (Oneal & Russett, 1999, p. 428). This is also the case with other comparable studies (Hegre, 2000; Oneal & Russett, 2001; Souva & Prins, 2006). This temporal frame is problematic, as inter-national conflict tends to build up over prolonged periods of time, and the adverse impacts of interdependence and liberal integration are more likely to result first in crisis and social dislocation, followed by some sort of economic distancing (perhaps under a new administration that replaces the one that embraced liberalization) and a wide range of policy measures, before leading to military conflict – underpinned either by the state that perceives that liberal integration is having negative impacts on socioeconomic development, or more often than not by the one which wants to prevent the deterioration of important trade and investment links.

Here, one vital issue often left out of the liberal peace equations is the fact that most military interventions in the post-Second World War period were aimed at disciplining countries that opted out of the United States’ global liberalizing project and sought to pursue a variety of indigenous pathways to modernity, often including many that did so under the rubric of socialism, democratically achieved or otherwise. The reverse is also true, as countries that chose to ally with the United States during the Cold War were shielded from attacks, and in some cases given preferential trade access, technology transfer and allowed to engage in market protection. In this context, associating conflict with the lack of strong trade links, rather than to the meticulous unfolding of a market-based imperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding that low opium consumption was responsible for British military expeditions in 19th-century China. While there is certainly a correlation between China’s ban on opium and British intervention, nobody could seriously suggest that opium consumption reduces interstate conflict. Similarly, in many of these cases, it is not that the absence of trade results in conflict, but on the contrary, that military intervention has often been aimed at expanding markets and protecting investment.

#### No US-EU coop, for reasons other than antitrust.

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On a broad level, the U.S. and Europe agree on the need for new regulations to limit dangers from the authoritarian digital model. They want to reign in tech monopolies. They want to protect privacy. They want to combat disinformation that threatens democracy.

On a practical level, both favors strengthened export controls of dangerous technology. A good example of cooperation concerns semiconductors. While the US is leading in most stages of the semiconductor supply chain, the Dutch company ASML dominates lithography equipment production. Even under President Trump, the Dutch government agreed to stop ASML from selling its most advanced machines to China.

Unfortunately, though, protectionism threatens to undermine future progress. The Biden Administration’s massive infrastructure plan and new “Supply Chain Disruptions Task Force” aim to keep innovation and production of leading-edge technology at home, making the U.S. a technological leader. Biden’s Buy America Executive Order (EO) encourages domestic procurement of “goods, products, materials, and services from sources that help the American businesses compete in strategic industries and help America’s workers thrive”. The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council is developing recommendations to extend requirements to information technology.

The U.S. is pouring public money into strategic digital industries. In a rare bipartisan vote, Congress approved $52 billion in subsidies in June for chip research and manufacturing. States from Wisconsin, Texas, and Nevada are showering tax benefits on digital tech giants including Amazon, Apple, and Google to build factories and data centers.

Europe similarly is determined to build its own tech capacities. It promotes the concept of digital sovereignty aimed at providing the continent the capacity to make “autonomous technological choices.” Several projects promote domestic production of critical technologies ranging from next-generation mobile phone production to quantum computing. Public funds already are being spent on the

European cloud computing project GAIA-X aims to break the U.S. stranglehold on cloud computing. While Europe insists that its actions are not protectionist, designed instead to promote and safeguard European values, GAIA-X aims to ensure data protection and limit access of U.S. intelligence to European data. U.S. tech giants including Amazon, Google, and Microsoft have been invited to join, but are banned from joining the board.

The U.S. is home to the world’s largest Internet companies and fears that European regulatory measures will discriminate against them. Plans for a European “digital” tax – put on hold to secure a global corporate tax reform – would disproportionately impact American companies that provide digital services in Europe. A separate Digital Markets Act proposal under consideration at the European Parliament addresses unfair practices of the so-called “gatekeepers,” that operate “core platform services.” Most of the targeted companies will likely be American, beginning with giants Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon.

Europe and the U.S. need to step back from pursuing their protectionist instincts, which threatens to allow China’s increasing inroads into the digital market. Beijing is making investments on all continents on projects ranging from education to critical infrastructure. Many countries are turning to China for support and guidance on technological development while the U.S. and the EU focus on their domestic anxieties and ambitions.

A transatlantic tech alliance could provide the blueprint for offering a viable alternative to Chinese inroads in the developing world. Europe and the U.S. need to coordinate against the export of authoritarian practices on the Internet. They can only do this by dropping the push for Buy American and European Digital Sovereignty.

#### Liberal understandings of “misinformation” ARE misinformation

Moufawad-Paul 17 J. January 17, 2017, The Magical Thinking of the US Liberal Establishment, <http://moufawad-paul.blogspot.com/2017/01/the-magical-thinking-of-us-liberal.html> ND.

Having lost the US election to Trump reactionism, rather than recognize their role in the reemergence of fascism the Democrats have resorted to magical thinking. Rather than realizing they were part of the problem of fascism––that they enabled Trump, that they were part of the settler-garrison racist ethos that is USAmerica and thus presented not even the ghost of a marginal alternative––the Democrats resorted to conspiracy theories about Russian hacking. As one of my good friends joked, the neo-liberals that once prided themselves in their hawkish realism have taken to bandying about the kind of conspiracy theory crackpot explanations that they always accused Republicans of making. Anything but realize that there is something deeply wrong with US democracy and the USAmerican project. This magical thinking is all the more ludicrous since, like most conspiracy theories, it is necessarily ineffective. Trump will still be inaugurated in a few days, the liberals will crow about foreign hackers and allow this to prevent them from actually resisting fascism (after all, if it's a conspiracy then one can do nothing but complain), and in the process deride and hamper actual anti-fascists, who despised Clinton almost as much as Trump, from organizing a viable counter-movement. It is a farcical and contradictory standpoint as well: Clinton won the majority vote, so the imagined Russian intervention was apparently not that effective, and the millions of working poor who did not vote did not have their minds hacked––they simply did not participate because they saw no reason to take part in the circus. Maintaining that Putin was the hidden hand behind Trump's election possesses its own particular irony. Putin, the product of the shock therapy liberalization of the former Soviet Union, inherited a social formation that was itself the product of US interference. Putin only exists because the US violently tampered with the various political processes that generated glasnost and perestroika. He is a US-created Frankenstein that has turned against its creator. The fact that we are to take this conspiracy theory seriously is repeated ad nauseam by mainstream news sources who have recently gone out of their way to declare everything outside of official sites of propaganda fake news. Never mind the fact that serious journalists who knew the identity of the people behind the leaks were saying that these leaks were not Russian, never mind the fact that the Guardian was caught falsifying an interview with Assange (who, though problematic, is no more ethically dubious than mainstream journalists)… the proof is apparently the statements made by the intelligence community who are now supposed to be trusted when, if we were realists about government "conspiracy", they ought to be treated as the least credible sources. But why precisely would the CIA claim Russian interference? It would be a mistake to see the intelligence community as Democratic partisans interested primarily in supporting the Clinton campaign just as it would be a mistake to believe that they are telling the truth about Russian involvement, particularly since the latter has been disputed by those journalists and experts who are autonomous from the intelligence community and have long challenged the "real news" sites of propaganda. Moreover, the fact that the intelligence community is making these assertions but is not organizing the kind of measures that it could and should organize in the face of a foreign threat

(i.e. a military coup, assassination, everything it possesses the means and vocation to do as the most powerful intelligence organization in the world) is quite telling. The fact is that Trump is an outlier who, because of his enormous ego and self-mythologization, saw himself outside of the bourgeois political community. To be clear, he understood himself as part of the bourgeois class––he revelled in the cesspit of bourgeois parasitism and depredation, pretended he was a self-made man, played the patriarch plutocrat. The problem was that he was new to the US political establishment, an especial bourgeois community that understood its national class commitments required a certain level of cooperation within the sphere of governance, and thus imagined he could make it his own… rebuilding it like another Trump Tower, transforming it into a season of the Apprentice, squatting in the Oval Office and pissing around its boundaries. Since the government is not a single corporation and the president is not a CEO, the kind of macho self-mythologization of lumpen-bourgeois avatars like Trump is immediately at odds with governance. The US president has long functioned as a figurehead who represents the entire spectrum of the bourgeois class, a participant in a variety of institutions that maintain hegemony. Obama, despite using progressive language to win the election, understood his role and embraced austerity capitalism: all the teary farewells to his regime should not be allowed to drown the fact that he represented a government that was to the right of Richard Nixon. But Trump, who wallows in his retrograde fantasies, will be even more right… But that's not what makes him a problem––what makes him a problem is his hyper-macho "I-will-be-in-charge-of-everything" bravado. The Russian conspiracy theory is intended to make him fall in line. The US intelligence agency does not care about the fascist emergence he represents since they have been more than happy to endorse fascist dictators and fascistic measures; they simply want him to be a team player in US hegemony. Indeed, the fact that the conspiracy theory has been successful as a disciplinary measure can be judged in Trump's recent flip-flopping over some aspects of his isolationism: in the face of these charges he is now condemning Russia and proving that he can be a team player with US hegemony abroad. Once he agrees to that, the US intelligence community will be more than happy to let his fascist supporters to proliferate since fascism has always been something with which the US has been happy to permit. That is, the intelligence community is not an anti-fascist front, and it would be a mistake to treat them a such, but only concerned with maintaining imperialist business as usual––a business which has always gone hand-in-hand with USAmerican ethos. Hence, any resistance to the Trump presidency in the US must break from the magical thinking promoted by the Democrats, refuse to assume that the CIA or FBI will ride into save the day, and stop thinking that the Hilary Clinton regime is a viable alternative to the viciousness of the Donald. Every US president, from Obama to Clinton to Trump, should be treated as anathema; the US must be removed from the world and the US itself.

#### Antitrust is just one of many disagreements.

Atkinson 9-17-2021, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), a leading think tank for science and technology policy (Robert, “How to improve transatlantic relations without caving to Europe on technology and trade,” <https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/572707-how-to-improve-transatlantic-relations-without-caving-to-europe-on>)

Washington and Brussels later this month will send senior delegations of economic and trade ministers to the first meeting of a new U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, dubbed the “TTC.” Their goal, as the name suggests, is to foster high-level cooperation on trade and technology issues of mutual interest. Given the long-simmering tensions between the two governments on matters such as digital taxation, cross-border data flows, antitrust, and more, such an effort is overdue. Whether the United States and European Union succeed in using the TTC to rebuild the transatlantic relationship holds broad implications, because the alternative — strained engagement between major trading partners — would contribute to the global fragmentation of the digital economy. And worse, it would be a strategic gift to China, because it would represent a fatal dissolution of a key alliance needed to limit China’s technology mercantilism and counter its digital authoritarianism. Forward-looking policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic need to recognize this and redouble their efforts to build a better, stronger, and deeper digital-trading relationship. But to do that, U.S. and EU negotiators will need to meet in the middle on some critical issues. The White House should not define success as increasing cooperation for its own sake — particularly if the price of comity is embracing the EU’s precautionary approach to regulating competition and technological innovation. The administration’s emissaries should instead focus on advancing key U.S. economic interests in ways that also maintain cordial relations with Europe. For example, no matter how desperately the Biden administration’s trade negotiators may hope to restore harmonious transatlantic relations after watching in dismay as they deteriorated during the Trump administration, the United States cannot agree to a digital services tax or acquiesce to discriminatory regulation of internet platforms, as the European Commission seeks to do with its proposed Digital Markets Act. Either of those would skewer America’s leading technology companies (and kill U.S. jobs) and fundamentally alter longstanding regulatory principles at the expense of innovation and growth. By contrast, the administration and Congress could, and should, meet the EU somewhere in the middle on data protection — not by emulating its heavy-handed General Data Protection Regulation, but by passing a national privacy law that establishes a common set of protections across state lines while improving transparency and enforcement. That would hopefully persuade the EU to support robust cross-border data flows, while at the same time defending America’s pro-innovation regulatory system. The most glaring differences between the United States and the European Union on digital economy issues stem from the fact that technology policy in the EU is motivated largely by social policy concerns — from data privacy rights to the potential for algorithmic bias — and it views the proper role of government as one of regulating and restraining digital companies and technologies to ensure they cause no harm. In contrast, the United States has long acted on the view that government is the one that should do no harm — and, where it can, it should support technological innovation. As such, the Biden team should ensure that talks cover how to foster the growth of technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence. Besides, social concerns such as privacy, bias, and other related issues are best addressed at the national or regional level, not in bilateral or multilateral trade talks.

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#### The aff’s “Extinction first” framing is a new link---it willingly sacrifices billions in the Global South at the altar of a miniscule risk of extinction---there’s a reason only white elites like their impact framing.

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It’s this line of reasoning that leads Bostrom, Greaves, MacAskill, and others to argue that even the tiniest reductions in “existential risk” are morally equivalent to saving the lives of literally billions of living, breathing, actual people. For example, Bostrom writes that if there is “a mere 1 percent chance” that 10^54 conscious beings (most living in computer simulations) come to exist in the future, then “we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.” Greaves and MacAskill echo this idea in a 2021 paper by arguing that “even if there are ‘only’ 1014 lives to come … , a reduction in near-term risk of extinction by one millionth of one percentage point would be equivalent in value to a million lives saved.”

To make this concrete, imagine Greaves and MacAskill in front of two buttons. If pushed, the first would save the lives of 1 million living, breathing, actual people. The second would increase the probability that 10^14 currently unborn people come into existence in the far future by a teeny-tiny amount. Because, on their longtermist view, there is no fundamental moral difference between saving actual people and bringing new people into existence, these options are morally equivalent. In other words, they’d have to flip a coin to decide which button to push. (Would you? I certainly hope not.) In Bostrom’s example, the morally right thing is obviously to sacrifice billions of living human beings for the sake of even tinier reductions in existential risk, assuming a minuscule 1 percent chance of a larger future population: 1054 people.

All of this is to say that even if billions of people were to perish in the coming climate catastrophe, so long as humanity survives with enough of civilization intact to fulfill its supposed “potential,” we shouldn’t be too concerned. In the grand scheme of things, non-runaway climate change will prove to be nothing more than a “mere ripple” —a “small misstep for mankind,” however terrible a “massacre for man” it might otherwise be.

Even worse, since our resources for reducing existential risk are finite, Bostrom argues that we must not “fritter [them] away” on what he describes as “feel-good projects of suboptimal efficacy.” Such projects would include, on this account, not just saving people in the Global South—those most vulnerable, especially women—from the calamities of climate change, but all other non-existential philanthropic causes, too. As the Princeton philosopher Peter Singer writes about Bostrom in his 2015 book on Effective Altruism, “to refer to donating to help the global poor … as a ‘feel-good project’ on which resources are ‘frittered away’ is harsh language.” But it makes perfectly good sense within Bostrom’s longtermist framework, according to which “priority number one, two, three, and four should … be to reduce existential risk.” Everything else is smaller fish not worth frying.

If this sounds appalling, it’s because it is appalling. By reducing morality to an abstract numbers game, and by declaring that what’s most important is fulfilling “our potential” by becoming simulated posthumans among the stars, longtermists not only trivialize past atrocities like WWII (and the Holocaust) but give themselves a “moral excuse” to dismiss or minimize comparable atrocities in the future. This is one reason that I’ve come to see longtermism as an immensely dangerous ideology. It is, indeed, akin to a secular religion built around the worship of “future value,” complete with its own “secularised doctrine of salvation,” as the Future of Humanity Institute historian Thomas Moynihan approvingly writes in his book X-Risk. The popularity of this religion among wealthy people in the West—especially the socioeconomic elite—makes sense because it tells them exactly what they want to hear: not only are you ethically excused from worrying too much about sub-existential threats like non-runaway climate change and global poverty, but you are actually a morally better person for focusing instead on more important things—risk that could permanently destroy “our potential” as a species of Earth-originating intelligent life.

#### 4---Anti-trust makes tech more unethical---small companies expand surveillance capitalism and divide privacy along classist lines.

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A Skeptical View of the Neo-Brandeisian Perspective

Creating multiple, competing social media platforms sounds nice until one starts thinking about how digital capitalism works. For starters, in order to turn profits, a corporation needs to generate revenue. One way to do this is to spy on users and monetize their data for marketing such as through personalized ads. People generally do not like surveillance or ads, so the corporations owning the platform have to force it on them. Ads can only be imposed on people because social media networks own and control the infrastructure, which they run as centralized networks on their corporate clouds. Even with more competitors, each company would still own and control the infrastructure, so they can all impose an ad-based revenue model on their users.

In fact, we already see this in the app marketplace. Seventy percent of the apps in the two most popular app stores, Google Play and Apple iOS, have hidden app trackers that spy on users (Vallina-Rodriguez et al. 2016, O’Brien and Kwet 2018). There are millions of apps, yet “competition” does not stop apps from spying on users. In fact, apps compete to spy on users, and users cannot do anything about it except stop using their beloved apps, because these are proprietary software applications that cannot be controlled by the users. There is no reason to assume competition among profit-seeking social networks will end differently.

A second possibility within the neo-Brandeisian framework is to charge users to access their services. Paid networks would then offer people a service that pledges to protect their privacy such as no data monetization. The “pay-for-privacy” option, however, is ethically flawed. Most of the world’s people have little or no disposable income (Hickel 2019). Poor people would be forced to use “free” surveillance-based networks, while the wealthy would pay to preserve their privacy. To fix this problem, one might advocate serving users ads without exploiting their data for personalization. This, too, is problematic. Most ads are involuntary corporate propaganda designed to manipulate people into buying more stuff. Bombarding people with ads all day pushes an environmentally destructive consumerist lifestyle on the world precisely at the time when we need to scale back overconsumption in rich countries and produce things that are needed in poorer countries, in order to transition to a sustainable and egalitarian global economy.

The real problem is we want a free and equitable social networking experience that respects privacy, provides the desired experience of users, and supports democracy; but we cannot deliver it in a capitalist system. A capitalist social network is enticed to profit and grow, which cannot be achieved without user exploitation or the generation of inequality. Indeed, business strategy scholars as well as political analysts understand it all too well – the prevailing conditions favor winner-take-all models (Hill 1997).

#### 3---It certainly links. The US uses the US-EU agreement to promote Western companies, and impose Western norms globally.

1AC Majcin, 21

(Juraj Majcin, PhD Candidate in International Law at the Graduate Institute, Member of Atlantic Council on GeoTech, 6-16-2021, "EU-US tech cooperation: Strengthening transatlantic relations in data-driven economies", accessed 10-13-2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/geotech-cues/eu-us-tech-cooperation/)

First, the **global economy** and international **trade** have become increasingly **data driven**. According to the report on the future of international trade launched by the World Trade Organization in 2018, the growing **digitalization** of the global economy will impact **international** trade in three significant ways: the importance of cross-border data flows as a component of trade in goods and services will grow **significantly** in the coming years.; trade in digitizable goods (e.g. DVDs or physical books) will decline while trade in digital services such as streaming services and e-books will grow; and regulation of **data flows** and other technology legislation will become an important source of **comparative advantage**. Therefore, adopting an agreement on **transatlantic data flows** is indispensable to adapt the normative framework that governs the EU-US trade relations to the new data-based reality. Second, innovation in the transformative technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (e.g. artificial intelligence and cloud computing) requires a vast amount of data from various sources. As a consequence, countries and businesses that have access to large pools of data are more competitive than those that do not. Currently, China is often referred to as a country with access to almost infinite datasets while having data protection rules focused on national security rather than individual rights. This gives Chinese companies an enormous advantage over their European and American competitors in the development of AI and other technologies. Therefore, an agreement facilitating the exchange of data across the Atlantic via a secure and privacy-respecting framework may increase the competitiveness of both European and American companies in the global **economy**. Third, **authoritarian** states such as Russia or China promote an **illiberal**, techno-nationalist vision of **global governance** based on harsh restrictions on cross-border data flows with **little respect** for fundamental human rights. Even more troubling is that these states export their **vision** of tech governance to **developing** countries by selling their technology and providing training programs on **surveillance** and other **repressive** techniques. They are also highly active at the multilateral level. China, for instance, promotes its approach to **internet** regulation as an alternative to the current internet architecture via various **standardization** fora and strategic documents such as China Standards 2035 or the new **IP protocol** proposed by China to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). For this reason, by establishing a transatlantic framework on data governance that would ensure **free flow** of data while protecting human rights, the EU and United States would reiterate their commitment to **free internet** and set a global standard for other countries to follow. Fourth, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown how crucial it is for governments to have well-functioning, **speedy**, and **secure** access to data of different types and origin. By using data modeling and AI technologies, public authorities can predict with greater accuracy the evolution of different public emergencies as well as long-term threats and thus adopt better **informed**, more **precisely** targeted policies. This will be of particular importance to refine societal **adaptation** capacity and resilience to climate change in a wide array of fields, ranging from **agriculture** to urban **planning** to public **health**. Secure data sharing between the US and European publics as well as research authorities may help significantly in this endeavor. However, to tackle the most pressing global issues such as global pandemics or climate change, the United States and the European Union need a data sharing framework that extend beyond the transatlantic space. Therefore, it is crucial that the EU and United States find agreement on the creation of a safe, rights-based data exchange **framework** that would foster the **connection** between experts and research institutions from other global players such as China, India, or Brazil.

#### Global inequality is increasing---structural adjustment policies and net outflows have reversed progress and stagnated growth.

Hickel et al. 18, Jason Hickel: Anthropologist, author, and fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. He serves on the Labour Party Task Force on International Development and works as Policy Director for The Rules collective. Nima Shirazi: Editor at Muftah, a digital foreign affairs magazine, and co-host of the media criticism podcast, Citations Needed. Adam Johnson: Host, The Appeal podcast. Media analyst at FAIR.org and host of the Citations Needed podcast (November 28th, “Episode 58: The Neoliberal Optimism Industry,” *Citations Needed*, https://citationsneeded.medium.com/episode-58-the-neoliberal-optimism-industry-and-development-shaming-the-global-south-cf399e88510e, Accessed 09-25-2021)

Nima: Can you dig a little deeper into, based on your work Jason, how the terms “development” and “growth” are really, not only misunderstood, but often deliberately misrepresented both in a political context and also throughout the media, like who do these misperceptions benefit?

Jason Hickel: So I think that there’s a narrative out there that poor countries are basically effectively catching up to rich countries, right? Because we know that, there’s China and they’re becoming a powerful player in the world stage and so on. And we’re seeing people lift out of poverty in China and India also, you know, a booming tech industry and whatnot. So clearly, you know, the gap between the rich and the poor on the global stage is shrinking. This is the dominant narrative we have. And unfortunately it’s simply not true. There are, in fact, was a period when that gap was shrinking, in the immediate postcolonial decades in the 1960s and the 1970s when newly independent governments were rolling out progressive economic reforms using Keynesian policy, protecting their economies with tariffs, using subsidies to promote infant industry developments, etcetera, etcetera. But, you know, and using land reform and labor laws to improve wages and so on. But these policies turned out to be a threat to Global North investors. Which, during the colonial years had enjoyed really easy access to cheap labor and raw materials and so on in those countries. And that was being cut off. And so they responded during the 1980s and 1990s by rolling back those progressive policies through structural adjustments imposed by the World Bank and the IMF, right? Which basically forced Global South countries to privatize public assets, to get rid of tariff barriers and subsidies, to cut spending on education and healthcare. Like all of the crucial elements necessary for real developments were basically denied to Global South countries. The vast majority of them at least. So that’s not true of East Asia and in China, and as a consequence, that region of the world did remarkably well, but what we see in the rest of the world is that the per capita income gap between the Global North and the Global South has tripled since 1960 in real terms and shows no sign of slowing down. I mean, there’s basically been, on per capita level, virtually stagnation in the Global South since the 1980s. And that’s, you know, that’s really not part of our narrative and that’s something that is a structural consequence of the way that the economy was organized during those decades.

Nima: Yeah. I think that actually leads into something that I’ve been so fascinated about while reading your work, which is that the conception that wealthy countries, countries that have historically colonized most of the world are now in a position to give back, right? To, to help out through aid or debt relief or whatever poorer countries in the Global South. So can you tell us how that view of things, that colonialism is a thing of the past that there’s no more extraction or exploitation, but now rather resources are flowing North to South from rich to poor, can you tell us how that might not exactly be true?

Jason Hickel: The dominant narrative development is that rich countries became rich kind of by their own hard work, their good institutions, their scientific inventions and so on, and poor countries are poor and remain poor because they have whatever bad governance or corruption, or maybe they’re lazy or have backwards cultural values in the more racist sense of the narrative, etcetera. But the idea is that rich countries, because they have this surplus, they’re able to sort of reach across the divide and give generously of their surplus to help poor countries up the development ladder. What I argue is that this narrative gets virtually everything about the story wrong, right? First of all, the determinants of success and failure in various countries around the world can’t be entirely attributed to only internal conditions, right? We live in a global economic system. We have done since at least the past 500 years since the onset of colonialism, and so we have to think about how the rules of that economy, of that global economic system affect the outcomes that we see around the world, right? You know, of course, that’s very easy to see during the colonial period, during the structural adjustment period in the 1980s and 1990s as well. And we can see it very clearly now in the way that capital flows around the world, right? And so if we look at total flows of money around the world right now, between the Global North and the Global South, we see something quite remarkable. This is using 2012 data, which is the last data that we have on this. But in 2012, developing countries received a total of $2 trillion US dollars in total inflows from the Global North, right? That includes aid, foreign investments, loans, remittances, everything, every bit of money, which is a lot, but in the same year, some $5 trillion flowed the other direction from South to North. So in that year there were $3 trillion in net outflows from South to North, so the South is in fact a net creditor to the North rather than the other way around. So we might be able to say that it’s, in fact, the Global South that’s developing the North rather than the North developing the South. And that really does flip the aid narrative on its head. And if we compare those outflows to aid, what we see is that for every dollar of aid that the South receives from the North, they lose $24 in net outflows, which is a tremendous reversal of the way we normally think about the situation. There’s lots of ways we can see this kind of reverse flow happening that are important to pay attention to. So one of course is the most obvious one, which is, you know, interest payments on exportable debts, which in and of itself outstrips the global aid budget, you know, almost twice over. But then we also have profit repatriation for multinational companies from host countries back to where they’re listed, which is about $500 billion per year. Sometimes even outstrips foreign direct investment flows themselves, but probably the biggest single cause of this in that outflow situation is illicit financial flows, which are largely through, you know, for the sake of tax evasion by multinational companies who are using basically tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions which are almost entirely in Global North countries controlled by Global North governments in order to secret money out of developing countries into Western bank accounts.

#### 1---Reject neoliberal optimism---all their green growth evidence is aspirational and disproven by status quo trends and empirics.

Brand and Wissen, 21

[Ulrich, PhD Poly Sci @ Goethe University, Prof. Int’l Politics @ U Vienna; and Markus, Prof. Social Sciences specialising on socio-ecological transformation @ Berlin School of Economies and Law: “False Alternatives: From the Green Economy to a Green Capitalism?” Chapter 7 in The Imperial Mode of Living: Everyday Life and the Ecological Crisis of Capitalism (2021) published by Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78873-936-8]//AD

Green capitalism is anything but inevitable. In many places, the creation of a green economy has encountered resistance from the fossil factions of capital and from people’s everyday practices. In the US especially, these forces have received an additional boost with the presidency of Donald Trump. There is a boom in the extraction of oil and gas through fracking, in tar sand oil extraction and in the exploration and exploitation of deep sea fossil energy sources. 42 In the EU, the transition to a renewable energy regime is slowed down by the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). And even in places where green capital factions and practices are becoming socially relevant, they are in constant conflict with retrograde social forces. This description even applies to the ‘pioneer’ in renewable energies, Germany, where powerful social forces from industry, energy suppliers and trade unions are increasingly aggressive in articulating their resistance to the energy transition and find political advocates in state apparatus such as the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

#### 2---Renewables under capitalism heighten colonial exploitation and environmental destruction.

Hickel 19, PhD, Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Senior Lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of London. (Jason, 5-6-2019, "The Limits of Clean Energy", *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/06/the-path-to-clean-energy-will-be-very-dirty-climate-change-renewables/>)

It’s important to keep in mind that most of the key materials for the energy transition are located in the global south. Parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia will likely become the target of a new scramble for resources, and some countries may become victims of new forms of colonization. It happened in the 17th and 18th centuries with the hunt for gold and silver from South America. In the 19th century, it was land for cotton and sugar plantations in the Caribbean. In the 20th century, it was diamonds from South Africa, cobalt from Congo, and oil from the Middle East. It’s not difficult to imagine that the scramble for renewables might become similarly violent.

If we don’t take precautions, clean energy firms could become as destructive as fossil fuel companies—buying off politicians, trashing ecosystems, lobbying against environmental regulations, even assassinating community leaders who stand in their way.

#### 3---Renewables fail---doesn’t displace fossil fuels and increased consumption offsets efficiency gains.

Parrique et al. 19, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden, Barth J., Briens F., C. Kerschner, Kraus-Polk A., Kuokkanen A., Spangenberg J.H. (Timothee, July, Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability, *European Environmental Bureau*, https://mk0eeborgicuypctuf7e.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Decoupling-Debunked.pdf)

Not leading to relevant innovations

Innovation is not in and of itself a good thing for ecological sustainability. The desirable type of innovation is eco-innovation or one that results “in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of resources use compared to relevant alternatives” (Kemp and Pearson, 2008, p.5). But this is only one type among several. In general, firms have an incentive to innovate to economise on the most expensive factors of production to maximise profits. Because labour and capital are usually relatively more expensive than natural resources, more technological progress will likely continue to be directed towards labour- and capital-saving innovations, with limited benefits, if any, for resource productivity and a potential rise in absolute impacts due to more production. But decoupling will not occur if technological innovations contribute to saving labour and capital while leaving resource use and environmental degradation unchanged.

Another issue is that technologies do not only solve environmental problems but also tend to create new ones. Assuming that resource productivity becomes a priority over labour and capital productivity, there is still nothing preventing technological innovations from creating more damage. For example, research into processes of extractions can lead to better ways to locate resources (imaging technologies and data analytics), to extract them (horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing, and automated drilling operations), and to transport them (Arctic shipping routes). These innovations may target resource use but with a result opposite to the objective of decoupling, that is more extraction. And this is not even considering unintended side-effects, which often accompany the development of new technologies (Grunwald, 2018).

Not disruptive enough

Another problem has to do with the replacement of harmful technologies. Indeed, it is not enough for new technologies to emerge (innovation), they must also come to replace the old ones in a process of “exnovation” (Kimberly, 1981). What is required is a “push and pull strategy” (Rockström et al., 2017): pushing environmentally-friendly technologies into society and pulling harmful ones, like fossil-based infrastructure, out of it.

First, in reality, such a process is slow and difficult to trigger. Most polluting infrastructures (power plants, buildings and city structures, transport systems) require large investments, which then creates inertia and lock-in (Antal and van den Bergh, 2014, p. 3). Let us, for instance, consider the energy, buildings, and transport sectors, which account for the large majority of world energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Initial lifetime for a nuclear or a coal power plant is about 40 years. Buildings can last at least as much. The average lifetime for a car is 12-15 years, and this is about what it takes for an innovation to spread in the vehicle fleet. The wide availability of petrol refuelling stations gives an infrastructural advantage to petrol-based cars, whereas this is the opposite situation for electric, gas, or hydrogen vehicles that would require different and new supporting infrastructures. Building a highway or a nuclear plant is a commitment to emit for at least as long as these infrastructures will last – Davis and Socolow (2014) speak of “committed emissions.”

Energy is a good case in point: using more renewable energy is not the same as using less fossil fuels. The history of energy use is not one of substitutions but rather of successive additions of new sources of energy. As new energy sources are discovered, developed, and deployed, the old sources do not decline, instead, total energy use grows with additional layers on the energy mix cake. York (2012) finds that each unit of energy use from non-fossil fuel sources displaced less than one-quarter of a unit of its fossil-fuel counterpart, showing empirical support for the claim that expanding renewable energies is far from enough to curb fossil fuel consumption. The relative part of coal in the global energy mix has been reduced since the advent of petroleum but this occurred in spite of absolute growth in the use of coal (Krausmann et al., 2009).

#### 1---Commercially viable CCS doesn’t exist and it never will---stop wasting our time.

Magrini 21, Climate Watch Columnist for Geographical (Marco, September 15th, “With just 20 facilities operating commercially, carbon capture and storage has failed, says Marco Magrini,” *Geographical*, <https://geographical.co.uk/opinion/item/4145-with-just-20-facilities-operating-commercially-carbon-capture-and-storage-has-failed-says-marco-magrini>, Accessed 11-07-2021)

It sounded so promising. Five years ago, the US multinational energy corporation Chevron committed to capturing and storing at least 80 per cent of the carbon dioxide emissions generated at its Gorgon liquefied natural gas project in Western Australia over its first five years. It would amount to around four million tonnes of CO2 per year, which would be injected beneath a small island. However, the five years are up and the plan has failed. Just four million tonnes of the greenhouse gas have been buried underground, instead of 20. A hefty fine will ensue.

Carbon capture and storage technology, or CCS, has a long string of fiascoes under its belt since it was hailed by George W Bush 20 years ago as a magic way to keep on burning fossil fuels. The basic idea is to extract CO2 from the smokestacks of coal plants or steel factories, compress it, transport it and finally inject it into some sort of underground reservoir, where (in theory) it will abide forever. But not only is the technology enormously expensive, it’s also largely unproven at scale.

Bush’s US$1.65 billion FutureGen CCS project folded in 2015. Numerous trial projects have been shut down since then. Environmentalists argue that CCS is a fig leaf, just another way to extend the fossil fuel industry’s life, and rightly so. Every oil and gas company has some flavour of ‘carbon capture’ included within its corporate plans and net-zero goals.

After 20 years of trial and error, a mere 20 commercial CCS projects are currently operating globally. They jointly capture about 40 million tonnes of CO2 a year, or one thousandth of current carbon emissions. According to the Global CCS Institute, a lobby group, 2.8 billion tonnes of CO2 must be sequestered annually by 2050 if we’re to reach the goals set in the Paris Agreement. This would mean scaling up carbon capture operations 70-fold in the next three decades. How many hundreds of miles of pipelines would be needed to accomplish that? How many subterranean aquifers with the right geology in the right location would need to be placed at our disposal?

Nevertheless, CCS enthusiasts keep on touting the idea. In October, Downing Street is expected to pick two or three hugely expensive CCS projects and provide them with financial support. Meanwhile, Chevron has already pledged to invest another US$3 billion just trying to fix its Gorgon CCS plant.

The technology that was supposed to buy us some time is now just wasting our time.

#### 2---NETs only happen if we do a carbon tax.

2AC Krupp et al. 19

(Fred Krupp , President of Environmental Defense Fund, a United States-based nonprofit environmental advocacy groupAssociates from Yale University with law degree from the University of Michigan, Nathaniel [Keohane](https://search-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/indexinglinkhandler/sng/au/Keohane,+Nathaniel/$N?accountid=14749), Vice president for international climate at the Environmental Defense Fund. He used to be in academia at Yale University and served in the White House as special assistant to President Barack Obama, Eric Pooley, Senior Vice President, Strategy & Communications at the Environmental Defense Fund, "Less than Zero: Can Carbon-Removal Technologies Curb Climate Change", accessed 10-22-2021, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora98&div=42&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=4Pz3ShPcnIcAAAAA:uCxgbSEWMLOPYIgBJTNeDfV5lX6MMH1xzDVkXrBcKalYnAS2ozm1cG65EN7DhhHR7FhVe9xZ&collection=journals) jcw

When it comes to generating support for climate policy, a warranted sense of alarm is only half the battle. And the other half-a shared belief that the problem is solvable-is lagging far behind. The newfound sense of **urgency** is at risk of being **swamped** by collective **despair**. A scant six percent of Americans, according to the Yale study, believe that the world "can and will" effectively address climate change. With carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels having risen by an estimated 2.7 percent in 2018 and atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, which will determine the ultimate extent of warming, at their highest level in some three million years, such pessimism may seem justified-especially with a climate change denier in the White House. But it is not **too** **late** to solve the global climate **crisis**. A decade of extraordinary **innovation** has made the **greening** of the global economy not only **feasible** but also **likely**. The market now **favors** clean energy: in many U.S. states, it is **cheaper** to build new **renewable** energy plants than to run **existing** coal-fired power plants. By **combining** solar power with **new**, efficient batteries, Arizona and other sunny states will soon be able to provide **electricity** at a **lower** cost per megawatthour than new, **efficient** natural gas plants. Local, regional, and federal governments, as well as corporations, are making **measurable** progress on reducing **carbon** pollution. Since 2000, 21 countries have reduced their annual greenhouse gas emissions while growing their economies; China is expected to see emissions peak by 2025, five years earlier than it promised as part of the negotiations for the Paris climate agreement in 2015. At the UN climate talks held late last year in Poland, countries **agreed** on rules for how to report **progress** on meeting emission-reduction **commitments**, an important step in implementing the **Paris accord**. What's more, an entirely **new** arsenal is emerging in the fight against **climate change**: negative emission technologies, or **nets**. Nets are different from **conventional** approaches to climate mitigation in that they seek not to **reduce** the amount of greenhouse gases emitted into the **atmosphere** but to **remove** carbon dioxide that's **already** there. These technologies range from the old-fashioned practice of reforestation to high-tech machines that suck carbon out of the sky and store it underground. The window of opportunity to combat climate change has not closed-and with a push from policymakers, nets can keep it propped open for longer. THE HEAT IS ON How much **time** is left to avoid climate **catastrophe**? The truth is that it is impossible to answer the question with precision. Scientists know that human activity is warming the planet but still don't fully understand the sensitivity of the climate system to greenhouse gases. Nor do they fully comprehend the link between average global warming and local repercussions. So far, however, most effects of climate change have been faster and more severe than the climate models predicted. The downside risks are enormous; the most recent predictions, ever more dire. The Paris agreement aims to limit the increase in global average temperatures above preindustrial levels to well below two degrees Celsius, and ideally to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. Going above those levels of warming would mean more disastrous impacts. Global average temperatures have already risen by about one degree Celsius since 1880, with two-thirds of that increase occurring after 1975. An October 2018 special report by the un's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a body of leading scientists and policymakers from around the world, found that unless the world implements "rapid and far-reaching" changes to its energy and industrial systems, the earth is likely to reach temperatures of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels sometime between 2030 and 2052. Limiting warming to that level, the ipcc found, would require immediate and dramatic cuts in carbon dioxide: roughly a 45 percent reduction in the next dozen years. Even meeting the less ambitious target of two degrees would require deep cuts in emissions by 2030 and sustained aggressive action far beyond then. The ipcc report also warns that seemingly small global temperature increases can have enormous consequences. For example, the half-degree difference between 1.5 degrees Celsius and two degrees Celsius of total warming could consign twice as many people to water scarcity, put ten million more at risk from rising sea levels, and plunge several hundred million more people into poverty as lower yields of key crops drive hunger across much of the developing world. At two degrees of warming, nearly all of the planet's coral reefs are expected to be lost; at 1.5 degrees, ten to 30 percent could survive. The deeper message of the IPCC report is that there is no risk-free level of climate change. Targets such as 1.5 degrees Celsius or two degrees Celsius are important political markers, but they shouldn't fool anyone into thinking that nature works so precisely. Just as the risks are lower at 1.5 degrees Celsius than at two degrees Celsius, so are they lower at two degrees Celsius than at 2.5 degrees Celsius. Indeed, the latter difference would be far more destructive, since the damages mount exponentially as temperatures rise. To **manage** the enormous risks of **climate** change, global emissions of greenhouse gases need to be cut **sharply**, and as soon as **possible**. That will require **transforming** energy, land, transport, and industrial systems so they emit **less** carbon dioxide. It will also require reducing short-lived climate pollutants such as methane, which stay in the atmosphere for only a fraction of the time that carbon dioxide does but have a disproportionate effect on near-term warming. Yet even that will **not be enough**. To **stabilize** the total atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases [GHGs], the world will have to reach net **negative** emissions-that is, taking more greenhouse gases **out** of the atmosphere than are being **pumped** into it. Achieving that through emission **reductions** alone will be **extremely** difficult, since some emissions, such as of **methane** and **nitrous** oxide from agriculture, are nearly **impossible** to **eliminate**. Countering the emissions that are **hardest** to abate, and bring concentrations down to safer levels, requires technologies that actually **remove** carbon dioxide from the **atmosphere**. That's where nets come in-not as a substitute for aggressive efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but as a complement. By deploying technology that **removes** existing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, while **accelerating** cuts in emissions, the world can **boost** its **chances** of keeping warming below **two degrees** and reduce the risk of catastrophe. Scientists and activists have tended to regard these technologies as a fallback option, to be held in reserve in case other efforts fail. Many fear that jumping ahead to carbon dioxide removal will distract from the critical need to cut pollution. But the world no longer has the **luxury** of waiting for emission-reduction strategies to do the job **alone**. Far from being a Plan B, nets must be a critical part of **Plan A.** What's more, embracing nets **sooner** rather than **later** makes **economic** sense. Because the marginal **costs** of emission reductions **rise** as more emissions are **cut**, it will be **cheaper** to deploy nets at the same time as emission-reduction technologies rather than waiting to exhaust those options first. The wider the solution set, the lower the costs. And the **lower** the costs, the **easier** it is to raise ambitions and garner the necessary **political support**. THE FUTURE IS NOW Even though removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere may sound like the stuff of science fiction, there are **already** nets that could be deployed at **scale** today, according to a seminal **report** released by the **National Academies of Sciences,** Engineering, and Medicine in October 2018. One category involves taking advantage of carbon sinks-the earth's forests and agricultural soils, which have soaked up more carbon dioxide since the Industrial Revolution than has been released from burning petroleum. To date, the growth of carbon sinks has been inadvertent: in the United States, for example, as agriculture shifted from the rocky soils of the Northeast to the fertile Midwest, forests reclaimed abandoned farmland, breathing in carbon dioxide in the process. But this natural process can be improved through better forest management-letting trees grow longer before they are harvested and helping degraded forests grow back more quickly. The large-scale planting of trees in suitable locations around the world could increase carbon sinks further, a process that must go hand in hand with efforts to curb tropical deforestation and thereby continue to contain the vast amounts of carbon already stored in the earth's rainforests. Farmland provides additional potential for negative emissions. Around the world, conventional agricultural practices have reduced the amount of carbon in soils, decreasing their fertility in the process. Smarter approaches can reverse the process. Small and large landholders alike could add agricultural waste to soil, maximize the time that the soil is covered by living plants or mulch, and reduce tilling, which releases carbon dioxide. All these steps would decrease the amount of carbon that is lost from soil and increase the amount of carbon that is stored in it. The most technologically **sophisticated** net available in the **near** term is known as "bioenergy with carbon capture and storage," or **BECCS**. It is also the riskiest. Broadly defined, beccs involves burning or **fermenting** **biomass**, such as trees or crops, to generate **electricity** or make liquid fuel; capturing the carbon dioxide produced in the **process**; and **sequestering** it underground. It is considered a negative emission technology, and not a zero emission technology, because **growing** the biomass used in the process **removes** carbon from the atmosphere. What makes BECCS so exciting is its potential to remove significantly **more** carbon from the atmosphere than other **approaches** do. But it also brings challenges. For one, it is expensive: electricity generated from beccs could cost twice as much as that generated with natural gas, because biomass is an inefficient fuel source and capturing and sequestering carbon dioxide is costly. The technology would also require careful monitoring to ensure that the carbon dioxide pumped underground stays there and clear rules for legal liability in the event of leaks. But the fact that **private** companies have been **successfully** injecting carbon dioxide into **depleted** oil and gas reservoirs for **decades** offers good **evidence** that permanent storage is possible on a **large** scale. More worrying are the additional climate risks that BECCS poses. If BECCS drives demand for biomass and more of the carbon that is stored in the forest ecosystem is released as a result, it could end up raising the level of carbon in the atmosphere rather than reducing it. Another concern is competition for land: converting farms or forests to grow energy crops, something that the large-scale use of BEccs might require, could drive up the cost of food, reduce agricultural production, and threaten scarce habitats. These problems could be mitigated by using only biomass waste, such as residues from logging and agriculture, but that would reduce the potential scale. Although BEccs deserves consideration as part of the arsenal, these risks mean that its contribution will likely end up being smaller than some proponents claim. Taking all these land-based nets together, and factoring in the considerable economic, practical, and behavioral hurdles to bringing them to scale, the National Academies report concludes that by midcentury, nets could remove as much as five billion tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere annually. Given the significant risks involved, that estimate is probably too bullish. Even if it were not, that's still only half of the ten billion tons of carbon dioxide that will likely need to be removed each year to zero out the remaining greenhouse gas emissions, even with aggressive cuts. CLOSING THE GAP Removing **from** the atmosphere the **balance** of the carbon dioxide necessary will require **perfecting** technologies currently in **development**. Two deserve particular mention; both are full of promise, although neither is ready for widespread use. The first is called "direct **air capture**"- essentially, sucking carbon from the **sky**. The technology is already being **tested** in Canada, Iceland, Italy, and Switzerland at pilot plants where **massive** arrays of fans direct a stream of air toward a special substance that **binds** with the passing carbon dioxide. The substance is then either heated or forced into a vacuum to release the carbon dioxide, which is compressed and either stored or used as feedstocks for chemicals, fuels, or cement. These technologies are real-albeit prohibitively expensive in their current form. As a recent study led by David Sandalow of Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy concludes, taking them to **scale** means solving a variety of **technological** challenges to bring down the **costs**. Above all, these processes are highly energy intensive, so scaling them would require enormous amounts of low-carbon electricity. (A direct-air-capture facility powered by coal-fired electricity, for example, would generate more new carbon dioxide than it would capture.) These obstacles are serious, but the surprising **progress** of the past **decade** suggests that they can be **overcome** in the next one. The second technology, enhanced carbon **mineralization**, is even further from being realized, but it is full of even **more** possibility. Geologists have long known that when rock from the earth's **mantle** (the layer of the earth between its crust and its core) is exposed to the **air**, it binds with **carbon dioxide** to form carbon-containing minerals. The massive tectonic collisions that formed the Appalachian Mountains around 460 million years ago, for example, exposed subsurface rock to weathering that resulted in the absorption of substantial amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. That took tens of millions of years; enhanced carbon **mineralization** seeks to **fast-forward** the process. Scientists are exploring two ways to do this. In one approach, rocks would be brought to the **surface** to bind with carbon from the **air**. Such natural **weathering** already occurs in **mine tailings**, the waste left over from certain mining operations. But mimicking this process on a large scale-by grinding up large quantities of rock containing reactive minerals and bringing it to the earth's surface-would be highly energy intensive and thus costly, roughly on par with direct air capture. Another potential approach is **pumping** the carbon dioxide **underground** to meet the rock. As the National Academies report explains, carbon-dioxide-rich fluids injected into basalt or peridotite formations (two kinds of igneous rock that make up much of the earth's mantle) react with the rock, converting the dissolved carbon dioxide into solid carbon-containing minerals. Pilot **projects** in Iceland and the United States have demonstrated that this is **possible**. There is also **evidence** for how this could work in the **natural world**. Peridotite usually lies deep inside the earth, but some rock formations around the globe contain pockets of it on the surface. For example, scientists are studying how the surface-level peridotite in Oman's rock formations reacts with the air and absorbs large amounts of carbon. In theory, this approach offers nearly **unlimited** scale, because suitable rock formations are **widespread** and readily **accessible**. It would also be **cheap**, because it takes advantage of **chemical** potential energy in the rock instead of **costly** energy sources. And since the carbon dioxide is converted to **solid** rock, the effect is **permanent**, and it carries **few** of the side effects that other nets could bring. GETTING TO LESS These technologies do not come cheap. The National Academy of Sciences recommends as much as $1 billion annually in U.S. government funding for research on nets. And indeed, such funding should be an urgent priority. But to make these technologies economically viable and scale them rapidly, policymakers will also have to tap into a much more powerful force: the profit motive.Putting a price on carbon emissions creates an economic incentive for entrepreneurs to find cheaper, faster ways to cut pollution. Valuing negative emissions-for example, through an emission-trading system that awards credits for carbon removal or a carbon tax that provides rebates for them-would create an incentive for them to join the hunt for nets. Forty-five countries, along with ten U.S. states, have put in place some mechanism to price carbon. But only a handful of them offer rewards for converting land into forest, managing existing forests better, or increasing the amount of carbon stored in agricultural soils, and none offers incentives for other nets. What's needed is a carbon pricing system that not only charges those who emit carbon but also pays those who remove it. Such a system would provide new revenue streams for landowners who restored forest cover to their land and for farmers and ranchers who increased the amount of carbon stored in their soils. It would also reward the **inventors** and **entrepreneurs** who developed new, **better** technologies to **capture** carbon from the air and the investors and businesses that took them to **scale**. Without these **incentives**, those players will stay on the **sidelines**. By **spurring** innovation in lower-cost nets, incentives would also **ease** the way politically for an **ambitious** pollution limit-which, ultimately, is necessary for ensuring that the world meets it climate **goals**. Simply put, humanity's **best** hope is to promise that the next crop of billionaires will be those who figure out low-cost ways to remove carbon from the **sky**. The biggest hurdle for such incentives is the lack of a global market for carbon credits. Hope on that front, however, is emerging from an unlikely place: aviation. Currently responsible for roughly two percent of global greenhouse gases, aviation's emissions are expected to triple or quadruple by midcentury in the absence of effective policies to limit them. But in 2016, faced with the prospect that the eu would start capping the emissions of flights landing in and taking off from member states, the un body that governs worldwide air travel, the International Civil Aviation Organization, agreed to cap emissions from international flights at 2020 levels. The airline industry supported the agreement, hoping to avoid the messy regulatory patchwork that might result if the eu went ahead and states beyond the eu followed suit with their own approaches. The resulting program, called the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (corsia), requires all airlines to start reporting emissions this year, and it will begin enforcing a cap in 2021. Once in full swing, at least 100 countries are expected to participate, covering at least three-quarters of the forecast increase in international aviation emissions. Airlines flying between participating countries will have two ways to comply: they can lower their emissions (for example, by burning less fuel or switching to alternative fuels), or they can buy emission-reduction credits from companies. Because the technologies for reducing airline emissions at scale are still a long way off, the industry will mostly choose the second option, relying on carbon credits from reductions in other sectors. It is estimated that over the first 15 years of corsia, demand for these credits will reach between 2.5 billion and 3.0 billion tons-roughly equal to the annual greenhouse gas emissions from the U.S. power and manufacturing sectors. With this new option to sell emission-reduction credits to airlines, there is a good possibility that a pot of gold will await companies that cut or offset their carbon emissions. In short, corsia could catalyze a global carbon market that drives investment in low-carbon fuels and technologies-including nets. To realize its promise, corsia must be implemented properly, and there are powerful forces working to see that it is not. Some countries, including ones negotiating on behalf of their state-owned companies, are trying to rig the system by allowing credits from projects that do not produce legitimate carbon reductions, such as Brazil's effort to allow the sale of credits from huge hydroelectric dams in the Amazon that have already been built and paid for (and thus do not represent new reductions). Allowing such credits into the system could crowd out potential rewards for genuine reductions. But there are also **powerful**, sometimes unexpected **allies** who stand to gain from a global **carbon market** that works. For example, some airlines are motivated to act out of a fear that millennials, concerned about their carbon footprint, may eventually begin to shun air travel. The new regulations, by creating demand for emission reductions and spurring investment in nets to produce jet fuel, could be the industry's best hope of protecting its reputation-and a critical step toward a broader global carbon market that moves nets from promising pilot projects to a gamechanging reality. Skeptics say that nets are too speculative and a possibility only, perhaps, in the distant future. It is true that these innovations are not fully understood and that not all of them will pan out. But no group of scholars and practitioners, no matter how expert, can determine exactly which technologies should be deployed and when. It is impossible to predict what future innovations will look like, but that shouldn't stop the world from pursuing them, especially when the threat is so grave. The fact remains that **many** nets are ready to be deployed at scale **today**, and they might make the **difference** between **limiting** warming to two degrees and **failing** to do so. Ultimately, climate change will be stopped by creating economic **incentives** that unleash the **innovation** of the private sector-not by **waiting** for the perfect technology to arrive ready-made, maybe when it's already **too late**. No one is saying that achieving all of this will be easy, but the road to climate stability has never been that. Hard does not mean **impossible**, however, and the transformative power of human ingenuity offers an **endless** source of **hope**.

#### 3---CCS erodes biodiversity, requires unsustainable resource inputs, AND justifies catastrophic delays on climate action.

Hickel et al. 21, Jason Hickel, Paul Brockway, Giorgos Kallis, Lorenz Keyßer, Manfred Lenzen, Aljoša Slameršak, Julia Steinberger and Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Urgent need for post-growth climate mitigation Scenarios, *Nat Energy* 6, 766–768, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00884-9)

To reconcile growth with the Paris Agreement goals, the majority of scenarios reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) rely heavily on the assumption that negative emissions technologies — mostly bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) — will be scaled up later this century to remove excess carbon from the atmosphere. This assumption has come under significant criticism in recent years, however. Scaling BECCS would require massive amounts of agricultural land and water for biofuels, which raises questions about land and water availability, competition with food production, emissions from land-use change, water depletion and biodiversity loss10. Alternative carbon removal strategies such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) may avoid some of these problems but could use up to 50% of the world’s current electricity generation to achieve the carbon removal rates assumed in existing scenarios, making it more difficult to decarbonize global energy supply11. In both cases, there are questions about the availability of sufficient storage capacity for captured carbon12

In light of these uncertainties, scientists increasingly regard reliance on negative emissions technologies to be speculative and risky8,13–15. If this approach fails, we will be locked into a high-temperature trajectory from which it would be impossible to escape. It is also worth noting that even if BECCS or DACCS were to succeed at scale, this might address emissions, but it would do nothing to address overshoot of other planetary boundaries, such as land-use change, biodiversity loss and biogeochemical flows, all of which are being exacerbated by rising resource use. Relying on negative emissions technologies is not an ecologically coherent approach to the crisis we face.

#### 1---Reject evidence from the Breakthrough Institute---it’s a lobbying group not a think tank.

BNI 20, Beyond Nuclear International (“Exposed!” BNI, 9/28/2020, https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2020/09/28/exposed/, kyujin)

BREAKTHROUGH INSTITUTE

Shellenberger is co-founder of the Breakthrough Institute, a lobbying group masquerading as a “think tank”. The Breakthrough Institute has “a clear history as a contrarian outlet for information on climate change [which] regularly criticises environmental groups”, according to Paul Thacker. Breakthrough has also been described as a “program for hippie-punching your way to fame and fortune.”

Shellenberger co-founded the Breakthrough Institute with Ted Nordhaus, nephew of economist, William Nordhuas. William Nordhaus features in Merchants of Doubt – Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway’s examination of the PR strategies used both by the tobacco and fossil fuel industries. His interventions in the 1990s helped set back essential action on climate change by decades.

Other figures associated with Shellenberger and the Breakthrough Institute include:

* Owen Paterson, one of the UK’s most prominent climate deniers who helped with the UK launch of the group’s Ecomodernist manifesto in 2015.
* Matt Ridley, coal mine owner, once hereditary Conservative Peer and famous climate delayer / ‘lukewarmist’ who spoke at the UK launch event.

#### 2---their studies are wrong, ignore offshoring.

Alexander & Rutherford 19, Co-director of the Simplicity Institute, is a lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, Australia, \*Coordinator of the New International Bookshop and a 'Simpler Way' activist (Samuel & Johnathan, A Critique of Techno-Optimism: Efficiency Without Sufficiency is Lost, *The Handbook of Global Governance*, http://samuelalexander.info/publications/)

4. Are Economies Decoupling Growth from Impact?

As noted, ‘decoupling’ is the idea that GDP growth can be, over time, progressively divorced from environmental impacts. In assessing the recent decoupling record, it is imperative to distinguish between ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ decoupling (Jackson, 2016). Relative decoupling refers to a decline in the ecological impact per unit of economic output. Absolute decoupling refers to a decline in the overall ecological impact of total economic output. While relative decoupling may occur, making each commodity less materially intensive, if the total consumption of commodities increases then there may be no absolute decoupling; indeed, the absolute ecological impact of total economic activity may increase.

Given that the global economy already exceeds the planet’s sustainable carrying capacity by 70% (Global Footprint Network, 2017), large scale absolute decoupling is what is needed. The problem is, the record to date suggests very little absolute decoupling is occurring, let alone at the rates that would be needed for long-term sustainability – an issue we will return to below.

Consider the example of carbon emissions. There is no doubt that significant relative decoupling – i.e. emissions per unit of GDP – has taken place. Tim Jackson (2016: 88) reports that the amount of carbon released per unit of world’s economic output has declined continuously over several decades, from 760 grams of carbon dioxide per dollar in 1965 to just under 500 grams of carbon dioxide per dollar in 2015. That is an average decline in carbon intensity of a little under 1 per cent per year. Nevertheless, despite these efficiency gains, global carbon emissions have continued to rise in absolute terms, more than trebling over the same period. It is true carbon emissions from fossil fuels and industry (excluding land-use change) were flat from 2014-2016 at about 36 billion tonnes, suggesting that emissions might have peaked and could soon start to decline. Unfortunately, however, global emissions have since recommenced their upward trajectory, with indications that record levels were reached in 2017 (Global Carbon Budget, 2017). This shows that – even thirty years after the IPCC was established – the significant relative decoupling of carbon (and energy) intensities has so far failed to translate into actual absolute declines. To date, technological advance is not fulfilling its promise to reduce overall impact.

A similar story holds with respect to global resource consumption, a measure which includes aggregate consumption of biomass, fossil fuels, metal ores and minerals. A review of the evidence found that resource efficiency improvement for the global economy between 1980 and 2009 averaged 0.9% p.a. (Giljum et al., 2014). This, however, represented a per annum efficiency improvement that was less than one third of the rate that would have been needed for ‘absolute’ decoupling (Giljum et al: 328), i.e., growth of GDP without any increase in materials use. As such, over the same period global materials use more than doubled. Furthermore, as a UNEP (2016) report found, this efficiency improvement rate masks a more recent efficiency decline since the turn of the century, from 1.2 kg per one US$ of GDP in 2000 to almost 1.4kg per US$ by 2010 (UNEP, 2016: 40). In other words, far from decoupling – even in relative terms – this report showed that, from the turn of the century, the global economy has undergone a process of material ‘recoupling’. Given the fact that increasing material consumption use ‘is one of the key drivers for environmental problems and is directly or indirectly responsible for problems such as climate change, water scarcity or biodiversity loss’ (Giljum, 2009: 332-3), it should be no surprise that these problems, far from improving at the global level, continue to get worse (Ripple et al, 2017).

It is true that some limited absolute decoupling is underway in certain sectors of some nations, specifically as some developed economies move towards ‘service’, ‘information’, or ‘post-industrial’ modes of production and consumption (see i.e. Steinberger et al, 2013). This is especially the case for localised pollutants, such as wastewater discharge, sulphur dioxide emissions, and carbon monoxide emissions (Dinda, 2004; Bo, 2011). Some of these nations have reduced domestic carbon emissions (i.e. emissions released within the national territory) in absolute terms (Carbon Tracker, 2016).

However, while these reductions are positive steps in the right direction, the achievement is often less impressive on deeper interrogation. Often a large fraction of the decoupling taking place in rich nations is a result of environmental ‘leakage’ – that is, the process whereby wealthy nations have, throughout the globalisation era, increasingly externalised environmental damage via mechanisms such as pollution trading and the outsourcing of environmentally intensive production to developing countries, especially China. While it may be possible to ‘externalise’ impacts from a given nation, the planet, of course, is a closed system in this regard. Accordingly, when ‘externalised’ manufacturing or agricultural commodities – and their associated environmental harms – are ‘internalised’ from an accounting perspective, much of the apparent environmental progress of high consuming countries disappears. For example, it is no good claiming a reduction in national deforestation, say, if a nation is simply importing more wood from abroad rather than cutting down its own trees (Asici, 2013). Similarly, it has hardly environmental progress if the rate of species loss is reduced within a nation if, at the same time, the net import of luxury agricultural crops is driving accelerated species extinction across the globe (Lenzen et al, 2012). The OECDs aggregated carbon reductions between 2000 to 2013 reduce by about half when a consumption based methodology is used and the emissions embedded in imports from ‘pollution havens’ in China and other industrialising nations are fully accounted for (Carbon Tracker, 2016). To the extent that some nations have achieved absolute decoupling in carbon emissions, the problem remains that this process has been too slow and too minor to provide much solace, and as noted above, from the global perspective that ultimately matters, carbon emissions remain on the rise.

#### 2---Coordinated strikes solve---they disrupt global supply chains that are key to capitalism.

Fox-Hodess 21, Sociologist and cofounder of the International Labour and Logistics Research Network (Katy, June 16th, “Logistics Workers Make Global Capitalism — and They Can Break It, Too,” *Jacobin Magazine*, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/06/logistics-industry-capitalism-unions>, Accessed 11-08-2021)

The logistics industry is key to the global circulation of goods under capitalism. Workers have immense power within it to grind that circulation to a halt — if they can get organized.

Over the past several decades, capitalism has broken up the production process into individual steps carried out in separate work sites scattered across the globe. As a result, logistics, the systems that organize the physical movement of goods through space and time, has become more central to global capitalism than ever, and that gives workers in the logistics sector — including ports, rail, trucking, and other industries — tremendous potential leverage over the capitalist class. Any attempt to think strategically about strengthening working-class power must therefore grapple with the sector and how it works.

#### 4---Socialist degrowth solves climate best.

Molyneux 19, is an editor of Irish Marxist Review and a supporter of People Before Profit (John, October 1st, “Socialism is the only realistic solution to climate change,” *Climate and Capitalism*, <https://climateandcapitalism.com/2019/10/01/why-socialism-is-the-only-realistic-solution-to-climate-change/>, Accessed 08-28-2021)

A lot has been written, including by myself, on why capitalism, by its very nature, cannot tackle or stop climate change. The purpose of this article is not to repeat those arguments but to make the positive case for socialism as necessary to deal with this existential crisis for humanity.

By socialism I mean simply the combination of two things: public ownership and democratic control of production and society.

By public ownership I mean not the elimination of personal private property or the nationalization of every small business and corner shop but of the main banks, corporations, industries, services and utilities. For example, public ownership of bus and transport networks, of the health service, of one main state bank and one main state insurance company, of social housing, of waste management, of water, electricity, gas, wind and solar power production, of Larry Goodman’s ABF Food Group, of Denis O’Brien’s Communicorp and so on.

By democratic control I mean that each major workplace — each hospital, factory, train station, school, university, construction company etc. — should be run by the elected and re-callable representatives of its workforce, within the context of a democratic plan for the economy and society as a whole. That would need to be proposed by government based on and accountable to democratically elected popular assemblies.

Without large scale public ownership, capitalism and the laws of the capitalist market will continue to dominate and this will have disastrous consequences for the environment as it has done already. Without democratic control you have not got socialism but state capitalism[1] with a new ruling class of state bureaucrats which, as has been seen in Stalinist Russia and in China, also has terrible ecological consequences because it subordinates the needs of the people and nature to accumulation for accumulation’s sake in competition with other states.

Only through socialism will it be possible to generate both the political will at the top and the genuine popular support and collaboration to achieve the immense coordinated transformation of the national and international economy necessary in the current emergency. Only public ownership and democratic planning can coordinate the establishment and expansion of free public transport, the urgent transition to renewal energy, the mass retrofitting of homes and a vast program of aforestation and rewilding.

A Just Transition

Most of the climate and environmental movement support the idea of a just transition but only socialism with its commitment to ending class privilege and inequality can actually deliver this. In any society where there are billionaires alongside homeless people, and immense divisions between rich countries and poor countries as a result of imperialism and globalized capitalism, all attempts at transition to ending carbon emissions, even where they are made, will inevitably be structured and blighted by this inequality. The rich will look to protect themselves and their life styles in gated communities in the uplands while trying to shift the burden of paying for the transition onto ordinary people.

Take the example of transport. If, as is absolutely essential, we get people out of the private car and onto free public transport, what will be the consequences of this? Under capitalism it will mean the bosses of the giant auto companies (Volkswagen, Toyota, General Motors etc) will see which way the wind is blowing, loot their own companies and put the proceeds in their Swiss bank accounts, while throwing their hundreds of thousands of workers on the scrap heap. Under socialism the auto industry CEOs and big shareholders could be relieved of their ill-gotten gains while the rundown of the industry is managed in a way that retrains and re-employs the workers in socially useful work, e.g. building wind turbines or buses.

The same applies to flying. If air travel were to be reduced, as it must be to save the planet,[2] under capitalism this would most likely be done by a price mechanism so that executives would continue to jet round the world to their conferences while ordinary people had to give up their holidays to Spain and the Greek Islands. That in turn would mean redundancy for airline workers and crisis in the Spanish and Greek tourist industry. Again only socialist planning could solve this.

And it would be the same for the utterly deadly coal industry. When Margaret Thatcher destroyed the British coal industry in 1984-5 she did it for entirely capitalist ‘economic’ reasons — there wasn’t an ounce of environmentalism in it — but the effect on mining communities and villages was devastating; many have still not recovered. Avoiding such communal destruction on a vastly greater scale requires socialist planning.

Thinking Globally

Climate justice on a global scale is totally unthinkable without socialism. Five hundred years ago the different continents and regions of the world were roughly at the same level of economic development; for example China was every bit as economically advanced as Europe and India was seen as a rich country. Centuries of capitalism, slavery and imperialism, with the latter growing out of the former, created an immensely uneven world; industrial production, wealth and power became concentrated in the so-called advanced ‘West’ — essentially Europe and North America—with poverty, starvation and lack of industrial development concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America, now usually called the Global South.

This pattern has changed somewhat in recent decades with massive capitalist development in China and other parts of South and East Asia but it is still a massive reality across much of the world. Historically and still today the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America have contributed least to climate change but will be hugely disproportionately affected by it. For example a 1.5-2 C global temperature increase will be a death sentence for much of Africa because it will destroy their agriculture; melting Himalayan glaciers and rising sea levels will utterly devastate the deeply impoverished Bangladesh.

This cannot be challenged or dealt with without socialist redistribution of wealth and socialist planning internationally. Only socialist internationalism based on the common interests of the world’s working people could achieve such international cooperation; any capitalist option, no matter how ‘green’ its intentions, would degenerate into national and international rivalries which would destroy any coherent international planning.

Then there is the question of overall economic growth. There is a growing view in the environmental movement that the idea of continuous economic growth is completely unsustainable. Greta Thunberg, in her speech to the UN, spoke of “fairy tales of eternal economic growth.”

But under capitalism stagnation or, even more so, de-growth is an immediate crisis, a recession when it is short and a ‘great depression’ when it is extended, spelling mass unemployment, poverty and austerity (with the risk of fascism thrown in). This is because capitalism has a drive to growth built into its very fabric. Achieving a non-growth economy (measured in terms of GDP) or, should it prove essential, a de-growth in certain areas would also only be possible on the basis of socialist planning combined with the popular consent that would come from mass involvement in the democratic planning process.

# 1NR

## 1

#### Turns Advantage 1---Status denial turns Taiwan war.

Ross 20, PhD, professor of political science at Boston College, associate of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, senior advisor of the security studies program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Robert S., 6-19-2020, "It’s not a cold war: competition and cooperation in US–China relations", *China International Strategy Review*, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-020-00038-8)

Adjustment and constrained competition will require the United States to moderate its naval and diplomatic posturing that signals China and the region that it seeks to contain the rise of China. The United States will continue to expand and modernize its military capabilities, maintain extensive cooperation with its regional security partners, and promote its international economic and global interests. But the US Navy’s high-profile challenges to China’s maritime claims, including its frequent freedom of navigation operations, do not reassure US security partners in East Asia, but they do elicit Chinese responses that exacerbate US–China maritime tension. The United States will maintain close defense cooperation with Taiwan, but the recent up-tempo US Navy transits of the Taiwan Strait do not contribute to deterrence or to Taiwan’s security, but they do elicit Chinese countermeasures and exacerbate US–China and cross-strait tension. US charges of China’s ideological incompatibility with international cooperation and global norms are not only unpersuasive, but they also suggest to Chinese leaders US resistance to any acknowledgement of Chinese interests or of a legitimate Chinese role in global affairs, encouraging Chinese hostility against apparent US containment of the rise of China (Pompeo 2019).

#### Decline solves war---there’s no scenario for escalation if the U.S. doesn’t intervene.

Wertheim 19, Historian who writes about American foreign policy (Stephen, September 14th, “The Only Way to End ‘Endless War’,” *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/opinion/sunday/endless-war-america.html>, Accessed 10-25-2021)

An even deadlier phase may be dawning. Because the United States pursues armed dominance as a self-evident good, the establishment feels threatened by a rising China and an assertive Russia. “Some of you will join the fight on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific,” Mr. Pence told the cadets, noting that “an increasingly militarized China challenges our presence in the region.” But China’s rise invalidates primacy’s rationale of deterrence and shows that other powers have ambitions of their own. Addressing the rise of China responsibly will require abandoning nostalgia for the pre-eminence that America enjoyed during the 1990s.

Despite Mr. Trump’s rhetoric about ending endless wars, the president insists that “our military dominance must be unquestioned” — even though no one believes he has a strategy to use power or a theory to bring peace. Armed domination has become an end in itself. Which means Americans face a choice: Either they should openly espouse endless war, or they should chart a new course.

As an American and an internationalist, I choose the latter. Rather than chase an illusory dominance, the United States should pursue the safety and welfare of its people while respecting the rights and dignity of all. In the 21st century, finally rid of colonial empires and Cold War antagonism, America has the opportunity to practice responsible statecraft, directed toward the promotion of peace. Responsible statecraft will oppose the war-making of others, but it will make sure, first and foremost, that America is not fueling violence.

On its own initiative, the United States can proudly bring home many of its soldiers currently serving in 800 bases ringing the globe, leaving small forces to protect commercial sea lanes. It can reorient its military, prioritizing deterrence and defense over power projection. It can stop the obscenity that America sends more weapons into the world than does any other country. It can reserve armed intervention, and warlike sanctions, for purposes that are essential, legal and rare.

Shrinking the military’s footprint will deprive presidents of the temptation to answer every problem with a violent solution. It will enable genuine engagement in the world, making diplomacy more effective, not less. As the United States stops being a party to every conflict, it can start being a party to resolving conflicts. President Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran and, to a lesser extent, President Trump’s opening with North Korea suggest that historical enmities can be overcome. Still, these steps have not gone far enough to normalize relations and allow us to get on with living together in a world whose chief dangers — climate change, disease, deprivation — cross borders and require cooperation.

Hawks will retort that lowering America’s military profile will plunge the world into a hostile power’s arms. They are projecting, assuming that one rival will covet and attain the kind of armed domination that has served America poorly. Russia, with an economy the size of Italy’s, cannot rule Europe, whatever it desires. China bears watching but has so far focused its military on denying access to its coasts and mainland. It is a long way from undertaking a costly bid for primacy in East Asia, let alone the world.

In any case, local states are likely to step up if the American military pulls back. The world conjured by the Washington establishment is an empty space, a “power vacuum,” waiting passively to be led. The real world is full of people ready to safeguard their freedom. Today a world with less American militarism is likely to have less militarism in general.

Hawks also warn that restraint will produce chaos, dooming the “rules-based,” “liberal international order.” Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, President Trump’s envoy for Syria, recently told a version of this tale when he pounded the table in anger at Americans’ objections to “endless war.” “Literally scores and scores of American military operations,” he said, “undergird this global security regime and thus undergird the American and Western and U.N. values system.”

But there’s a reason no one can connect the dots from unceasing interventions to a system of law and order. After decades of unilateral actions, crowned by the aggressive invasion of Iraq, it is U.S. military power that threatens international law and order. Rules should strengthen through cooperation, not wither through imposition.

In truth, the largest obstacle to ending endless war is self-imposed. Long told that the United States is the world’s “indispensable nation,” the American people have been denied a choice and have almost stopped demanding one. A global superpower — waging endless war — is just “who we are.”

#### Deterrence inevitably fails — A2AD and geography.

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Emerging Chinese military capabilities could pose significant problems for the United States in several important ways, as we will outline below. This analysis suggests that China’s growing capabilities will pose eventually insurmountable challenges to some of the more ambitious versions of U.S. regional missions, such as open-source notions of elaborate Air-Sea Battle concepts that envision significant operations into mainland China. However, U.S. objectives are not aggressive, and the analysis suggests that the United States, working with regional partners, ought to be capable of deterring China from seizing key territories in the East and South China Seas. China would come to any conflict significantly stronger than it was the last time it took provocative actions in the Taiwan Straits in 1996. Its military spending has outpaced the rest of the world’s over the past 25 years, with the exception of the United States. It has the largest population of any nation and the second-largest economy in the world, which could help it sustain a lengthy and costly war. China’s size and terrain also make it easier to hide its weaponry, including long-range surface-to-surface, anti-ship, and anti-aircraft missiles. If a conflict with Japan, the Philippines, or Taiwan were to escalate to war, the United States would start with one significant disadvantage: It would have to project power across the Pacific Ocean to China’s neighborhood. In recent foreign conflicts, it has taken months for the United States to build up its military forces, but a strategy for countering China may dictate a much faster timeline for action. Once U.S. forces arrive in theater, they would confront a well-equipped Chinese military already several days—if not weeks—into its campaign. Nevertheless, the United States, working with regional partners, ought to be capable of sustained credible posture for key defensive missions in places where China must project power further from home—namely, the East and South China Seas. The one possible exception, and the most challenging mission in relation to possible Chinese aggression, has been and remains the defense of Taiwan. Anti-Access China might employ anti-access capabilities to keep the United States from projecting combat power into the region. China has highly effective anti-access capabilities in the form of a large arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as the complete “kill-chain” with the sensors and C2 necessary to target U.S. forces. Anti-access capabilities could strike several types of targets, but we will focus on air bases and surface ships in this analysis. DoD reports that the PLA has 200 to 300 conventional medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a similar number of ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges of more than 1,500 km. Depending on their accuracy and reliability, these weapons could be used to attack airfields throughout the region, including those used by U.S. forces in Japan.219 The time to repair the damage can vary, but a planning factor of eight hours is reasonable.220 An eight-hour window might allow China to prevent sortie generation from numerous runways within 1,500 km of China for several days. The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range of 4,000 km, and a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles can be launched by submarines and bombers.221 These missile systems also could target U.S. bases on Guam. (See Table 5.1). Historically, the United States has used a mix of permanent bases and contingency bases in wartime. For instance, to support operations in Vietnam, the United States increased the number of air bases from 11 to 33, but since then has often added more modestly to existing bases.222 For example, if the United States were to increase its bases from 11 to 33, then China would be forced to spread its arsenal to attack a much greater number of bases (and note that many of the airfields will have more than one runway). Depending on the percentage of missiles devoted to runway attacks, the PLA might be able to shut down operations for one to four days. Alternatively, PLA forces could use these weapons to attack aircraft on the ground, either because that is their preferred target, or because the CEP of their missiles is not low enough to attack runways. Weapons with 200-m CEP that disperse submunitions over a large area (for example, over 275 m) can still effectively target aircraft on the ground.223 Surface ships also can be attacked with ballistic and cruise missiles. The challenge for the attackers is to find, fix, and target a fast-moving ship so that their area weapons can successfully engage it. In the case of long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, the time of flight of the weapon adds to the uncertainty, because the target continues to move during the minutes of flight from weapon launch to potential impact. Weapon systems can compensate for these latencies by having multiple warheads and an ability to direct those warheads to the target, as long as the target falls within a certain area, or basket, that the weapon sees when it first acquires the target with its sensors. If this basket, or missile-kill radius, is equal to or larger than the targeting location uncertainty, and if the probability that the weapon will score a hit on a target within its basket is high, then the attacker is likely to score a hit with a small number of attacking weapons. Conversely, if the missile-kill radius is smaller than the target location uncertainty, then the number of weapons required can climb so high as to become infeasible. If the PLA can find, fix, and target a large ship—such as an aircraft carrier—in less than 15 minutes, it could launch between two and 14 weapons. Given the importance of the target, this number of weapons is a reasonable price. If C2 delays take more than 15 minutes, the number of weapons necessary increases very dramatically.224 A fast-moving aircraft carrier is a difficult target to hit, and because the number of appropriate anti-ship ballistic missiles is rather limited, the PLA is likely to only take shots when it has reasonable odds of hitting the target. This places a premium on high-quality sensors and fast C2 reaction. Low-powered over-the-horizon (OTH) radars are one source of initial cuing information about the area in which an aircraft carrier might be operating. They are very useful because of their long-range capabilities but cannot precisely fix the location of a ship. Instead, OTH radars can cue other, more precise sensors to look in specific areas. These sensors could be airborne or space assets. An airborne sensor provides flexibility but must be protected. Several different kinds of PLA satellites—including electro-optical or various radar wave forms—also could be used for this mission. DoD recognizes the importance of the PLA’s kill chain, which makes it increasingly difficult for surface combatants and short-range tactical aircraft to enter and operate in or near the East and South China Seas. This military-technical problem creates a concern that, if the United States can be denied access to allies and partners, they are more vulnerable to Chinese aggression or coercion. There are two approaches to addressing the military-technical problem of China’s anti-access capabilities. The Air-Sea Battle operational concept proposed by the former Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the Air Force was to develop the offensive strike and cyber capabilities to destroy an adversary’s sensor, C2, and missile systems, thus “breaking the kill chain” in its antiaccess system.225 This approach would seek to restore U.S. air superiority and sea control against any potential adversary. Ground-based OTH radars located deep within China and PLA satellites are vulnerable, but striking these targets is not automatic because of the risk of escalation. How would China react to strike missions launched deep into its territory? What constraints, if any, would the two sides place on destructive attacks on satellites? Part of the negative reaction to the Air-Sea Battle concept was its focus on attacking such systems. This puts pressure on the United States to seek to jam or fool these systems. The disadvantages of applying offensive Air-Sea Battle (as the former service chiefs defined it) to China become clear when policymakers consider the likely reactions to destroying hundreds of targets on the mainland that China deems essential for self-defense.226 China is no more likely to accept the loss of its critical defense systems than the United States would be willing to accept the loss of its Pacific Fleet without escalating the conflict to a wider war, and perhaps eventually to the nuclear threshold. An offensive doctrine to destroy China’s A2/AD system is destabilizing because each side would have a military incentive to strike first based on a “use it or lose it” calculus. This incurs the risk of rapid vertical escalation, leaving policymakers with little time for developing diplomatic solutions to defuse a crisis. On the other hand, as suggested earlier, a defensive approach would aim not to destroy China’s anti-access capabilities, but instead to deny China’s ability to project power over water to conduct coercive strikes or an amphibious assault against U.S. allies (and, if policymakers choose, Taiwan). China’s principal means to conduct these hostile acts include strike aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, naval vessels, and amphibious landing craft. Thus, the militarytechnical problem that would drive joint concept and capability development is not China’s A2/AD per se, but how to defend U.S. allies by defeating China’s offensive power-projection capability. U.S. planning for dealing with the possibility of Chinese aggression has always incorporated aspects of direct defense. A greater focus on friendly or “Blue A2/AD”—recognizing that it works in both directions and that the same worries it creates for the U.S. military can be turned back against the PLA—offers opportunities to present robust defenses while reducing the need for potentially escalatory strikes on the Chinese mainland.227 A direct-defense approach would concentrate on defeating China’s means for projecting power by, for example, employing submarines and long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASMs) fired from any number of air, maritime, and allied land platforms to inflict significant losses on China. China’s A2/AD systems would be of marginal value in countering defensive systems that operate undersea, at stand-off range, or dispersed in mobile or hardened positions on land. In effect, countering Chinese anti-access capabilities with Blue A2/AD would render the “near seas” contested commons where both sides could deny access or impose unacceptable costs against aggressive actions by the other, but neither side need strike first to protect its forces. Such a circumstance would be strategically, operationally, and tactically more stable and less prone to crisis than an alternative that yields significant advantages to the side that hits first. Policymakers should recognize that the goal of sustaining U.S. military dominance over China is a dangerous and expensive illusion. Both countries are mutually vulnerable, both militarily and economically, in a manner that should constrain rational actors. Consistent with this reality, mutual A2/AD defense leads not to Chinese domination of Asia, but to better prospects for a stable relationship between great powers. Both sides could defend their key interests with less incentive to strike first.228 Because allies and partners will still require U.S. military support, Blue A2/AD provides an acceptable concept to build military partnerships. Adopting a Blue A2/AD defense would force China onto the wrong side of the capability and cost curve if it wants to pursue a foreign policy based on aggression. This supports allied desires to trade with China and avoid a cold war, but still hedge with the United States to maintain their independence. Area Denial Area denial refers to capabilities that prevent or hinder U.S. operations in a given area. It is closely related to anti-access but differs in that anti-access threats attack the sources of combat power (primarily air and sea forces attempting to enter an area), while area denial threats prevent combat forces from conducting their operations once in a particular area. Some of China’s principal area denial forces are shown in Table 5.2. Our assessment will focus on threats to combat aircraft conducting their missions. Area denial threats could come from other aircraft or from SAMs. When coupled with radar and other sensors used to detect aircraft, these integrated air defense systems (IADS) can provide very sophisticated defenses that either can deny air space to U.S. forces or exact a high price of entry. China can field a dense and sophisticated IADS by combining layers of SAMs with fighter aircraft. China has imported some of the most sophisticated SAMs from Russia for many years, including the S-300, but also has begun to develop its own sophisticated systems, such as the HQ-9 and short-range systems like the HQ-12. This allows China to employ sophisticated cooperative defense techniques to make it difficult for intruders to target specific elements of the IADS without other elements engaging in defense. Using these systems, the area that China can deny stretches out many miles from China’s coast. A DoD report estimates that it reaches out over Taiwan.229 China reportedly is expecting delivery of Russia’s most sophisticated long-range system, the S-400, in 2020. SAM development in Russia and China has improved the abilities of the radar, both in terms of its range and discrimination of targets, as well as the range of their interceptors. From the S300 to the S-400, the interceptor ranges have increased from 150 km to 200 km and, finally, to an estimated 400 km.230 This poses problems for U.S. efforts to engage SAM radars because current weapons do not match these ranges. Both the HARM and the small diameter bomb (SDB) have ranges of about 110 km, depending on their launch altitude.231 The implication is that the United States will need aircraft with very low radar cross-section (RCS) in order to operate in areas within range of an S-300.232 The SEAD mission will get harder as China continues to invest in advanced aircraft and SAMs with long-range interceptors and increasingly sophisticated tracking radars that attempt to locate low-RCS aircraft. The PLA has a structural advantage in that U.S. low-RCS aircraft have operated for many years using the RCS technology available when they were designed and built, but the cycle of radar development and fielding can be faster. The United States can compensate in two ways: by developing longer-range and faster missiles and by improving onboard capabilities—such as jammers and other electronic warfare capabilities—to destroy or suppress Chinese air defenses. However, neither approach would quickly neutralize China’s sophisticated air defense network, which would remain an effective area-denial capability for the duration of a conflict between the United States and China. Once again, a more effective and efficient approach would be to develop friendly area-denial capabilities that can interdict Chinese ships, aircraft, and missiles from stand-off range to minimize the operational impact of China’s air defense network. U.S. Air Superiority Is Eroding In the past 25 years, China took an air force that featured the technology of the 1950s and began a concerted effort to retire old systems while purchasing advanced Russian platforms and investing in indigenous capabilities to produce modern fighters. Although its aircraft and pilots continue to lag U.S. capabilities, the PLA can compensate for some of these shortfalls in several ways. The PLA modernization effort has opted for quality over quantity. It cut the number of fighters in its inventory by almost half, eliminating 2nd-generation aircraft while acquiring more than 900 4th-generation aircraft. Now the majority of fighter aircraft operated by the PLA are 4th-generation aircraft. This includes the indigenous J-10, as well as the J-11 (Su-27) and J-16 (Su-30). The PLA currently has two other fighters under development, the J-20 and J-31. The most advanced air-to-air weapon in its inventory, the PL-15, outranges the U.S. AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). The outcome of an engagement is determined by many factors, but having a longer-range weapon is a big advantage as long as one’s radar can acquire targets at the full kinematic range of the weapon. That is where the low RCS offers an advantage to the United States. The exact exchange ratio is highly uncertain, but previous estimates have assumed that a U.S. 5th-generation aircraft may have a 22-to-1 advantage over a J-11B (indigenous upgraded Su-27) with PL-12 air-to-air missiles, but when the same J-11B flies with longer-range PL-15 missiles, the exchange ratio may fall to something like 5 to 1.233 Whatever the exact ratios, this estimate gives a sense of how dramatically advantages can erode as adversaries invest in air dominance capabilities. The United States has many more 4th- and 5th- generation fighters in its inventory and operates no 3rd-generation aircraft. Although the United States retains the advantage in the total force, the question is how many fighters it can get forward, how quickly, and whether those timelines meet the operational needs. In terms of quality, the United States has an advantage, but would need to deploy many aircraft to defend its partners in the region. For example, in a Taiwan scenario, the combination of a lack of appropriate bases in the Pacific Ocean and potential PLA anti-access strategies could force the United States to devote many more aircraft to a conflict than the PLA would need to deploy. Previous analysis of a Taiwan conflict estimated that if China devotes 1,000 fighters to a Taiwan campaign, the United States would need an equivalent number of aircraft based as far from Taiwan as Okinawa (770 km). However, because there are only a few bases on Okinawa and few equivalent options, it is likely that the United States would have many of its aircraft operating from farther distances. If it were to instead operate its fighters from Guam (2,870 km from Taipei), the number necessary would more than double (and would depend on a large and capable fleet of air-to-air tankers).234 The ability of the United States to maintain air superiority also is closely tied to the outcome of both anti-access and area denial competitions. In airspace close to its shores, China could use long-range SAMs to hold at risk U.S. aircraft seeking to gain air superiority. The area denial threats will force the USAF to operate from farther away from China, while the anti-access threats may drive up the number of aircraft needed for this mission. Counter Space and C2 Information collection, analysis, and dissemination has been an area of strength for the U.S. military as compared with potential adversaries. This allows the U.S. military to effectively command and control joint and coalition forces to unify efforts and respond dynamically to battlefield changes. It also allows command concepts that feature centralized control but distributed execution, meaning that commanders at every level are given leeway to take initiatives in their own area, but higher-level commanders seek to unify efforts. The system works best when commanders at each level retain access to communication links so that battlefield changes and force levels are quickly sent up the chain, while orders to achieve unity of effort are sent down the chain and forward units can coordinate with each other. Fully leveraging these advantages and implementing these command concepts relies on many technologies, capabilities, and organizational constructs. In this section, we focus on the contribution and potential vulnerabilities of the space systems in a conflict with China. The U.S. military relies on many types of satellites with many capabilities. Satellite positions can be tracked, which is very helpful to those who want to attack or disrupt them. Disruptions can be carried out in many ways, including by attacks by anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), jamming, or blinding. The PLA has demonstrated all of these capabilities. China began ASAT tests in 2005 and demonstrated that it could hit a satellite in orbit when it destroyed one of its own satellites in 2007. This action was heavily criticized because of the large amount of space debris it created. China subsequently demonstrated several other strike capabilities that could target satellites in higher orbits. China also is reported to have launched satellites capable of destroying other satellites, including the Aolong 1.235 The PLA also could use lasers to dazzle satellite sensors or jammers to degrade space-based radars. The implications of these counter-space capabilities are difficult to judge. First, the degree to which space warfare will become a feature of a future conflict is uncertain. Both the United States and China rely on satellites for military operations. Fear of losing one’s own space capabilities is a possible deterrent to destructive attacks in space. In addition, if the attacks create space debris, they could interfere with the commercial use of space by all nations. Although these factors might inhibit space attacks, warfare is not often singular in its restraints. Jamming and lasers could be used to achieve temporary disruptions, in some cases without permanently destroying the satellite or its sensors, but those jammers and lasers are subject to attack. Second, if U.S. satellites face disruptions, it will be difficult to identify the consequences in advance. Even if a satellite were destroyed, there may be other workarounds that could be implemented to compensate. The overall redundancy of the system is unknown. Communication and/or sensor degradation may be localized to a small area or to a much larger one, depending on the system. Whatever the exact consequences, the potential for loss of communications and sensors is real and plans need to be in place for satellites to degrade gracefully, reconstitute, and operate in the meantime. U.S. forces should aim to operate in ways that do not require the same communications and sensor inputs desired in a fully operational system.

#### China rise is peaceful now---encirclement makes it fast and hostile.

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Factions and interests on both the right and the left are now disturbingly united in an effort to cast China as the next multidimensional threat to the U.S.—on par with or even exceeding that of the Soviet Union in its dimensions. Many of those interests, moreover, are poised to profit from such a characterization. A few obvious facts, however, are worth repeating when considering the putative threat posed by China to U.S. national security: China has not resorted to any significant use of force in more than three decades, it has no foreign bases, and it remains rather weak (compared with U.S. forces) in the domains of power projection and nuclear war fighting. In the coming decades, all of those metrics may reverse, and China could morph from a bungling, paranoid panda into a fire‐​breathing, goose‐​stepping dragon. It seems likely that Beijing will have the requisite resources, bureaucratic discipline, and talent to make such a transition. Moreover, it is not short of strategists advocating for more aggressive steps to counter the United States.41 Washington’s overall goal should be to forestall that metamorphosis, in part by acknowledging China’s security concerns and by seeking compromises on the many issues that divide the United States and China, as outlined in the previous section. It is worth reiterating that Beijing is planning neither to attack the United States nor to conquer East Asia. Rather, its foreign policy behavior has, by and large, comported itself well with current international norms—in rather stark contrast to Moscow’s much more confrontational approach toward the West.

#### Their evidence says China is illiberal---integrationists control foreign policy---status quo causes liberalization, but continued status denial will give Nativists the upper hand and that drives a revisionist challenge.

Ward 17- Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University (Steven, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, p. 199-

The foreign policy preferences of China’s elite vary fairly widely. Shambaugh and Xiao have identified seven distinct orientations toward the status quo within Chinese foreign policy discourse. At the integrationist end of the spectrum are the Globalists, who believe that China should take on additional responsibility for global governance within the existing framework of institutions – in short, China should “act as a responsible power.”56 Chinese Globalists are much like Western “liberal institutionalists,” and are thus generally supportive of the liberal order. Five other perspectives (which Shambaugh and Xiao identify as Selective Multilateralists, the Global South school, the Asia Firsters, the Major Powers School, and the Realists) are less sold on the liberal order, but at least agree that some degree of participation in its institutions, norms, and rules is necessary.57

But there is one group – the Nativists – that rejects participation in the liberal international order. The Nativists are “hyper-nationalist” Marxist ideologues who oppose domestic reforms aimed at producing openness and market capitalism. In the realm of foreign policy, they oppose participation in the liberal order because they “view international multilateral involvement as ‘traps’ (laid by the West) to embroil China in costly overseas commitments.”58 Nativists have multiple reasons for rejecting integration, not all of which have to do with status – for instance, they worry that participation in the Western order will destabilize the Communist Party. But they are also deeply concerned about China’s status and are skeptical about the prospects of achieving their ambitions within an order dominated by Western powers. According to Shambaugh and Xiao, Nativists “regularly harp on the nationalist theme of the ‘century of shame and humiliation’ and argue that China is entitled to global respect (particularly by those powers that previously humiliated China).”59

Liu Mingfu’s sensationally popular China Dream is a remarkably open call for a deep revisionist challenge to the liberal order. While Liu may not be a Nativist (according to Shambaugh’s classification), his writing is worth considering as a modern Chinese manifestation of the kind of argument that Friedrich von Bernhardi popularized in Germany during the years before World War I. Liu’s central proposition is that China should aim to become a “champion” nation – the global top dog or leader (as distinct from the hegemon, which to Liu implies a form of imperialism and military domination). As the “champion,” China would “create a new world order that prefers peace, development, freedom, and cooperative civilization.” This seems like a clear demand for China to – at some point – remake the international order.

What is significant is the source of the demand for radical revisionism, and its implications for China’s participation in the liberal order. Liu links the need for a new order to the deficiencies of American hegemony, the “worst expression” of which is “its monopolization of its status as champion.”60 In other words, the United States will not accede willingly to China’s attainment of a position of equality in a “multipolar” world. The book goes on to document and decry American efforts to contain the rise of China, considers lessons fromthe successfulAmerican defeat of two other potential “champions” (the Soviet Union and Japan), and makes a clear argument against integrating too deeply within the liberal order:

However, it cannot be denied that America has a clear upper hand in terms of control and power with China. China can be promoted to copilot to help the United States cope with risks, but this will only help America maintain its position as pilot. America allows opponents to board its plane, which is ultimately a higher degree of control and containment.61

Integrating within the liberal order would amount to becoming Washington’s “copilot,” which would do nothing more than strengthen the basis of a status hierarchy that the United States is intent upon preserving. This is reminiscent of the way that Bernhardi, militant pan-Asianists, andWeimar nationalists argued against participation in the pre-WorldWar I and interwar orders. And Liu’s book is hardly peripheral: in 2013, Xi Jinping began invoking the term “China Dream” to describe his vision for China’s future, and has reportedly been deeply influenced by the book’s central argument.62

Nativists and other revisionists may not be ascendant in Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking, but their foreign policy preferences are not marginal either. While other schools of thought do not take such strident positions against participation in the liberal order, some share a sense of skepticism: Realists for instance, are also concerned that Western institutions are traps meant to keep China down.63 And Chinese elites remain worried about Chinese status and link it to the terms of participation in the liberal order – they emphasize “equality of participation” over “governance” and chafe at the idea of complying with American standards in order to be recognized as a “responsible power.”64

So while Chinese foreign policy is currently run mostly by proponents of intermediate and at least partially integrationist perspectives, Nativists and others like Liu constitute a loud and potentially influential voice for policies that reject the liberal international order – much like Pan-Asians or German radical nationalists spent the 1920s demanding policies of protest and delegitimation from the more moderate leaders who ran Taisho¯ and Weimar foreign policy.65 It is not difficult to imagine support for the Nativist perspective (not just among the elite but also in the public) growing along with developments that seem to confirm fears that Chinese status ambitions face an insurmountable, unjust obstacle imposed by the United States and the liberal order. Indeed, evidence suggests that Chinese “netizen” nationalists are hyper-aware of status issues and often mobilize in response to concerns about the way China is treated by foreign actors and what that treatment says about China’s international standing.66

Status, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Foreign Policy

The question that remains is whether – in China’s authoritarian system – pressure from outside the government for radical revisionist policies could have much influence. The government is (and likely will be for the foreseeable future) committed to foreign policy moderation: but what if developments appearing to confirm that China faces a status “glass ceiling” increase support for the Nativist position and lead to widespread demands for policies aimed at rejecting the liberal order? Could these forces impact Chinese policy in the same way that they impacted German and Japanese policy? It is hard to know for sure, but there is good reason to think that the government is susceptible to influence from external pressure and that it may only become more so in the future.

While some scholars maintain that Chinese policymakers mostly effectively ignore public opinion, or that public opinion prompts short-term shifts in official rhetoric or policy but does not influence grand strategic direction,many others agree that “bottom-up” forces play a significant role in Chinese foreign policy.67 Unofficial attitudes and preferences cannot influence policy through themechanisms of electoral political competition, but this does not mean they are irrelevant. First, policy has to be at least somewhat responsive to the diversity of elite preferences – just as Bethmann Hollweg was constrained by the attitudes of the Kaiser, Tirpitz, and the Pan-Germans, Chinese leaders may be constrained by the preferences of Nativists and some status-sensitive and integrationskeptical Realists in the military and the Party.68 Second, mass opinion can threaten China’s elite through the dynamics of widespread popular protest. According to Weiss, mass protests may menace ruling elites by creating demonstration effects, tipping points, and information cascades; facilitating future mobilization against the regime; and fostering or exacerbating divisions within the leadership.69 And while strong authoritarian states like China can prevent and manage anti-regime protests, there are costs and risks associated with doing so, especially when public opinion is aimed at forcing the regime to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy posture.70 This means that the masses can be a potent weapon for anyone interested in forcing the government into adopting a more belligerent foreign policy; in turn, this means that any factor that makes it easier to mobilize anti-Western opinion (such as apparent evidence that the United States is unwilling to accommodate a Chinese claim to equal rights) may provide opportunities for Chinese proponents of challenging the liberal order.

#### Bipolarity sufficiently constrains Chinese expansion---clinging to primacy goes too far and solidifies Chinese belligerence. Prefer it---2AC evidence is not about China, this card is.

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Toward constrained competition

The trend in US–China security relations is toward greater tension and greater risk of costly maritime confrontations. This trend reflects a hardening of US and Chinese policies, as the United States is determined to resist a changing regional security order, despite China’s continued rise, and China is determined to reorder East Asia to reflect the changing balance of power, even as US resistance increases. Nonetheless, interminable conflict escalation and cold-war hostility are not determined by structure or the power transition conflict. The course of US-China competition will be determined by policy choices. Pragmatic US and Chinese policies can contribute to constrained competition.

Constrained competition requires US adjustment to the power transition and acknowledgement of Chinese interest in greater influence in regional security affairs. Determined US insistence on maintaining the post-World War II status quo in regional alliances and alignments will necessarily lead to greater Chinese belligerence, as China will demand a revised regional order commensurate with its greater capabilities and the changing great power distribution of power. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien-Loong expressed it well:

it is well worth the US forging a new understanding that will integrate China’s aspirations within the current system… China will expect a say in this process, because it sees the present rules as having been created in the past without its participation. This is an entirely reasonable expectation… The world…has to adjust to a larger role for China (Lee 2019).

US hegemony and the unipolar maritime order have given the United States near absolute security in East Asian seas, so that the emerging bipolar order is not optimal for the United States. Nonetheless, bipolarity can prevent the development of unchecked Chinese power and it can constrain Chinese strategic ambitions both in East Asia and the globe. US adjustment to the rise of China does not require that the United States cede East Asia to Chinese hegemony. Rather, the United States can adjust to the rise of China while competing in a bipolar regional balance of power. Moreover, the United States will retain worldwide leadership in military affairs, in critical elements of technological innovation and research and development, and in international leadership capabilities.

Adjustment and constrained competition will require the United States to moderate its naval and diplomatic posturing that signals China and the region that it seeks to contain the rise of China. The United States will continue to expand and modernize its military capabilities, maintain extensive cooperation with its regional security partners, and promote its international economic and global interests. But the US Navy’s high-profile challenges to China’s maritime claims, including its frequent freedom of navigation operations, do not reassure US security partners in East Asia, but they do elicit Chinese responses that exacerbate US–China maritime tension. The United States will maintain close defense cooperation with Taiwan, but the recent up-tempo US Navy transits of the Taiwan Strait do not contribute to deterrence or to Taiwan’s security, but they do elicit Chinese countermeasures and exacerbate US–China and cross-strait tension. US charges of China’s ideological incompatibility with international cooperation and global norms are not only unpersuasive, but they also suggest to Chinese leaders US resistance to any acknowledgement of Chinese interests or of a legitimate Chinese role in global affairs, encouraging Chinese hostility against apparent US containment of the rise of China (Pompeo 2019).

#### No leadership impact.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

#### Decline solves transition conflict---only clinging causes war.

MacDonald & Parent 18, \*PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. \*\*PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. (Paul K. and Joseph M., “Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment”, pg. 2-3, Published by *Cornell University Press*)

In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline.

Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cutthroat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly conflicts and reinforce core strongpoints. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on conditions and the enemies faced.

Third, after depth, structural conditions are the most important factors shaping how great powers respond to relative decline. Four conditions catalyze the incentives for declining states to retrench. One is the declining state’s rank. States in the top rungs of the great power hierarchy have more resources and margin for error than those lower down, so there is less urgency for them to retrench. Another is the availability of allies. Where states can shift burdens to capable regional powers with similar preferences, retrenchment is less risky and difficult. Yet another is the interdependence of commitments. When states perceive commitments in one place as tightly linked to commitments elsewhere, pulling back becomes harder and less likely. The last catalyst is the calculus of conquest. If aggression pays, then retrenchment does not, and great powers will be loath to do it. The world is not just complex and cutthroat, it is also dynamic. No set of conditions is everlasting, and leaders must change with the times.

Empirically, this work aims to add value by being the first to study systematically all modern shifts in the great power pecking order. We find sixteen cases of relative decline since 1870, when reliable data for the great powers become available, and compare them to their non-declining counterparts across a variety of measures. To preview the findings, retrenchment is by far the most common response to relative decline, and declining powers behave differently from non-declining powers. States in decline are more likely to cut the size of their military forces and budgets and in extreme cases are more likely to form alliances. This does not, however, make them ripe for exploitation; declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes. Our headline finding, however, is that states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do. These results challenge theories of grand strategy and war, offer guidance to policymakers, and indicate overlooked paths to peace.

#### China rise is peaceful now---encirclement makes it fast and hostile.

Goldstein 20, associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College. (Lyle, 7-22-2020, "China’s Putative Threat to U.S. National Security", Published in *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/chinas-putative-threat-us-national-security)

Factions and interests on both the right and the left are now disturbingly united in an effort to cast China as the next multidimensional threat to the U.S.—on par with or even exceeding that of the Soviet Union in its dimensions. Many of those interests, moreover, are poised to profit from such a characterization. A few obvious facts, however, are worth repeating when considering the putative threat posed by China to U.S. national security: China has not resorted to any significant use of force in more than three decades, it has no foreign bases, and it remains rather weak (compared with U.S. forces) in the domains of power projection and nuclear war fighting. In the coming decades, all of those metrics may reverse, and China could morph from a bungling, paranoid panda into a fire‐​breathing, goose‐​stepping dragon. It seems likely that Beijing will have the requisite resources, bureaucratic discipline, and talent to make such a transition. Moreover, it is not short of strategists advocating for more aggressive steps to counter the United States.41 Washington’s overall goal should be to forestall that metamorphosis, in part by acknowledging China’s security concerns and by seeking compromises on the many issues that divide the United States and China, as outlined in the previous section. It is worth reiterating that Beijing is planning neither to attack the United States nor to conquer East Asia. Rather, its foreign policy behavior has, by and large, comported itself well with current international norms—in rather stark contrast to Moscow’s much more confrontational approach toward the West.

#### Their evidence says China is illiberal---integrationists control foreign policy---status quo causes liberalization, but continued status denial will give Nativists the upper hand and that drives a revisionist challenge.

Ward 17- Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University (Steven, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, p. 199-

The foreign policy preferences of China’s elite vary fairly widely. Shambaugh and Xiao have identified seven distinct orientations toward the status quo within Chinese foreign policy discourse. At the integrationist end of the spectrum are the Globalists, who believe that China should take on additional responsibility for global governance within the existing framework of institutions – in short, China should “act as a responsible power.”56 Chinese Globalists are much like Western “liberal institutionalists,” and are thus generally supportive of the liberal order. Five other perspectives (which Shambaugh and Xiao identify as Selective Multilateralists, the Global South school, the Asia Firsters, the Major Powers School, and the Realists) are less sold on the liberal order, but at least agree that some degree of participation in its institutions, norms, and rules is necessary.57

But there is one group – the Nativists – that rejects participation in the liberal international order. The Nativists are “hyper-nationalist” Marxist ideologues who oppose domestic reforms aimed at producing openness and market capitalism. In the realm of foreign policy, they oppose participation in the liberal order because they “view international multilateral involvement as ‘traps’ (laid by the West) to embroil China in costly overseas commitments.”58 Nativists have multiple reasons for rejecting integration, not all of which have to do with status – for instance, they worry that participation in the Western order will destabilize the Communist Party. But they are also deeply concerned about China’s status and are skeptical about the prospects of achieving their ambitions within an order dominated by Western powers. According to Shambaugh and Xiao, Nativists “regularly harp on the nationalist theme of the ‘century of shame and humiliation’ and argue that China is entitled to global respect (particularly by those powers that previously humiliated China).”59

Liu Mingfu’s sensationally popular China Dream is a remarkably open call for a deep revisionist challenge to the liberal order. While Liu may not be a Nativist (according to Shambaugh’s classification), his writing is worth considering as a modern Chinese manifestation of the kind of argument that Friedrich von Bernhardi popularized in Germany during the years before World War I. Liu’s central proposition is that China should aim to become a “champion” nation – the global top dog or leader (as distinct from the hegemon, which to Liu implies a form of imperialism and military domination). As the “champion,” China would “create a new world order that prefers peace, development, freedom, and cooperative civilization.” This seems like a clear demand for China to – at some point – remake the international order.

What is significant is the source of the demand for radical revisionism, and its implications for China’s participation in the liberal order. Liu links the need for a new order to the deficiencies of American hegemony, the “worst expression” of which is “its monopolization of its status as champion.”60 In other words, the United States will not accede willingly to China’s attainment of a position of equality in a “multipolar” world. The book goes on to document and decry American efforts to contain the rise of China, considers lessons fromthe successfulAmerican defeat of two other potential “champions” (the Soviet Union and Japan), and makes a clear argument against integrating too deeply within the liberal order:

However, it cannot be denied that America has a clear upper hand in terms of control and power with China. China can be promoted to copilot to help the United States cope with risks, but this will only help America maintain its position as pilot. America allows opponents to board its plane, which is ultimately a higher degree of control and containment.61

Integrating within the liberal order would amount to becoming Washington’s “copilot,” which would do nothing more than strengthen the basis of a status hierarchy that the United States is intent upon preserving. This is reminiscent of the way that Bernhardi, militant pan-Asianists, andWeimar nationalists argued against participation in the pre-WorldWar I and interwar orders. And Liu’s book is hardly peripheral: in 2013, Xi Jinping began invoking the term “China Dream” to describe his vision for China’s future, and has reportedly been deeply influenced by the book’s central argument.62

Nativists and other revisionists may not be ascendant in Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking, but their foreign policy preferences are not marginal either. While other schools of thought do not take such strident positions against participation in the liberal order, some share a sense of skepticism: Realists for instance, are also concerned that Western institutions are traps meant to keep China down.63 And Chinese elites remain worried about Chinese status and link it to the terms of participation in the liberal order – they emphasize “equality of participation” over “governance” and chafe at the idea of complying with American standards in order to be recognized as a “responsible power.”64

So while Chinese foreign policy is currently run mostly by proponents of intermediate and at least partially integrationist perspectives, Nativists and others like Liu constitute a loud and potentially influential voice for policies that reject the liberal international order – much like Pan-Asians or German radical nationalists spent the 1920s demanding policies of protest and delegitimation from the more moderate leaders who ran Taisho¯ and Weimar foreign policy.65 It is not difficult to imagine support for the Nativist perspective (not just among the elite but also in the public) growing along with developments that seem to confirm fears that Chinese status ambitions face an insurmountable, unjust obstacle imposed by the United States and the liberal order. Indeed, evidence suggests that Chinese “netizen” nationalists are hyper-aware of status issues and often mobilize in response to concerns about the way China is treated by foreign actors and what that treatment says about China’s international standing.66

Status, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Foreign Policy

The question that remains is whether – in China’s authoritarian system – pressure from outside the government for radical revisionist policies could have much influence. The government is (and likely will be for the foreseeable future) committed to foreign policy moderation: but what if developments appearing to confirm that China faces a status “glass ceiling” increase support for the Nativist position and lead to widespread demands for policies aimed at rejecting the liberal order? Could these forces impact Chinese policy in the same way that they impacted German and Japanese policy? It is hard to know for sure, but there is good reason to think that the government is susceptible to influence from external pressure and that it may only become more so in the future.

While some scholars maintain that Chinese policymakers mostly effectively ignore public opinion, or that public opinion prompts short-term shifts in official rhetoric or policy but does not influence grand strategic direction,many others agree that “bottom-up” forces play a significant role in Chinese foreign policy.67 Unofficial attitudes and preferences cannot influence policy through themechanisms of electoral political competition, but this does not mean they are irrelevant. First, policy has to be at least somewhat responsive to the diversity of elite preferences – just as Bethmann Hollweg was constrained by the attitudes of the Kaiser, Tirpitz, and the Pan-Germans, Chinese leaders may be constrained by the preferences of Nativists and some status-sensitive and integrationskeptical Realists in the military and the Party.68 Second, mass opinion can threaten China’s elite through the dynamics of widespread popular protest. According to Weiss, mass protests may menace ruling elites by creating demonstration effects, tipping points, and information cascades; facilitating future mobilization against the regime; and fostering or exacerbating divisions within the leadership.69 And while strong authoritarian states like China can prevent and manage anti-regime protests, there are costs and risks associated with doing so, especially when public opinion is aimed at forcing the regime to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy posture.70 This means that the masses can be a potent weapon for anyone interested in forcing the government into adopting a more belligerent foreign policy; in turn, this means that any factor that makes it easier to mobilize anti-Western opinion (such as apparent evidence that the United States is unwilling to accommodate a Chinese claim to equal rights) may provide opportunities for Chinese proponents of challenging the liberal order.

## 2

#### 2---assumes growth is equally shared

Szayna et al 17, Research department director of the Defense and Political Sciences Department and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He has over 30 years of experience in national security policy and defense analysis. From 1997 to 2011 he served as associate director of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program in RAND's Army Research Division. His research has focused on aspects of strategic planning for the U.S. armed forces, post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, and coalition interoperability. He gave testimony for the U.S. House of Representatives and has been a keynote speaker at a number of defense conferences. Szayna received a B.A. in history and philosophy from Villanova University and an M.A. in international relations from Claremont Graduate School. Also Angela O’Mahony, Jennifer Kavanagh, Stephen Watts, Bryan Frederick, Tova C. Norlen, Phoenix Voorhies. (“Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers: An Empirical Assessment of Historical Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections”. 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RR1063.html)

There are a number of factors that could lead to discontinuous changes in this metric. For example, a global economic downturn could lead to sharp reductions in development aid that could threaten any improvements in governance that had been made with the benefit of that assistance. Alternatively, a major jump in global energy costs could induce widespread fiscal crises similar to those of the 1970s and 1980s, ultimately leading to reduced state capacity. The branch scenario in red projects essentially no improvements in state capacity over the period in question, so larger changes would entail the rapid erosion of the capacity of states that are already relatively capable. Such changes are certainly possible, but they would constitute an example of nonlinear disruptive change. On balance, our projection is that state capacity is likely to continue to improve, which will tend to exert a downward pressure on the likelihood of intrastate conflict. Prevalence of Consolidated Democracies Consolidated democracies are less likely to fight one another and to be involved in internal conflict. While this correlation is clear, the mechanism by which democracies reduce conflict is more contested. The literature on interstate conflict has focused on the greater transparency and consistency of democratic regimes that allow them to credibly commit to peaceful solutions to disputes and the possibility that domestic norms and greater political accountability may make democratic states less likely to pursue violent conflicts.8 There are fewer arguments that the greater ability of consolidated democracies to resolve grievances within the political system leads to less intrastate conflict.9 We note, however, that partial democracies or the process of democratization itself may not be particularly peaceful and may even be associated with an increase in conflict.10 Given the importance of consolidated democracy in the literature on conflict, there is already a great deal of work in the academic literature on measurement of democracy. Several aggregate measures of democracy have been developed that include the competitiveness of elections; the state’s respect for civil, political, and minority rights; and freedoms of the press and religion. The most widely used measure of consolidated democracy, and the one we employ, comes from the Polity project. By coding a wide range of regime characteristics, such as political 8 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, Conn., and London: Yale University Press, 1984; Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996; Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. 9 Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 33–48; Christian Davenport, State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace, New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 10 Hegre et al., 2001; Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Simon Hug, “Elections and Ethnic Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2012, pp. 387–417. 49 competition and constraints on the executive, an aggregate “Polity score” is produced, ranging from –10 to 10. Values of 6 or higher are typically used to identify the presence of a democracy, with a more conservative measurement of 8 or higher often used to identify consolidated democracies. We use this metric to calculate the percentage of all states that are consolidated democracies, with the historical values denoted by the black line in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2. Prevalence of Consolidated Democracies SOURCE: Historical data: Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Data Set [Computer file; version p4v2012], College Park, Md.: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2002; projections calculated by authors. We projected the baseline scenario by fitting a trend line to the historical data and calculating the future values.11 This projection is represented in the figure by the gray line. We calculated the two branch scenarios as one standard deviation above and below the baseline projection; they are shown in the figure by the blue and red lines, respectively. Discontinuous growth in the prevalence of democracies could result from various tippingpoint effects. If a high percentage of the world’s population were governed through democracy, other forms of government may come to be seen as illegitimate, and greater international pressure may be brought to bear to remove them. Within the time frame of our study, a dramatic reversal in the prevalence of consolidated democracies appears to be less likely. The reversion of 11 The trend line was fit using a generalized linear model linked to a binomial logit function. The resulting projections are therefore bounded between 0 and 1 (in this case, 0 and 100 percent). The model used in Figure 3.2 has a Pearson statistic (1/df) of .0037, suggesting a high degree of fit with the data. 50 consolidated democracies to autocracies historically has been extremely rare and is unlikely in the absence of extreme economic decline, the conquest of democracies by more powerful autocracies, or both. Either of these potential paths is likely to lead directly to increases in future conflict levels as well. Degree of Ethnic and Sectarian Polarization The academic literature generally agrees that a high level of ethnic and sectarian polarization is not sufficient by itself to cause conflict either within or between states. However, there is also agreement that in the intrastate context, where group mobilization occurs along ethnic lines, identity can become a significant contributing factor for violence, especially when strengthened by socioeconomic and sociopolitical grievances. Consequently, we identified the degree of ethnic and sectarian polarization as one of the primary factors likely to affect the level of intrastate conflict in the future. Evidence also shows that while ethnicity may not lead to conflict by itself, it may work to prolong conflicts and increase the intensity of violence in those conflicts that are already occurring.12 Such effects will most likely be strengthened if ethnic groups are deliberately disadvantaged by the state or if they are territorially based and have secessionist or separatist demands.13 Scholars tend to agree that ethnic and sectarian polarization, while a strong predictor for increased levels of intrastate conflict, is not a strong driver for conflicts between states. However, if regional and international actors become involved in intrastate conflicts, or if conflicts spread across borders, such polarization could also affect levels of interstate conflict. Such a scenario is especially likely where ethnic kin-groups in neighboring states become involved with secessionist movements.14 Quantifying ethnic and sectarian polarization is inherently difficult. While various measures have been tried, such as linguistic differences (e.g., ethno-linguistic fractionalization) or religious preferences, they are often criticized for not capturing the cleavage that gives rise to political mobilization. For example, different ethnic groups may share the same religion, and one ethnic group may speak multiple languages. It can also be difficult to determine when certain identities in a society are increasing in salience, and when they are becoming less relevant. One prominent 12 Rajat Ganguly and Raymond Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, Longman Publishers, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 50, No. 11, 2007. 13 Gurr, 1970; Stephen M. Saideman, and William R. Ayres, “Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and 1990s,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 4, November 2000, pp. 1126–1144; Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. 14 John A. Vasquez, and Brendan Valeriano, “Territory as a Source of Conflict and a Road to Peace,” in Jacob Bercovitch, Viktor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds., The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Los Angeles, Calif.: SAGE, 2009, pp. 193–209. 51 attempt to quantify relevant ethnic identities is the Minorities at Risk data set at the University of Maryland, which identifies minority groups by their “at risk” status—that is, by the extent to which they are disadvantaged in their relationships with other groups in the state in which they reside. However, the Minorities at Risk data identify such “at risk” groups somewhat subjectively, and the project does not claim to be comprehensive. An alternative, objective measure is to look for the degree of formal discrimination against ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups. The creation or removal of official laws providing for formal discrimination can help to identify states where identity-based grievances may become more or less salient. For capturing the degree of ethnic and sectarian polarization, therefore, we looked at the percentage of states with formal discrimination against minorities, where such minority groups make up at least 5 percent of the state’s population. We used the Ethnic Power Relations data set (EPR), which tracks the extent of access to state power for all politically relevant ethnic groups in every country of the world from 1946 to 2013. It includes annual data on more than 733 groups and codes the degree to which their representatives held executive-level state power—from total control of the government to being formally barred from holding political office. While the disadvantage of such a proxy may be that it potentially fails to capture some of the unofficial social discrimination that can lead to group mobilization, the advantage is that it allows for a more objective measure of sectarian tension. The overall levels of ethnic or sectarian polarization in the figure below may therefore be understated, but we can have more confidence in the general trend line than we could with more subjective data sources. We projected the baseline scenario by fitting an exponential trend line to the available historical data and calculating the future values.15 The projection is shown by a gray line in Figure 3.3. We calculated the two branch scenarios as one standard deviation above and below the baseline projection; they are shown by a red and blue line, respectively. 15 The exponential trend line fit to the data has the equation: y = 0.3098e-0.012x. The trend line has a high degree of fit with the data, with an R² of 0.85. 52 Figure 3.3. Percentage of States with Discriminated Minorities SOURCE: Historical data: Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data set,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, 2009, pp. 316–337; projections calculated by authors. Discontinuous change in this variable may occur as a result of several factors. Historically, ethnic and sectarian factors often have increased in relevance after the breakup of larger states and empires, including the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, or the end of colonialism in the 1960s. The breakup of other large, multiethnic states in the future could result in a similar outcome. Extremely high levels of resource stress because of population pressures also could prompt increased ethnically based conflict within states. Ethnic and sectarian polarization and grievances are latent in many societies, and may become politically important in order to mobilize groups to violence under conditions of severe resource or economic privation. Rate of Economic Growth Economic growth affects the prevalence of conflict in several ways. While territorial expansion traditionally has been a major cause of interstate war, states with higher levels of economic development may be less motivated to pursue such expansion because of the lower relative value of land inputs in an industrialized economy. Moreover, their reliance on international capital markets may increase the potential costs of disruptions from serious 53 international crises.16 At the intrastate level, economic growth (if broadly shared) reduces grievances, bolsters the capacity of the state to handle security challenges, and increases the population’s opportunities for licit employment, thus raising the opportunity costs of participating in rebellions or insurgencies.17 Growth benefits that accrue along ethnic or sectarian lines, however, might increase the potential for intrastate conflict, as discussed in the previous section, and sharp declines in the rate of economic growth could be associated with an increased risk of internal conflict as well.18 Therefore, there are at least two different concepts that any operationalization of this factor should attempt to capture: the overall level of economic development and changes in the rate of economic growth. Over the short term, wealthy countries tend to remain wealthy and poor countries tend to remain poor, and their degree of wealth may have a strong effect on their overall likelihood of being involved in conflict. In addition, sharp declines in the rate of growth for a range of states may increase their likelihood of intrastate conflict in particular.

#### Litany of alt causes now.

Politico 21 (Where Europe and the US don’t see eye to eye, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-us-trade-coronavirus-vaccines-data-china-russia-artificial-intelligence-farming-carbon/)

With eight days of glad-handing, photo ops and fanfare, Joe Biden and his team are hoping his trip to Europe will reboot transatlantic relations. That won’t be easy. Even though Biden’s election might have swung Washington’s needle closer to the EU playbook, the U.S. and Europe remain split on many policy issues key in Brussels and EU capitals. The two sides are at odds on everything from lingering Trump-era trade tariffs to taxing America’s tech giants to making farming more environmentally sustainable. Here’s POLITICO’s rundown of the policy disputes that could prove problematic. 1. The tariff trade warThe new president has left much of Donald Trump’s trade policy untouched, including tariffs on steel and a blockade of the World Trade Organization’s court system. Biden’s drive for a “Buy American” policy, favoring U.S. companies in major public tenders, is one of the reasons Brussels is preparing a new legal tool to ensure reciprocity in big public contracts. After dithering for almost a decade, the EU is finally moving on plans to bolster the EU’s industrial champions that could be harmful for U.S. companies. Brussels and Washington have agreed to call temporary tariff truces on both steel and aluminum duties and Airbus-Boeing tariffs. But resolving these long-standing trade disputes will be the true test for the renewed transatlantic love declarations. 2. Waiving vaccine patentsIntellectual property rights are likely off the agenda after the U.S. threw the EU under the bus in May. Washington’s about-turn to support a waiver on patent protections for coronavirus vaccines blindsided many and left the EU scrambling to defend its continued opposition to a similar waiver proposal at the WTO. The aim of Washington’s plan? To allow wider production of coronavirus vaccines, unhindered by patent protections. The EU argues it won’t work, and that factors such as manufacturing are the limiting factor. But there are cracks in EU solidarity, with Italy and Belgium indicating support for a waiver. Officially, the EU is standing firm as one of the few WTO participants delaying detailed discussions on the proposal. On Friday, it presented a counter-proposal that sidesteps calls for a waiver in favor of clarifying existing provisions that allow countries to force individual vaccine makers to share patents during health emergencies. 3. Transferring everyone’s dataIt’s been almost a year since the EU’s top court annulled a data flows deal with the U.S. called Privacy Shield due to fears of American surveillance practices. It’s the second time Europe’s top judges have killed such an agreement, and the pressure is mounting to get it right this time. Brussels and Washington don’t see eye-to-eye on how to fix the agreement so that it meets Europe’s high privacy standards, but Biden is keen to use this trip to push for a high-level political agreement with Commission boss Ursula von der Leyen. The goal is to lay the groundwork for a new transatlantic data transfer deal. The stakes are high. Privacy Shield underpinned billions of dollars in EU-U.S. digital trade, and companies on both sides of the Atlantic have been pushing hard for a replacement agreement for almost a year. Political deal or not, major hurdles remain over possible limits on how U.S. national security agencies can access EU citizens’ data. 4. Trade with China Nobody mention the China deal. The EU in December struck an investment deal with Beijing, handing a big reputational win to China just as it dismantled freedoms in Hong Kong, locked up hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs without trial and withheld crucial information on the origins of the coronavirus outbreak. The timing of the deal was more than awkward for the Biden administration, which was not yet sworn in but broke its silence to warn the EU about its Sino embrace. The deal is now on ice amid objections from the European Parliament. But that doesn’t mean Washington and Brussels are on the same page when it comes to trade with their common rival. While the U.S. has banned imports of products from the Xinjiang region over slave-labor concerns, the EU has no such restrictions. The U.S. also continues to block reforms to the World Trade Organization that the EU sees as key to tackling Beijing’s state-capitalism model. Pharmaceutical companies are heavily reliant on U.S. sales to keep the industry healthy | George Frey/Getty Images 5. The cost of drugsThe U.S. has frequently complained that Europe pays too little for drugs, leaving pharmaceutical companies heavily reliant on U.S. sales to keep the industry healthy. With the U.S. pharma lobby having the ear of lawmakers, companies have remained sheltered from any effort to standardize drug pricing negotiations on the basis of how much added value new treatments actually provide. So-called health technology assessments have been commonplace in Europe for over two decades and are credited with preventing drug prices from spiraling and keeping health systems affordable. Biden has promised to tackle drug prices, and progressive Democrats have drafted a bill that would give the federal government the power to negotiate prices over insurance companies — but it’s already facing opposition from the president’s party. A group of House Democrats wants to see more moderate reforms that would preserve America’s “invaluable innovation ecosystem.” The divide could provide drugmakers with their escape from a bill considered by the industry as a worst-case scenario for U.S. drug pricing, and continue to drive a wedge between transatlantic allies. 6. Taxing Big Tech There’s less than a month to go before negotiators are expected to reach a global deal to revamp the world’s tax regime. After the Biden administration unveiled new proposals — targeting the world’s top 100 companies, and not just Silicon Valley’s biggest names — the mood music changed on getting a deal over the line. Europeans, particularly France, are eager to include all the Big Tech companies, and are willing to reach a compromise with the U.S. on which other companies should also be included in the revamp. But nothing is certain. U.S. officials released — and quickly postponed — billions of dollars’ worth of retaliatory tariffs on countries, including many in Europe, that had imposed their own national digital services taxes. Those domestic regimes are still in place until a global deal is done. The European Commission is also about to release its own digital levy that could complicate the final days of negotiations. U.S. lawmakers’ eyes are so fixed on international negotiations for a multinational corporate tax that most have overlooked the digital tax that EU policymakers will separately propose. Brussels insists the EU initiative, expected in July, is no big deal. But among those who have noticed it stateside, there’s concern it could upend a global compromise. The EU wants to create a global golden standard for safe AI, but the U.S. is unlikely to swallow a rulebook drafted in Brussels | David McNew/AFP via Getty Images 7. Getting ahead of artificial intelligence Europe has been courting the Biden administration since last year when it comes to agreeing on controls on artificial intelligence, but the silence from Washington is starting to get awkward. The EU wants to create a global golden standard for safe AI. But the U.S., which is home to the world’s biggest AI companies, is unlikely to swallow a global rulebook drafted in Brussels. According to the Commission’s top digital Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, the EU-U.S. summit will kick start a transatlantic initiative meant to boost tech cooperation, dubbed the Trade and Technology Council. But an “AI Accord,” pitched by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in December, has yet to elicit an official response from Washington. There is increasing anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic over what AI technologies can do in the hands of authoritarian states such as China, and the U.S. and EU agree that technologies should be developed based on democratic values. But what that means in practice is unclear. In April, the European Commission proposed the world’s first AI law, to regulate AI uses most likely to harm people. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains loath to regulate its tech giants.

#### US/EU divergences aren’t attributable to the CWS.

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A comparison of U.S. and EU competition enforcement illustrates how enforcers can reach different outcomes even when they share a commitment to the CW standard, over which there is broad convergence in merger and coordinated conduct cases (Kovacic 2008). In Microsoft/LinkedIn, for example, the European Commission was concerned about the risks of post-merger marginalization of competing professional social networks that offered “a greater degree of privacy protection to users than LinkedIn” and held that the merger would cause “harm to consumers” and “restrict consumer choice”. And in other cases involving digital platforms, European competition agencies have objected to MFN clauses that are used by online travel agents in contracts with hotels on the ground that they foreclose competitive entry and/or expansion and inflict net losses to consumers.

U.S. enforcers reached different conclusions in these matters because they made different assessments of the effect of the conduct on consumer welfare. The more cautious U.S. approach appears to reflect a greater aversion to the risk of Type 1 errors.

The differences are not attributable to the CW standard in U.S. antitrust law because the European agencies rely generally on the same standard. In fact, the EU statutory provision on anticompetitive unilateral conduct is almost entirely phrased in terms that are closely related to the CW standard (Joliet 1970). The differences between EU and US enforcement reflect different factual judgments within the CW standard about such matters as the likelihood of future harm and the likely efficiencies from the conduct at issue and different normative judgments about the relative importance of Type 1 and Type 2 errors or preference for total welfare or trading partner welfare (Blair and Sokol 2013).

Differences in decisional outcomes under the CW standard might also be attributable in part to institutional and procedural differences. In the EU, agency decisions are self-enforcing, presumptively lawful and subject to a Chevron-type judicial deference standard; and defendants are not permitted to take discovery from third parties or to cross-examine adverse witnesses. In the US, by contrast, most antitrust cases are litigated in independent tribunals; all are subject to review by courts that decide questions of law de novo; and defendants are permitted to take discovery from third parties and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. In these respects, US law is more defendant-friendly, and EU law is more likely to entail false positives. Again, however, these differences have nothing to do with the CW standard.